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APPENDIX D(6)
ABWEHR LI AND MIL AMT D OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

The following codewords have also been remembered by PETERS but he claims to have completely forgotten details of the operation, as have also GAMBE and RAUPACH:-

APOLLO, LJUBA, NINA, GELERAND, KAEFER, KALLUECKENJAGD,
ACHZEHENDER, ZWANZIGENDER, GRUENERWALD, RAUCHSCHWALBE, MINERVA,
KAUKASIER, BASIA, STASYS, PAUL, ADLER, VESUV.

Extrad 5
SF 52/4/4 (93)
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APPENDIX D (7)

The Streifkorps Organisation and Einheit Schill

1. A Streifkorps is a group consisting of volunteers, officers and men (usually about 10/40 men, although it could be as low as 3), normally led by German officers and N.C.Os. These groups were armed with light automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons and explosives. W/T also formed part of its equipment. The job of a Streifkorps was to report on and molest the advancing enemy behind their lines, and also (in theory) to harry the lines of communication of a retreating enemy. In contrast to the normal reconnaissance troops, Engineer and tank-destroying units, the Streifkorps were expected to remain a considerable length of time behind the enemy lines. The organisation of each particular group depended on the type of operation that was to be carried out, e.g. F.S. Einsatz, Schl. Einsatz, or Ue Einsatz. (See Appendix D(6)).

2. GAMBEKE first came across the idea of the Streifkorps in the Summer of 1944, in connection with the foundation of the SS Jagdverbaende. In place of the words "Unternehmen" or "Sonderunternehmen", a term was found which suited the nature of the operation; hence "Streifkorps". The first part of the word (Streif) explains the nature of the activities of the unit, namely, "streifen" in the hunting sense (i.e. ranging or scouting), while the latter part of the word is used in much the same way as in e.g. "Freikorps". The Jagdverbaende avoided using the term "Kommando", which had been so frequently borrowed from the English. It was SKORZENY's idea to use large German forces or at least forces with German leaders for operations behind the enemy lines.

3. In Autumn 1944, the OKH Command, as distinct from the SS, decided to form Streifkorps units also, and the II Kommandos were given the job of organising these groups. They became responsible for training and equipment, and for supplying W/T contact and reinforcements. The details of the particular task to be carried out came principally from the Ic of the Army Group. The FATs themselves did not play any part.

Therefore, from October 1944, for all practical purposes, the Streifkorps were mainly OKH units although Streifkorps of the SS were used by the Jagdverbaende, but the latter had no organised connection with the OKH Streifkorps. SKORZENY at first opposed the setting-up of these units by the OKH as he saw in them a slight on his own competence. As they were subordinated to the Army groups, he had no direct control over them.

The first training place to be set up under OKH orders was founded by the then Heeresgruppe "A" under the auspices of FAK 202 as "Unternehmen" or "Einheit" SCHILL.

4. Streifkorpschule Einheit SCHILL.

The idea of sending German officers to the active units of the Anti-Bolshevist resistance movements in the rear of the Red Army in order to have some influence on the strategical decisions made by these groups was continually discussed during the Summer of 1944 by the Ic ~~Oberstleutnant STEPHANUS~~ of the Army Group Nordukraine (later called "A"). The first practical realisation of this idea was an operation undertaken by Hauptmann KIRN, leader of FAK 202.

See M

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The Streifkorps Organisation and Einheit Schill (Contd.)

At the beginning of October 1944, he crossed over the line north of Ungvar together with another officer, three N.C.Os, and four men, and carried out harassing activities in the Lemberg neighbourhood. After six weeks, he was picked up by a JU 52 from an improvised landing place.

On the orders of STEPHANUS the Einheit SCHILL was then set up by FAK 202. Its first location was 15 Km. South-West of Krakow, and during the German retreat, it moved along the line Krakow-Beuthen-Glatzer-Bergland. Its leader was a Leutnant LOEWEN @ MORITZ, who had already been on a F.S. Einsatz as an N.C.O. in the Caucasus. All divisions in the Army Group were ordered to contribute recruits.

The school was strongly backed up by the Army Group. The number of volunteers were relatively large (at least 150 from each Army) and men were supposed to be chosen for their courage, endurance, and general resourcefulness. However, the material that arrived to be trained at the school was not very impressive. The training included instruction in all kinds of guerilla warfare, engineering, and W/T.

In January and February 1945, at least 15 groups (i.e. Streifkorps units) were despatched from this school into Soviet-occupied territory, namely, to the right of the Oder in the Silesian area. The groups consisted in this instance of approximately 10 men each. The missions were in the main successful, although a great many casualties were suffered, generally on account of frostbite. After they had carried out their battle mission, the Streifkorps had to try and slip back to their own lines. During the first stage of the retreat to the Oder line, this was in most cases possible. Both RAUPACH and GAMBKE are unable to remember details of individual successes, but are agreed that in the first stage, the value of the successes compared favourably with the casualties that were suffered. Some of the men who returned were made a fuss of by General Oberst SCHOERNER and decorated. GAMBKE states that some groups were reported to have gone over to the Russians. RAUPACH claims that at the time of the German collapse, one Streifkorps was still in the Ukrainian Settlement Area (Maszyna district). Groups were not, apparently, left behind in the Polish area.

RAUPACH states that in general, the Streifkorps obtained no help from the German population in Upper Silesia. In fact, they were threatened with denunciation for fear of terrorist retaliatory measures being taken by the Red Army.

5. Although, in October 1944, all Army Groups in the East had been ordered to set up Streifkorps schools, the Einheit SCHILL was, until January 1945, the only organisation of this type that had in fact been instituted. However, in February 1945, Kommando 204 set up a Streifkorps. No details are remembered beyond the fact that it was composed of Polish and Russian groups taken from the Kommando's P.O.W. camps under German leaders. This FAK also withdrew about 200 men from the Front Line units in February 1945, and started to train them for Streifkorps work. This was in conjunction with the Second Army HQ. and under the auspices of Hauptmann THOMSEN. However, when the Red Army approached Danzig, the unit was transferred for Infantry use.

Kommando 203 set up a Streifkorpschule in Brandenburg in February 1945 under a Hauptmann SCHLEGEL. Officers and men were taken from the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst and were given training. No further details are remembered.

APPENDIX D (7)The Streifkorps Organisation and Einheit Schill (Contd.)

6. The Streifkorps groups were given instruction in "S Work" and "K Work": the meaning of these terms will be found in Appendix D (6). A Kampftrupp (or to be exact a K-Zug) was generally attached to a FAT. It consisted of volunteers who had been directed by the Ic of the Army to which the FAT was attached for such shock-troop operations behind the enemy lines. It was either drawn up specially for each occasion or (as in the case of the FEEL operation) built up on a permanent basis for a long-term operation or series of operations. The term K-Trupp dates back to the time when the II Verbaende were working with Russian volunteers and each FAT ran several K-Trupps. The construction of sabotage bunkers is an example of the type of work they were given.


7. According to GAMBE and RAUPACH the Streifkorps, as such, had no connection with the Brandenburg Division. They consider it possible that this Division established units of a similar nature but are unable to give any information on the subject.

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APPENDIX D (8).

~~WIRTSCHAFTSSCHULE SIED.~~ (WS).

1. General.

The purpose of the WS was intended to be the aiding of active anti-Bolshevists of Russian nationality in diversionary tactics right back in the rear of the Russian Army. The decision was made by Kommando 202 in August 1943, but on account of the retreat, organized activity was only possible in May 1944. At that time, the school was stationed at Landskron, 35 km. south of Kracow; in the autumn it transferred to a village 7 miles north of Jaegerndorf (formerly Sudetengeu-Ost (East Sudetenland).)

2. Personnel.

The German in command was Lieutenant RAUPACH; the Russian leader was Oberstleutnant KUSNETOFF (a former Soviet Squadron-Leader (Geschwader-kommandeur). From October 1944, KUSNETOFF was in sole command. His assistants were: ~~Uffz. W. HORSCH~~ (cover name MANZ) as instructor; ~~Uffz. SIGL~~ as book-keeper; ~~A. NITKIN~~ as instructor; and some German technical assistants.

3. Training.

The purpose of the school - diversionary tactics against the enemy - was to be achieved by means which the Russian members themselves considered suitable. No particular theory was followed, but individuals and groups were trained according to their own particular needs. By exercising a personal influence on contacts in influential civilian or military positions, their activities were able to extend to actual guerilla warfare in the forest area near Briansk. On the German side, help was given through discussion, technical aids in training, transport, and excursions with the aim of showing them German social life (in the country, in particular, as an antidote to collectivism).

In May 1944, the course started with about 15 Russians, generally youngish people, of whom half were officers. The Russians built up around them, according to sympathy or origin, small groups with which they were later to go out on mission. Besides training in political subjects (economic and political conditions in Mid and West Europe) through German instructors, the Russian instructors discussed the problem of Bolshevism, excursions were made to industrial and agricultural centres in Upper Silesia, and to theatres and cinemas in Kracow; there were rambles of several days' duration in the Tetra mountains and practice was given in map-reading. In the preliminary course, no instruction was given in the use of weapons or W/T. The second course (from November) included the use of weapons and explosives, the miniature printing-press and the falsifying of documents, having regard to the actual requirements of the National-solidaristen (a Russian reactionary group). A W/T operator went through a different course of training. Sixteen people followed the second course, including some girls who, according to RAUPACH "were the real spiritual leaders of these Russians".

4. Operations.

In August 1943 in Saporoshe: a political officer, Major

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APPENDIX D(8)
Wirtschaftsschule Sued (WS) (Contd.)


~~POLITERIK~~ ^H set out on a mission to gain information regarding the possibilities for political activity. He did not return. ^{See Mr}

At the beginning of July 1944, a Fliegermajor set out from Kracow, on an expedition on foot through the front line, for the purposes of political agitation.

In mid-August 1944, three Fliegeroffiziere were despatched by aircraft in the neighbourhood of Briansk. Their mission was to create political agitation and to persuade further sinmen to come over to the German side.

At the end of October, 1944, a group of 7 men and 1 woman set out from Kracow by aircraft, for the forest area of Obere Djesna (Upper Djesna), for the purpose of getting into contact with Kommando 203's Gruppe WOLF - setting up of NationalSolidarist cells directed against Moscow. They were supplied with W/T apparatus. No reinforcements were flown to them.

The course of the war rendered further operations impossible, and the hoped-for liaison with the Warsaw movement could no longer be carried out.



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 Appendices

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APPENDIX D(9)

X TECHNISCHE BAUKOMPANIE 5 (TB)

1. General

This organisation was set up by Kommando 202 in the summer of 1942. It was first stationed at Poltava; later locations were Kiev, Andrejewka (near Saporoshe), Winniza, Lemberg, Seitendorf (near Troppau).

2. Personnel

A The leader was Hauptmann LUHM^{NT}, assisted by Sonderfuehrer NIEBUHR^{NT}, and the Russian Oberleutnants KUSNETZOFF^{NT} and KWATERNIK^{MLT} (the latter is a cover name). From August 1943 Hauptmann BAUM^{NT} took over the leadership and at the same time NIEBUHR, KUSNETZOFF and KWATERNIK were withdrawn for use elsewhere. Hauptmann BAUM had only N.C.O.s as assistants, (Feldwebel KONDLER^{NT}, Uffz. WIEMERS^{MLT} and some Russian and Ukrainian instructors).

3. Training

The TB trained V-Leute in the use of explosives and incendiary bombs against the enemy's rear communications. At the command of the Ic of the Army Group it was supposed to have been provided with an aircraft, but as no individual machine could be spared for this purpose, the TB was helped out by the Air Force as the occasion arose and provided in the main with transport aircraft (Ju.52). Since aircraft and equipment were not available in sufficient quantities for this purpose, the V-Leute had to wait a very long time before setting out on mission.

The chief difficulties were overcoming this period of inaction and the problem of keeping the V-Leute occupied. Another problem was that of providing some form of work for the V-Leute on their return, though there were some V-Leute who volunteered for a mission twice, or even more.

The training was very simple, for the trainees were generally of a simple working-class type, and was limited to blowing up railway tracks. Attacks against more complicated objectives, such as the water-pump of railways, was continually under consideration, but such a project would require a permanent partisan organisation of the kind set up by the Soviets, and naturally one single school could not make such an arrangement. So the TB stuck to individual attacks by individual V-Leute. Things changed when the Soviets entered the West Ukrainian area, but even then Ukrainian nationals at the Wirttschaftsschule Sued were only rarely organised into groups.

No W/T training was given, and W/T sets were not supplied. The V-Man was ordered to return after he had carried out his mission. As a general rule this was done by the man in question joining the Red Army as a straggler and then slipping over to the German lines again. When the V-Man asked for his reward he was given a civilian outfit and a civilian job, either in Germany or in Occupied Territory, according to his wish.

4. Results achieved.

It is difficult to say anything about the results achieved, as there was no means of checking through a network of agents in the enemy-

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APPENDIX D(9)
TECHNISCHE BAUKOMPANIE 5 (TB) Ctd.

occupied area (the only reliable method); photographs by air reconnaissance could only be obtained in rare instances, and then it was generally by pure chance, so that as a rule the TB had to rely on the statements of the V-Leute who returned (the percentage of V-Leute who returned was about 14). Even with careful checking it was not possible to determine the reliability of these statements with certainty. This was because it was only in very rare instances that the V-Man possessed the courage, or had the opportunity, to wait to see the results of his activities.

So far as RAUPACH can remember, aerial photographs confirmed the following successes:-

Explosions on the Astrachan/Derwent Line; 1942.
The blowing-up of bridges and railway stations
in the area of the Don; 1943.

Proof that the Soviets found the activities of the TB very disturbing was contained in an intercepted wireless message at the beginning of January 1945, to the effect that they had sent out roving bands to kill off the personnel.

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APPENDIX D (10)Recruitment for TB and WS

WIRTSCHAFTSCHULE SUEB

Technische Bankompagnie

1. For the TB and the WS there were various ways of getting recruits. Until the end of 1942 recruitment generally was from the prisoner-of-war camps near the front. For this purpose Russian V-Leute were put into the large camps to act as talent scouts and to look out for suitable volunteers. Since the TB used simple folk as a general rule, whose motives for volunteering were not particularly complicated, this system generally could be adhered to.

2. With the commencement of the German retreat, it became necessary to check more carefully the reasons given by the recruits for volunteering. For this purpose we had to turn back to the permanent and well-organised collective camps of volunteers within the Reich itself. In the course of time the various Dienststellen had set up camps of this type; for example, Ast-Breslau's Kreuzberg Camp, and Ast-Muenster's Camp for Ukrainians which gave exceptionally good political instruction. The general authority for the selection of the volunteers was the "Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain" (Kirchhain Labour Exchange) under Sonderfuehrer NIEBUHR. The representatives of the schools then went to Kirchhain to select volunteers for themselves.

3. The WS was able to fall back on the recruiting activities of the Nationalsolidaristen, but in this respect, on account of the mistrust the S.D. held for this group, obstacles rose which were difficult to overcome.

4. Recruitment among Ukrainians, Balts and White Russians (White Ruthenians) was exceptionally easy since, from the very beginning of the German retreat, these reported in such numbers that there were not sufficient technical supplies for the training of these people and their despatch on mission.

5. The type of people who offered their services were those who, for personal or political reasons, were opponents of Bolshevism, mostly those whose relations had been executed, or sent to Siberia. Many of them also wished, above everything else, to get out of the prisoner-of-war camp. On account of the necessity for secrecy, details of the work which would later be required of them were not made known until they arrived at Kirchhain, or later at their training camp. It was here that they decided whether they wished to be used for S-Work or K-Work.

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APPENDIX D (11)

Canastid.
WALLI (X ref)
to FAK, SF 52 (71/P)

X The Dienststelle Walli

1. The Dienststelle Walli was founded in 1941 prior to the attack on Russia, and acted as an advanced command post of Admiral CANARIS' Amt Ausland Abwehr, i.e., it was an Aussenstelle of the Berlin Zentrale. It was intended mainly as a supply depot. For I and III it remained an administrative centre while Walli II was never more than a supply depot for transport, munitions and special equipment.
2. Nachschubdienststelle Walli II was set up in the neighbourhood of Warsaw (as far as can be remembered, in Sulejow). What remained of it was transferred during 1944 to the Posen area and finally to Meissen. It was finally disbanded during the summer of 1944.
3. Walli II was commanded by a Major SEELIGER up to the end of 1943 and he was succeeded by Lieutenant STRAUSS who remained until the organisation was disbanded.

Other personnel were:-

- X Oberstleutnant ARNOLD
- X Oberleutnant MULLER
- Hauptmann LEIBENDECKER

4. RAUPACH states that the Head of Walli I was a certain Oberstleutnant BAUN and both RAUPACH and GAMBKE think that III was run by a certain Oberstleutnant SCHMALSCHLAGER. The Leitstellen I and III Ost were formed from Walli I and III.

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APPENDIX D (12)

X Einheit Bergmann MT

1. Einheit Bergmann, composed of Caucasian and Georgian volunteers, was set up under Hptm. OBERLAENDER (other personnel: the brothers Lts. Ehrenfried and Martin SCHUETTE) in 1941 in Poltava, with the purpose of founding an autonomous state in the Caucasus, with this unit as a nucleus. MT

2. In January or February 1942, the unit which then consisted of about 400 men, was in its final stages of completion. It was withdrawn for training to the Bavarian mountains where it was placed under the direct control of Abw. II and later, probably in the summer of the same year, under command of the Freiwilligen Verbaende, which had recently been created.

3. Einheit Bergmann was then employed as fighting troops in the front line in the Terek region. It withdrew with the Army, still fighting as ordinary troops, to the Crimea in December 1942. There, it was given the task of eliminating Partisans working for the Russians on the South East coast. When the Russians were threatening the Crimea, the unit was sent up to participate in the Perekop Peninsula fighting, where it suffered heavy casualties, but was mentioned for valour in the Army communique.

4. By 1943 its strength had increased to 1,000 men. In the Summer, however, Hptm. OBERLAENDER was relieved of his command for political reasons and sent to Prague. His successor is unknown to GAMBKE and RAUPACH.

5. After the evacuation of the Crimea, the unit was sent to Roumania. RAUPACH claims to know nothing more of its movements as the information he has given was obtained from OBERLAENDER, who was a friend of his. GAMBKE, however, thinks he remembers hearing that the unit was transferred to Greece in the Summer or Autumn of 1944.

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APPENDIX D (13)The Werewolf Organisation

1. RAUPACH states that in the spring of 1944, PRUETZMANN, who subsequently became the Head of the Werewolf Organisation, suggested to Gruppenfuehrer BERGER (deputy to HIMMLER) that an organisation of this nature should be set up in the rear areas as far back as the Oder line. BERGER apparently greeted this defeatist suggestion by demanding if PRUETZMANN wanted to lose his head.

However, in the summer of 1944, the organisation was in fact created by an order issued by the Reichsfuehrer S.S. for the formation of a German resistance movement in the areas occupied by the enemy and its extension through the greater part of the Reich as a propaganda weapon.

It was at this time that GAMBKE first heard of a Sonderzug (special train) which served as quarters for the Command H.Q. of an organisation 'W'. The purpose, as also the location, of the special train was at first kept extraordinarily secret, as the authorities were fearful of its effect on German morale.

2. The 'Sonderstab PRUETZMANN' (PRUETZMANN's special service), or as it was later called 'Der Generalinspekteur fuer Spezialabwehr', was comprised of a very small staff and they worked in the special train described above. (This was located near Berlin.)

In January 1945 several liaison officers were attached to this Headquarters; they kept in contact with the Army Stellen and the Frontline commands. The branch offices (Aussenstellen) worked in conjunction with the Bds (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei) and with Party and S.A. Stellen.

3. Personnel were as follows:-

In command at Headquarters: Obergruppenfuehrer PRUETZMANN
Standartenfuehrer TSCHIRSCHKY as Chief of Staff (formerly attached to Amt VI as Gruppenleiter VIc).
S.A.-Brigadefuehrer SIEBEL (in charge of training).
Sturmbannfuehrer EHRHARDT (in charge of the working out of regulations - Bearbeiter der Vorschriften.)

The H.Q. staff remained comparatively small, and was only enlarged in December 1944/January 1945.

In command of Aussenstellen: East Prussia: Standartenfuehrer BOEHME
Sturmbannfuehrer SCHMITZ
Silesia: Obersturmbannfuehrer MUELLER-ALTENAU
Stettin: S.A. Standartenfuehrer HILLER

4. Mil D and the Werewolf Organisation

(a) East Prussia

In approximately July 1944, as a result of an order issued by Major NAUMANN, GAMBKE had to proceed to East Prussia for the purpose of getting into contact in Koenigsberg with the Headquarters for Werewolf preparations which had there been established. The order for Referat Ost to participate in the work in East Prussia emanated from Brigadefuehrer SCHELLENBERG.

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APPENDIX D (13)The Werewolf Organisation (Contd.)

As a result of GAMBKE's trip to Koenigsberg, it was agreed that Mil. D's participation was to be as follows:-

- (i) The delivery of weapons, sabotage material and other munitions.
- (ii) Provision, through Mil.D, of a sabotage instructor. A certain Hptm. KUTSCHKE was appointed, but after a week (this was in July or August 1944) he came back from Koenigsberg because there were no training facilities available.
- (iii) The transfer of an Abwehr Kommando to Koenigsberg to help out with the work. Kommando 212 was chosen for this purpose. As this Kommando did not suit the Koenigsberg Zentrale, the order was rescinded almost as soon as it had been given and the Kommando was transferred to Silesia, having made no contact with the Werewolf Organisation.

The organisation in East Prussia was in the hands of Sturmbannfuehrer SCHMITZ, who was attached to the Bds (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei) for Koenigsberg, Standartenfuehrer BOEHME. The organisational side at the beginning consisted of a few (perhaps five) SS-Fuehrer. Towards the end of 1944, SCHMITZ was removed, for unknown reasons. His success or fell into the hands of the Soviet Army (it is believed in January 1945). That was the fate of the East Prussian organisation.

The nature of Werewolf work, as was shown in the Koenigsberg conversations, was not clearly defined. SCHMITZ had been given no indications whatever from PRUETZMANN's office. Those who were working on the matter in East Prussia had an idea it should be some kind of partisan warfare, but only of the type used exclusively in wooded or unpopulated areas (i.e. as in certain parts of the Balkans and Soviet-occupied territory).

GAMBKE states that the result of these practical experiences and the insistence on theoretical principles rather than on practical plans in the mid-European theatre doomed the undertaking to disaster from the very first. The Werewolf agents were taken from among the ranks of the Party, as SCHMITZ believed he could only work with 'reliable' people. (Naturally, he chose only Party Members of long standing.)

(b) Silesia

In the late summer of 1944, Kommando 212 was despatched to the Silesian area to take preparatory measures against the possibility of a retreat by Army Group A-11. The work of the Kommando consisted in the preparation of sabotage caches in the Upper Silesian area ('Sixtus' and 'Wachholder' operations).

In order to prevent a clash between Mil.D. activities and Werewolf work in Silesia, Major NAUMANN had a conference, some time in August 1944, with Obergruppenfuehrer PRUETZMANN, head of the whole Werewolf organisation. It was then agreed that PRUETZMANN should confine his preparatory measures to the frontier districts and thereafter to comparatively small strips of territory, (i.e. East Prussia, Burgenland, Suedkaernten). He was thinking of putting the organisation into operation in the case of a temporary yielding of territory. The organisation he had prepared was of a very improvised nature. In no case was there sufficient forces - (not to speak of equipment) - to guarantee preparations on a satisfactory scale.

This conference showed that PRUETZMANN had had no thought whatever

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APPENDIX D (13)
The Werewolf Organisation (Contd.)

of the Werewolf organisation making preparations in Silesia or Upper Silesia. He was of the opinion - and it was an opinion that would have cost him his life, had it become known - that if the enemy took Upper Silesia, then the war would be lost. He considered that:-

- (i) The war and the Werewolf operations should only be carried on so long as there was any sense in doing so. When the industrial area of Eastern Germany was lost, then there was no point in carrying on either the war or the Werewolf resistance any longer.
- (ii) The Werewolf was an organisation which could only work in conjunction with operational measures undertaken by an Army which was still intact. It was not an organisation applicable to a resistance movement at a time when Germany was totally occupied. For this reason, preparations were confined solely to the frontier provinces (East Prussia, Upper Silesia and Burgenland).

5. After January 1945

After the great offensive by the Soviet Army in January 1945, during which the Oder Line was reached in a very short time and crossed in some parts, the tasks of the PRUETZMANN organisation were extended, on the order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, to Pomerania, Saxony and the Sudeten area.

In regard to the Mil.D. area of interest in the East, so as to prevent friction among the Aussenstellen, the names (location and commander) of the FAKs and Trupps were reported to PRUETZMANN's representative (Brigadefuehrer SIEBEL) and he passed this information on to the corresponding Werewolf representative. In this connection the names of Obersturmbannfuehrer MUELLER-ALTENAU and SA-Standartenfuehrer (?) HILLER were mentioned for Silesia and Stettin respectively.

The II-Frontaufklaerung was directed to get into touch and co-operate with the leaders of Werewolf in the Eastern frontier provinces.

The collapse of the Intelligence system (in the technical sense) during the last months of the war in Europe allowed GAMBKE no opportunity of checking up on the extent to which this co-operation was successful. In Silesia, the work instituted by Kommando 212 and Trupp 206 in the Glatzer area (ordered by SCHOERNER's Army Group 'A') was handed over to MUELLER-ALTENAU.

MUELLER-ALTENAU had been before 1933 a camouflaged SD Fuehrer and according to RAUPACH was a cunning, dangerous and unprincipled man, who 'had on his conscience the events of June 1934'. He had latterly been Volkspolitischer Referent under Gauleiter HENLEIN. He did not remain in Silesia, having managed to get out at the right time.

6. General comments on the Organisation

As will be seen from the PRUETZMANN/NAUMANN conference, the Werewolf organisation was envisaged purely for the frontier areas. Work of that type within the Reich itself would not have been possible as it would have been interpreted by the responsible Leaders as defeatism. Moreover, at one time (i.e. late summer 1944) preparations for Werewolf work would have upset the morale of the people, who as a result of propaganda were still optimistic.

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APPENDIX D (13)

The Werewolf Organisation (Contd.)

The technical equipment of the Werewolf organisation was much too meagre. It was a central station which, for better or worse, the Aussenstellen of the B&S were working. There were not sufficient assistants.

The Werewolf organisation was called into being at a time when motor fuel, as well as the motors themselves, were lacking. At this time also, it was no longer possible to set up a new organisation, both from the point of view of man-power and equipment.

In the summer of 1944 it had become extraordinarily difficult to supply East Prussia with munitions and explosives. The difficulties were even greater as far as the terrain itself was concerned, so that even the most primitive basis for Werewolf work was lacking. In regard to reinforcements, the Werewolf organisation was directed to get help from other organisations, such as SS and Wehrmacht stations. At that time everything was in short supply.

Preparations for the organisation in East Prussia were started much too late. The Soviet Army was already at the gates. The countryside was overrun with refugees and reinforcement units of the Wehrmacht. It was almost impossible in those conditions for a camouflaged movement to be prepared in secret. In the other Eastern provinces, too, preparations were started much too late - January 1945 - for any really secret and well-camouflaged organisation to operate.

According to GAMBKE, as a result of the vigorous combing out of man-power for the fighting fronts, the supply available was very thin. Nothing, he says, can be accomplished with women, children and old men. It was only during 1942 that the Soviets had any successes in partisan warfare, i.e. when they had managed to send back into occupied territory sufficient numbers of young fighters. These were young people who had been very carefully chosen and had moral support from the unoccupied area.

GAMBKE sums the position up as follows:- 'In my opinion there was no co-ordinated Werewolf organisation throughout the whole Reich territory. A resistance movement in the whole Reich territory could only be run from outside. But what foreign power would allow this? Although I have no knowledge of Werewolf successes within the Reich, by reason of the knowledge I have of the preparations made for this organisation, I can state the following: with the exception of some scattered actions of a wild and desperate character, no co-ordinated Werewolf work can ever be carried out in any part of the Reich. The fall of National Socialism, which had been the supporter of the Werewolf idea, is absolute. That is, there is no hope that the supporters of this idea will ever be able to come into power again. Therefore, they have no interest in carrying on illegal activities of the Werewolf type. This is all the more so since, up till the time of the destruction of Hitlerite Germany, the Werewolf has run as an exceptionally secret organisation, rather like the V-weapons. This has served to alarm the Allies unnecessarily and has unnecessarily increased the sufferings of the German people.

A people as a whole cannot go under ⁱⁿ the Nibelungen sense, as was required by National Socialism. The Werewolf idea will be regarded as the final crazy notion of a leading clique heading for madness. The people themselves have a good desire to go on living, and will therefore oppose the Werewolf idea and prevent its ever coming to life again, because they consider it would only serve to bring about their complete destruction.

Action already taken

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APPENDIX D(14)

BRANDENBURG DIVISION AND S.S. JAGDVERBAENDE

1. Relations with Abwehr II and Mil Amt D

This division was subordinate to the Amt Ausland Abwehr since the early days of the war and consisted of volunteers with special linguistic qualifications and knowledge of foreign countries. These volunteers were trained for Abwehr tasks. Originally only the strength of a battalion (Lehrkompanie Brandenburg), the unit in the summer of 1942 became a Division and had its own training depot, the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst. The latter, according to GAMBKE, was under Oberstlt. Ernst zu EIKERN and directly responsible to Abwehr Abteilung II.

RAUPACH states that the Brandenburg Division itself as time went on tended to become independent of the Abwehr, was used more as a military formation, engaged in normal infantry fighting and suffered very heavy casualties.

Eventually, in approximately June 1944, its control passed out of the hands of the Abwehr except for the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst. After the formation of the Mil Amt, the Lehrregiment was placed directly under the head of the Mil Amt, Oberstlt. HANSEN. Its main task was the training of German personnel for the FAKs and FATs.

2. After the transfer to the Wehrmacht

GAMBKE states that a Panzer Grenadier Division was created from the Brandenburg Division which, however, still retained its original flash. He also suggests that the reason for its transfer was that the Wehrmacht commanders did not wish to see it disappear into the ranks of the S.S. RAUPACH considers that political mistrust was the real reason, for in S.S. circles the Division was condemned as pro-Abwehr. In any case SKORZENY took over most of the specialists from the Division.

3. Transfer of officers and men to S.S. Jagdverbaende

Approximately 1,200 officers and N.C.O.s and men were transferred from the Brandenburg Division to the Jagdverbaende during the summer of 1944.

4. Division of work between Jagdverbaende and FAKs, Abteilung II

The fundamental difference between these two parallel organisations lay in the fact that the Jagdverbaende were free of all connection with the army and were answerable to the R.S.H.A. alone.

The Jagdverbaende were organised into a series of Befehlsstellen - Ost, Suedost, Suedwest, Sued, etc. These Befehlsstellen were parallel to the Leitstellen. For example, Leitstelle II Ost corresponded to the Befehlsstelle Ost (also called Jagdverband Ost).

In the autumn of 1944, a conference was held at Bischofsfelden between these two Stellen and the division of work was arranged on the

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APPENDIX D(14)BRANDENBURG DIVISION AND S.S. JAGDVERBAENDE (Contd.)

following lines:

- a) The Jagdverbaende took over the entire control of all European Resistance Movements.
- b) The FAKs and FATs were to continue their relations with Resistance Movements but they were to send all information thereon to the Befehlsstelle. This concerned particularly the activities of FAK 202 in regard to the Ukrainian Resistance Movements.
- c) All relations with WLIASSOW were to be carried on by the Jagdverbaende only.
- d) The Jagdverbaende were to carry on all activities involving operations behind the Russian lines whilst the FAKs were confined to operations closer to German territory and within it.

5. Organisation of Befehlsstellen

As far as is known to GAMBKE and RAUPACH, each Befehlsstelle had one battalion under its command, but they claim to know nothing further regarding the organisation. They state that the S.S. Streifkorps were not definite subordinate units but were parties of any required number of men formed to carry out a particular mission.

6. Befehlsstelle Ost.

This was stationed until January 1945 in Hohensalza under Hstuf. VOELKERSAM. At that time it was besieged with the remainder of the occupying forces in Hohensalza by the Russians and was almost entirely wiped out. VOELKERSAM was killed.

The Stelle was then re-formed, GAMBKE thinks in Friedenthal under a Sturmbannfuhrer AUCH with Stubaf. Dr. PECHAU, Stubaf. HEINZE and Ostuf. RIEDEL.

The Befehlsstelle controlled a training camp in Trautenau (Sudetenland). The camp leiter was a certain ? GIEL.

7. Other organisations

GAMBKE states that there were special Kommandos but he claims to know no details concerning these except the Sonderkommando der Unterwasserschwimmer which was in Vienna. Details of the latter as far as he knows are:

- a) Fuehrungstab: In Friedenthal. Evacuated to Hof in March 1945.
- b) Personal:
 - C.O. - Ostufaf. SKORZENY
 - Asst. - Oberstlt. WALTHER
 - Hptm. EIHT (?)
 - Hstuf. GERHARD
 - Ostuf. Dr. GRAF

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APPENDIX D(14)BRANDENBURG DIVISION AND S.S. JAGDVERBAENDE (Contd.)

- c) Their main function was apparently the destruction of bridges.

8. Activities of the Jagdverbaende in Ost and Suedost

- a) In March 1945, the Vienna Unterwasserschwimmer, as a result of the demands of Leitstelle II West, were transferred to the Remagen bridgehead. The Leiter of the Vienna school, a certain Ustuf. SCHREIBER (?) went with them.
- b) Unternehmen "Waldlaeufer" (See Appendix D(6)).
- c) In March 1945, in the Baltic area, under the command of Stubaf. Dr. PECHAU, an operation was to have been carried out. Leitstelle II Ost handed over, for this purpose, two camps with Lithuanians and White Ruthenians to the S.S. Jagdverband Ost. No further details known.
- d) An operation was carried out in August or September 1944, by Jagdverband Ost with the object of searching for the large number of troops reported to be cut off from the Heeresgruppe to the south and east of Bialystock, and to bring them back to the front.
- e) Missions under the personal command of SKORZENY:
 - i) About August/September 1944, mission in Hungary. Object not known.
 - ii) December 1944, mission in connection with the offensive on the Western front. Details not known. Lt. LOCHNER was killed during this mission.
 - iii) End of January/February 1945, infantry mission by the Jagdverbaende in the Schwecht bridgehead on the Oder, south of Stettin. SKORZENY was in charge of the battle of Schwecht. Subordinate to Heeresgruppe Weichsel.

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APPENDIX D (15).

ABWEHR AND MIL. INT. INTELLIGENCE REGARDING RUSSIA.

GENERAL

1. GAMBKE states that the interest of Abwehr II/Mil. D was confined to the following information:

a) Political

i.e.; administrative measures; religious measures; treatment of minorities; nutrition questions, with particular regard to the effect on the population; reports of resistance; treatment of the population in the occupied territory.

b) Military

i.e. composition of nationalities in army units; welfare among the troops; morale among the troops; issue of passes.

c) Economic and Commercial

i.e. output of industry; reports on existing factories and new plant; new commercial plans.

d) Geographical

i.e. particular details of lie of land; weather conditions at given times; living conditions of the population; distribution of vegetation.

Where the Ost-Referat was concerned, only a general idea of the political situation was necessary, and as regards the other points, they had to know what items (for example, morale of troops) were of the type to be passed on as of interest to II. (Such information would be passed on to Leitstelle II Ost).

Economic and geographical information was only of interest for the preparation of specialised undertakings. For that reason, information of this type was only supplied when it was asked for.

2. This information was mainly supplied through the following Stellen:

a) Political

Ant VI (VI c) passed on detailed reports and gave out a regular newspaper and wireless service on the situation in the East which often coincided with the Chi-News.

OKW Chi (Chiffre) Abteilung gave out Chi-News daily. This contained the substance of wireless reports from all over the world, generally without any comment. This news was supposed to be perused by the Head of the Department only, but after the summer of 1944, it was distributed further, i.e. Intelligence regarding the Eastern front was passed to the Ostreferat.

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APPENDIX D(15)Abwehr and Mil. Amt Intelligence regarding Russia (Contd.)

The Ostministerium (Office for Eastern Front affairs) gave out a daily report concerning the Eastern Front which included, besides reports from German-occupied territory, information from within Russia, part of which naturally was derived from the same sources as the Chi-News.

b) Military

Mil C. (formerly Abwehr-I) passed on any information it received to Frontaufklärung-I.

1c Air Force Command (Luftwaffenführungsstab) delivered on request, aerial photographs, mostly as a check on Intelligence reports (in actual practice this was not often taken advantage of.)

c) Economic and Transport

OKW Wirtschafts-Rüstungsamt, Abt-Ost (OKW Office of Economic Warfare). - The name of this department is not certain, for it was frequently altered- provided on request, knowledge it had obtained regarding industrial concerns and their output. This was constantly being brought up-to-date by reliable information obtained by the Aussenstellen of the Army Groups. The Railway Department of the Gen. d. Heeres provided reliable details of contemporary traffic conditions behind the lines.

d) Geographical

Well before the offensive, the Military Geographical Institute had provided a geographical background through the issue of military geographical maps, and these were continually being brought up-to-date and enlarged. This work depended naturally on the results of the work of the other Stellen previously mentioned. It was, therefore, Intelligence which had already been tested.

3. Intelligence knowledge regarding Russian Rear Areas

GAMBE summarises the most important items of Intelligence knowledge as follows:

- a) "The Soviet system implemented thoroughly the three camouflage devices envisaged for the duration of the war: Nationalism, Clericalism and Federalism.
- b) "The Soviet people were tired of war; they had been excited by the victories but finally, because of the fatigues caused by the war, had become apathetic. The general feeling against the (Soviet) System, which had been discovered in 1941, had weakened, but naturally was latent, especially among the minorities.

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APPENDIX D(15)Abwehr and I.S.I. Ant Intelligence regarding Russia (Contd.)

- c) "There were constant reports of unrest in areas which had become famous for resistance - i.e. Turkestan, the Caucasus and the Ukraine. The reports themselves were unimportant, but what was of interest was the fact that parts of the population were capable of revolt.

"The Baltic peoples - who had been influenced by Western civilisation - voted for resistance, disregarding the fact that the leaders of the opposing units had fled. The White Ruthenians especially were a group without leaders, for their most important members had been pro-German and had retreated with the Germans.

"Reports of revolts in concentration camps in the Murmansk/Kotlas region were highly exaggerated. Concentration camps in such areas, after many years of exile, cannot provide any active units worthy of consideration.

- d) "Morale among the troops was good and they were certain of victory, especially after the arrival of foreign food supplies, tanks and transport vehicles.
- e) "The attitude adopted in the occupied territories was a very careful one. Roumania had been occupied with extreme wariness. In Bulgaria the Nationalist clique had been removed. Finland was treated in the same way as Roumania. It is not quite clear how to regard the report regarding Finns having rescued German prisoners-of-war from transport which was taking them to the Soviet Union.
- f) "The troops' belief in victory was to some extent increased by their believing that the war would continue until all Europe was won over and - in the opinion of convinced Communists - the Party Plan could be fulfilled and the dream of World Revolution realised.
- g) "With these scattered reports, it is difficult to draw any conclusion regarding the position of the (Soviet) System and the Soviet prospects. Its becoming a 'Democratic Party' could only be correctly judged if one had an idea of conditions within Headquarters, but there was no information to hand of this kind."

4. The value of this information.

GAMBKE states that it is very difficult to evaluate the worth of reports received from the Russian area. Individual reports may have tallied, while the conclusions drawn from them were mainly false, since "here it was a question of the hegemony of a system and that is incalculable".

The reports of Frontaufklaerung-I in conjunction with the Ic

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APPENDIX D(15)Abwehr and Mil. Amt Intelligence regarding Russia (Contd.)

activities of the Truppe were particularly substantial. For example, the great Soviet offensive in January 1945 was known in all its details. The investigations carried out on the German side were not nearly so detailed. GAEBKE believes they only touched on a percentage figure in their estimation of the numbers of Soviet Divisions.

5. The Sources of this information and routes by which it reached Berlin.

GAEBKE states as follows:

"Mil. C worked with the information gained by Frontaufklaerung-I. Frontaufklaerung-I had only a small number of agents; the majority of its Intelligence was obtained through the interrogation of prisoners, and included the information from Ic work and radio interception.

"The information was passed from Frontaufklaerung-I to Mil. D via Leitstelle I-Ost and Mil. C.

"Vic worked mostly with the Zeppelin Unternehmen, which had set up a remarkable P/I interrogation service. Vic sent its Intelligence direct to Mil. D.

"IKW (economic and armaments office) had a small unit in each army group, which examined all booty which fell into our hands and determined from it the productive ability of Soviet industry, as well as estimating the state of their food situation and distribution of goods."

RAUPACH has the following general observations to make:

"Before the beginning of the Russian campaign, the procuring of information from the Soviet Union by the usual methods was extraordinarily difficult for the following reasons: no free travel, the rigorous control on personal connections of all Soviet citizens, the impossibility of paying out large sums of money, the increasing ineffectiveness of anti-Soviet groups, and the efficiency of the double agent system of the Soviet Intelligence Service.

"It is therefore evident to me that our sources of intelligence could only be successful if they were built up around individual highly-placed personalities of the Red Army; although whether this was in fact the case I do not know. After the Polish Campaign, this situation improved somewhat on account of the new frontiers and owing to the minorities in the Baltic and the West Ukraine. In spite of these difficulties, Abwehr I submitted before the commencement of the campaign, a picture of the enemy which afterwards proved reasonably accurate.

"During the Russian campaign, the acquisition of information by agents as opposed to other sources fell completely into the background. General technical difficulties and inadequacies

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APPENDIX D(15)

Abwehr and Mil. Amt Intelligence regarding Russia (Contd.)

"(lack of aircraft, suitable radio apparatus) as well as the evergrowing security measures and controls on the Russian side, did not make for the efficient running of an agents' net.

"The information supplied by individual agents who were actually working was very incomplete on account of the vast distances involved and as a result of the rigid counter-espionage control which naturally cramped their movements. This meant that it was extremely difficult to collate such information into a reliable general picture.

"However, the scarcity of intelligence obtained from agents was more than offset by the amount of information collected from the interrogation of deserters and prisoners. National minorities and even Russian nationals showed an astonishing willingness to talk, without the slightest employment of any kind of pressure. This was true even of high-ranking officers. The reports were of especial value on account of the wonderful memory of the Russians for facts, numbers and names. In my own work of examination, (perhaps 300-400 individuals) I do not know of a single case where a prisoner refused to talk, or concealed facts or made deliberately misleading statements.

"The resulting picture in regard to Order of Battle information, troop movements etc., was one that can be described as perhaps 90% correct. The I(c)s were never in doubt about the strength and intention of the Russian Army. As a result of the information gathered by the Prinz REUSS Dienststelle, full knowledge was obtained in regard to armament production and supply (including Allied deliveries and their channels).

"The procuring of information in regard to the political sphere remained difficult. The reasons are easy to understand on account of the system. Political officials or their reports were never allowed to fall into our hands. Abwehr II however, looked after the obtaining of political intelligence from its own sources, principally through the appropriate questioning of prisoners by the PAKs and PATS."

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APPENDIX D (16)

X Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations NT

1.

At the beginning of the Eastern campaign, neither the political nor the military authorities had thought of forming voluntary formations from Soviet citizens. It was expressly forbidden to employ Czarist Russian emigrants who had offered their services in considerable numbers. This procedure by the German Dienststellen was justified from an Abwehr point of view, but the main reason was a political one: Russians and national minorities were to be given no excuse, by reason of their active participation in the war, for future political demands. This policy did not alter when citizens of the Baltic nations, during the first months of the Eastern campaign, wished with spontaneous enthusiasm to take part in the fight against Bolshevism, and when the large numbers of P/Ws made possible, as a matter of course, the formation of a Russian Anti-Bolshevist Army.

Under such circumstances, Abwehr II was the only Dienststelle which, under cover of its general work, could take steps to form voluntary Anti-Bolshevist groups or at least amass practical knowledge which would later lead to the formation of such groups. Before the campaign, however, even this preparatory work was hindered by the loyalty existing in all Stellen towards the German-Russian Friendship Pact. The preparatory work therefore was confined to an examination of the emigration problem. The main point at issue among the old emigrants was the Caucasian Groups, and among the new emigrants (since 1939) the Baltic groups and the Ukrainians. The only military formation which could be established from among the Werkschutz (Werkpolizei) in the Generalgouvernement Polen, was the 'Nachtigall' enterprise, which amounted to about a battalion of the most active young men of the West-Ukrainian emigrants.


In the first stage of the Eastern campaign, until the winter of 1941, the field units of Abwehr II brought into action small S and K Truppen of volunteers, and tried to bring about the formation of large volunteer groups by memoranda to the higher Kommandostellen concerning the proved reliability of such volunteers. However, even then, such proposals broke down in relation to the above-mentioned political difficulties. About the end of the year the 'Bergmann' undertaking was formed on its own responsibility, together with a Ukrainian Schutzpolizei and a Sonderdienst for fighting partisans in the rearward battle area.

2.

The year 1942 brought at first no change in the political administration's general principle of turning down voluntary groups, but the army changed its policy of its own accord. The lower commands recognised that Soviet soldiers of all nationalities would make good co-operators if well treated, and picked out volunteers from the P/W camps for all possible non-combatant duties (cooks, stable hands, drivers for horse and motor vehicles, airport personnel); some, however, were given armed duties (guarding and transport of prisoners). The divisions at Stalingrad in the late summer of 1942 had up to 2000 such assistants.

The catastrophe of the 6th Army brought the high command to its senses. It could be seen, late thought it was, that the German forces alone were insufficient to control the Eastern sphere of war. The status of the volunteers was legalised by order of the OKW. The Hilfswillige (HiWi) was put on essential duties (supplies, medical assistance, welfare of dependants) on an equal status with the German soldier. He could also carry weapons if his duties demanded it.

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APPENDIX D (16)

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Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations (Contd.)

This decree created room for a development whose many consequences can scarcely be visualised at a glance. Every unit of the army, the air force, the police and the S.S. now began to appoint HiWis so that frequently the prescribed proportion of one-tenth per unit was exceeded.

The actual fighting volunteer corps were formed in addition to this large number of HiWis but on the same pay basis. They can be divided into the following main groups:

- (a) Army volunteers (Cossack units, Caucasian, Kalmuck, Turktartar units and Abwehr II units)
- (b) S.S. Volunteers (Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, White Russian, S.S. Division Galizien (Ukrainian).)
- (c) Luftwaffe volunteers (Flak assistants).
- (d) The Wlassow Army (National Russian Freedom Army).

(a) The administration was at a special Dienststelle, 'Der General der Freiwilligenverhaende'. This Stelle accomplished a great deal in the care and control of the subsidiary groups. Newspapers in all languages, theatre groups, religious instruction, political instruction and tours through Germany were instituted. The administration of the units, up to battalions, was carried out by nationals of the country concerned. The existing National Committees had direct contact with the corresponding military units.

The general tendency was to withdraw these groups more and more from the East, for it was obvious that, in view of the German retreat since the late summer of 1943 and by reason of Soviet counter-propaganda, the morale of these volunteers would become increasingly worse. Up till the date of invasion, the groups operated exclusively in guerilla warfare, in particular in the Balkans, Slovakia, North Italy and Southern France. Some were also used in the fighting against the Invasion Army.

From the end of 1944 it was no longer possible to use them in the Partisan areas of the east, as in view of the Red Army successes the tendency to desert to the guerillas became perforce stronger as they saw thereby an opportunity of returning to their homeland.

(b) The S.S. regarded the formation of Baltic and Ukrainian Legions as its own special preserve. The strongest group was the Estonian Legion. After showing considerable merit on the Narva front, they were withdrawn from the Baltic and finally defended the fortress Brieg on the Oder with about 10,000 men. They must have perished in this action.

The S.S. Division Galizien was formed in the spring of 1944 at the suggestion of the then Gouverneur WACHNER. The influx of volunteers was extraordinarily large (about 80,000 men enlisted), as the Ukrainian Nationalists had given the order to make full use of military training. The Division was trained as a Gardetruppenteil and became a fully equipped Panzerdivision. It was placed in the Lemberg frontal sector, north-east of Lemberg. The Soviets, recognising the political significance of this formation, concentrated exceedingly powerful forces against it and destroyed it at the first assault. A fairly large part of the division, about 7,000 men, are said, according to UPA (Ukrainian Rebel Army) reports, to have fled with their small arms to the UPA in the mountains and to have joined forces with the Ukrainian Nationalists in further fighting. A new S.S. Division Galizien was immediately formed.

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APPENDIX D(16)Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations (Contd.)

(c) No details known.

(d) WLASSOW, whose personality and political opinions subsequent to his capture were known only to a few, and whose ideas were at first made use of purely as propaganda, became of all the more value when it was clear to the German Command that Russian volunteers could not be used indefinitely in a military capacity without agreeing on a positive political aim. Although in the winter of 1943 HITLER declared in a secret instruction his disapproval of WLASSOW's claims of leadership, under pressure of the position in the East (and therefore too late) official recognition was given to WLASSOW's movement in the autumn of 1944. This dementi, however, did not even then come from the political administration but from the Propaganda Department (promoter was D'ALQUEN, head of the S.S. active propaganda). In the middle of November 1944 the official acceptance of the WLASSOW programme was proclaimed in Prague; and the ideological principles of this proclamation gained approval in wide Russian circles. WLASSOW was authorised to form three Russian divisions whose training was immediately begun.

3. WLASSOW's claim, however, to be leader of a great part of Russia met with the decisive opposition of the representatives of national minorities of the Soviet Union. Ukrainians, Caucasians and Turkomen declared to the German Stellen that they would never subordinate themselves to WLASSOW, and that further they were going to fight for the freedom of their peoples from the Russians and not just from Bolshevik domination. The two factions consequently had their supporters among the S.S. staff. Nevertheless, the majority of WLASSOW's soldiers were Soviet-Ukrainians, and the officers were Russians; all nationalities were represented on the WLASSOW National Committees.

The training and equipment of the Division took place in Muensingen. The staff was stationed first in Dabendorf, south of Berlin, and was then moved to Karlsbad. General ASCHENBRENNER (Luftwaffe) was the German liaison officer. The political affairs were managed by S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER. WLASSOW officers were publicly given equal status to the German officers and were also saluted.

As far as is known, WLASSOW troops as such did not engage in active operations. WLASSOW only wished to take over a sector with the strength of a corps, and this request, from the point of view of prestige, could not be turned down. WLASSOW, however, assuredly wished in addition to gain time, during the course of preparations, for assessing the prospects of a Soviet success. The employment of his troops against a victorious Soviet army would have been absolutely senseless. However, he did not refuse to participate in operations with smaller units, like the Panzervernichtungstrupps, who fought with success on the Oder Front until February 1945.

4. In brief, the following can be said about the volunteer groups on the Eastern front:-

(a) The decision of the NS administration to wage the war in the East without an appeal to the peoples of the Soviet Union made it impossible to form, at the right moment, a Volunteer Army (which could have reached a strength of 1,000,000 without difficulty). Furthermore the complete reversal of the S.S. policy and attitude did not result in putting an end to the general air of mistrust which prevailed.

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APPENDIX D(16)Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations (Contd.)

(b) If, in spite of this, hundreds of thousands enlisted as Hilfswillige, the reason can be traced back not only to the expectation of a future improvement in their standard of living but also to the political desire to alter existing conditions in the Soviet Union.

(c) The only groups capable of taking part in large military operations were the Baltic and Ukrainian legions, who fought for their country with conviction. Certain Abwehr II units (BERGMANN, NACHTIGALL and K-Trupps of the FATs) were of special fighting value owing to their German officers having filled them with enthusiasm by good treatment and conviction of the national future of their peoples.

5. (a) Organisation

(i) OKH General der Freiwilligen-Verbaende (for front-line troops) and
Kommandeur der Freiwilligen-Verbaende at the B.d.E
(Befehlshaber der Ersatzheeres).

Units Cossack Division (C.O. General v. PANWITZ)
162nd Turk-Tartar Division
Caucasian Units (with BERGMANN)
National Russian Units (before recognition of WLASSOW)

Publications of this Dienststelle

'Mitteilungen fuer die Kommandeure der Freiwilligenverbaende'
(until the end of the war about 30 issues)
(Contents: pay, equipment, administration, etc.)

(ii) S.S.

S.S. Hauptamt Amtsgruppe D (Ausland)

Units Latvian, Esthonian and Lithuanian Legions.
White Russian Brigade (latterly in Denmark)
S.S. Galizien Division (in Ukraine, latterly in North
Slovakia)
Turkestan Units
3 Divisions of the Russian Freedom Army (WLASSOW) in
process of formation and training; also a small
Jagd-und-Transportstaffel in Karlsbad (fighter and
transport squadron).

(b) Personnel(i) German

a) Wehrmacht: OKH - General NIEDERMEYER and General KOESTRING.
Luftwaffe Liaison Officer - General
ASCHENBRENNER.

b) S.S.: S.S. Hauptamt - Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER.
do. (Amtsgruppe D Ausland) - Gruppenf. WASCHER
do. (Amtsgruppe D, Referent Eastern minorities)
- Obersturnbannfuehrer Dr. ARIT.
do. (Liaison Officer to WLASSOW) -
Standartenf. KROEGER.

c) Wehrmacht (Propaganda)(OKW, WPr):

Gruppenleiter Ost - Hauptmann v. GROTHE.
Referent for Turkestan and Caucasian questions
- Sonderfuehrer LUEDERSEN.
Referent for Ukrainian and Cossack questions
- Regierungsrat Dr. STUPPERICH.
Camp Dabendorf - Eptm. STRICK-STRICKFELD.

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APPENDIX D(16)Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations (Contd.)(b) Personnel (ctd.)(ii) Non-German

- a) Russians: General WLASSOW
 General TRUCHIN (O.C. Military Units)
 Major TENSEROFF (Intelligence Service)
- b) Ukrainians: General SCHANDRUCK (units intended to be formed)

(c) Estimated figures of Volunteers (of Soviet-Russian origin):
(as at beginning of 1945)

(i) Wehrmacht:	Cossack units	5,000
	Caucasian units	3,000
	162nd Turk. Div.	8,000
	Russian units (not under WLASSOW's command)	3,000
(ii) S.S.:	Galizien Div.	18,000
	White Ruthenian Brigade	2,500
	Baltic Units	10,000
	Turkestan units	2,000
	3 WLASSOW Divs.	30,000
	Russian Air Force	500
(iii) Abwehr:	FAK II	2,500
	FAK I	1,000
		<hr/>
	Total:	85,500
		<hr/> <hr/>

At a rough estimation, a round number of 100,000 volunteers were employed in the above formations. The 'HiWis' totalled a round number of 300,000 (i.e. 10 per cent. of the Eastern Army).

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APPENDIX D (17)SYSTEMS OF COMMUNICATION.*Action already taken!*1. Between Mil.Amt.D. and Leitstelle II-Ost.

- (a) By Letter: via the courier office of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Berlin W.35, Potsdamerstrasse 56, in the "Foreign Traffic House". Eventually Amt-VI set up its own courier office in Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Berkaerstrasse.
- (b) By Telegraph: from Mil.Amt.D.'s own signal department to that of the Leitstelle II-Ost, through the Army network.
- (c) By W/T: over the Mil.D. radio station (code-name "TUIDRA") to the Army radio station in Belzig near Berlin (code-name "BURG"), thence to Leitstelle II-Ost station (code-name "LEDOS").

2. Between Leitstelle II-Ost and Kommandos.

- (a) By Letter: by Army courier via the courier office of the Army Group to which the Kommando had been assigned.
- (b) By Telegraph: via the telegraph office of Leitstelle II-Ost to the office of the Army Group concerned.
- (c) By W/T: via the Leitstelle II-Ost radio station direct to the Kommando's radio station. FAK code-names remembered are

"SATURN" for FAK 212

"PAPPEL" " FAK 204

These radio code-names were changed every six months. The radio call-sign is stated to have been changed every hour.

3. Between individual Leitstellen.

Letters were routed through the appropriate Army courier offices. Telegraphs and W/T messages went over their own stations.

4. Telephone Communication.

In all cases went through the local Army telephone network. Mil.Amt.D. was connected with the Mil.Amt. exchange.

5. Personnel.

A civilian employee (name unknown) was responsible at Mil.D. for supervising the appropriate courier channel. A Gefreiter (name unknown) was responsible for the telegraph office, and an Obergefreiter SIGISMUND for the W/T routing. No details are known regarding the signals personnel at the Leitstellen and FAKs but it is assumed that they were staffed by N.C.O.'s. GAMBKE states that the Leitstelle and FAKs did not have their own signals officers. The Funkleiter Ost Department was the competent authority as they had a signals officer attached to each Army Group, who also worked on behalf of the FAKs. The Leitstelle was served direct by Funkleiter-Ost.

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APPENDIX D(17)
SYSTEMS OF COMMUNICATION (Contd.)

In regard to the Mll.Amt., Oberleutnant OESTERLE of Mil.Amt.E. was the signals superintendent and he was responsible for dealing with technical questions regarding signals generally, and for providing apparatus.

The name of Wachtmeister POHL of FAK.202 is remembered, but RAUPACH states that this was his cover-name.

Extract to 75/ger/10(s)

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APPENDIX D(18)

GRENADIER REGIMENT 1001 AND ERSATZBATAILLION 600 (LISSA)

General

A unit, with a skeleton staff of German personnel, for all volunteers of foreign origin in the service of the Frontaufklaerung II (Abwehr II). It was formed in the early summer of 1944, under the leadership of Oberstlt. PUTZ, the regiment working mainly for the Eastern units. The "FEEL" operation, for instance, was undertaken by the Grenadier Regiment 1001.

H.Q.

Kamenz, with the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, subordinate to the Mil Amt - early Summer 1944.

Jitcin, Bohemia - late summer of 1944.

Later, during the course of military operations in the East, the Staff moved from Jitcin to the Karlsbad area.

Camps

Two camps were established during the summer of 1944, one near Vienna and the other near Graz.

O.C.

Oberstlt. PUTZ (killed in an accident summer 1944).

Oberstlt. MARWEDE (late summer 1944 - winter 1944/45, when he retired on account of his age).

Oberstlt. LIENHARD (temporary).

Oberst. NAUMANN (?) (spring 1945).

Functions

- 1) The card indexing of all non-German volunteers in Abwehr service.
- 2) Care and administration of approved volunteers after successful appointment to the Frontaufklaerungsverbaende.
- 3) Care and administration of the relatives and dependents of the volunteers.
- 4) Arrangements for leave for these volunteers; care and administration of the wounded (hospital treatment, convalescence, etc.).
- 5) Finding work for personnel who could no longer be sent on operations.
- 6) Promotion and appointments.

Ersatzbataillon 600 (Lissa)

O.C. Oberstlt. Ernst zu EIKERN
 Major P.....(?)

According to RAUPACH, the Ersatzbataillon 600 carried out similar functions to the Grenadier Regiment 1001, but only for the German members of Abwehr II, excluding officers. Its functions were handed over to the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst in Brandenburg, whose H.Q. was later

Extract to 75/ger/10 B.

SF 75/ger/10(s)
 SF 75/ger/10B

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APPENDIX D(18)

GRENADIER REGIMENT 1001 AND ERSATZBATAILLON 600 (LISSA) Contd.

transferred to Kamenz. GAMBKE, however, states that as far as he knows, this was the Ersatzbat. of Abwehr I, dealing chiefly with interpreting.

PETERS' depot-unit, according to his Soldbuch, was for a considerable time the Ersatzbataillon 600. He agrees with RAUPACH as to its function.

SF 75/60.1108

CI Card

APPENDIX D(19)

KAMENZ AND MESERITZ SCHOOLS

1. Kamenz, Saxony SF 75/600.10 B

Lehrregiment Kurfuerst-Ersatz (Reserve) Unit of the Frontauf-
klaerungsverbaende, to which was attached the "PESTALOZZI" Abwehr School
(named after the original school in Brandenburg/Havel, in whose premises
it was formerly accommodated).

PETERS was in one of the Ersatz Coys. for a short time - November
1943/January 1944. The three Coys. then consisted of about 100/120 men,
excluding the Administrative Staff of about 50. Although PETERS, who was
mainly occupied with barrack and field duties, did not follow a course at
the school, he heard that the courses on Abwehr work lasted 3/4 weeks.

O.C. Major VERBEECK

Other Personnel Leutnant THARANDT
Stabsarzt HUEBENER

MT
x A
x A
MLT

SF 75/600.10 B

2. Meseritz

CI Card

RAUPACH and PETERS state that there was a training camp for
Abwehr II volunteers, known as 'Regenwurmlager', similar to the Sonderlager
Luckenwalde, until the end of 1942 (?).

According to GAMBKE, in 1942 (?) the LANGE Unit (a Caucasian unit
used for the preparation of the 'SCHEIL' Operation in the N. Caucasus,
under command of Lt. LANGE) was temporarily accommodated in a camp in
Meseritz. It was not, however, under the Abwehr.

SF 52/4/4/29

X
Card in Subject Index

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APPENDIX D (20)

X "UNTERNEHMEN 20 OFFIZIERE" N.T.

al
S.I.
13/9/45

1. In June 1944, RAUPACH was working with Kommando 202 at Cracow under Oberit. SEEELIGER. RAUPACH had as his assistant a certain Unteroffizier Walter HOESCH, and had frequently discussed with him the hopelessness of Germany's position. After the events of 20th July 1944, these two were convinced that the war was lost for Germany, and decided that the best thing to do in the circumstances was to try and get into touch with the British Intelligence Service and hand over to it the information in their possession concerning Russia. RAUPACH states that HOESCH's sympathies were with the Western Allies as he had spent a considerable time in Belgium and England before the war.

In August 1944, HOESCH, who was in contact with certain members of the Polish Resistance Movement, received information that the latter were shortly to come into personal contact with certain members of the British Intelligence Service. RAUPACH and HOESCH decided that HOESCH should therefore contact these individuals and having made arrangements for giving themselves up, hand over to them all information regarding the German activities with Russian Resistance Groups in the Ukraine, and intelligence on the internal, political and economic situation in Russia, in regard to which HOESCH was apparently particularly well informed.

The possibility of W/T contact between HOESCH and RAUPACH was vaguely discussed but was eventually dropped owing to the technical difficulties. HOESCH himself was a fully trained W/T operator, having served with the Signal Corps previously in Norway up to August 1942.

From September to November HOESCH tried to establish this contact with the British through the Poles, but without success. RAUPACH thinks the lack of success was due to a great deal of justifiable mistrust on both sides.

2. In December, RAUPACH was posted back to Referat Ost, Mil Amt D. He saw HOESCH once again in January 1945, at the Referat Ost offices and the latter told him that he hoped to make contact very shortly. During the evacuation of Cracow, HOESCH was left behind and was subsequently reported as missing. RAUPACH affirms that he is convinced that HOESCH remained with the Polish Resistance Group in order to carry out his unofficial mission. He was apparently well known to the Poles as a Belgian citizen under the name of Anatol MANZ, and had exceptionally friendly relations with them. RAUPACH states that HOESCH comes from the well known Rhineland Industrial family from Dueren, where he owned a paper factory; that he is aged about 28; was supposed to have been to Oxford in approximately 1936 and speaks English, French, Russian, Roumanian, Polish and Czech. Since his meeting in January, RAUPACH has not seen or heard of HOESCH. He states that they gave a private code name to this unofficial mission, which was known as "Unternehmen Mathilde".

3. During one of his visits to the Referat Ost at Mil Amt D, RAUPACH had told GAMBKE (who was working there under Major LOOS) about his plans regarding HOESCH, and GAMBKE had agreed to help him if possible. When RAUPACH left Cracow in January, 1945, he discussed with him the question of deserting to the British and

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APPENDIX D(20)"UNTERNEHMEN 20 OFFIZIERE" (Contd.)

turning over all information to them. They then decided to put this proposal before certain other officers who, they anticipated, would be sympathetic. Accordingly, whenever an officer called in at their H.Q. on his way from the front to Berlin or vice versa, they tactfully broached the subject and sounded his views. In this way, they gathered round them some 20 officers. The general plan was that at the first opportunity GAMBKE and RAUPACH should desert to the British and hand over to them details of the conspiracy and the names and particulars of the officers concerned, who would be willing to have information to the British. It was generally agreed that this information would only be handed over to the British authorities (not the American) as it was considered that Great Britain was the sole member of the Allies who would be able to make good use of the experiences gained during the German campaign in Russia, referred to by GAMBKE as merely a "violent reconnaissance in the East".

From these officers, therefore, the British authorities would be able to collect all available information regarding:-

- a) The German Intelligence activities on the Eastern Front.
- b) Details of sabotage dumps in the Balkans and around Lemberg.
- c) The Russian Resistance Movement in the Ukraine.
- d) German knowledge of the Russian internal situation.
- e) The activities of a certain Roman Catholic priest, KWERTKOWSKY.
- f) German "Insurgierung" activities in Turkestan.

4. GAMBKE and RAUPACH thereupon took the following action:

- i) The setting up of a rendez-vous point at Betzendorf where they could meet and hold out if the Russians overran the country before the arrival of the British. This was purely a private arrangement between GAMBKE, RAUPACH, PETERS and four men from Lager Luckenwalde - Sdf. HOEHN, Uffz. BRAUER, Uffz. WALCKE and a Gefreiter. GAMBKE planned the provisioning and equipping of the place which was situated in a forest on an estate belonging to either Graf v. d. SCHULLENBURG or another member of the same family. The four men from Luckenwalde actually prepared the site. A certain SCHULZE, the head forester on the estate, was told about it and could give directions.
- ii) RAUPACH had been ordered by the Berlin authorities to destroy all documents to prevent them falling into enemy hands. Both he and GAMBKE, however, decided to try and save certain files which they thought would be of use to the British authorities, in spite of the extremely serious consequences which would result if they were found out. RAUPACH kept back all the "Laenderakten" - reports on the various districts of Russia and Russian-occupied territory. These included the results of all enquiries, investigations, and research on the Caucasus, Turkestan, Ukraine, etc., which they believed to be unique and of inestimable value to Great Britain.

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APPENDIX D(20)
"UNTERNEHMEN 20 OFFIZIERE" (Contd.)

On the 3rd or 4th March, 1945, RAUPACH left Referat Ost for Bad Elster, with these documents. He states that he gave them to a soldier, whose name he has forgotten, with strict instructions to bury them in a chest just outside the village. He is certain that this soldier obeyed his orders. The approximate position is:- Germany 1,25,000, Sheet 5639 ADORS, GSGS 4414, Map Reference 212987.

iii) KWERTKOWSKY

A certain Gefr. BOGOJAWLINSKY had been posted to the Referat Ost in the autumn of 1944. Before the war this man had been a commercial artist and in this capacity had worked for the Ministry of Propaganda. It was while so engaged that he had met a Roman Catholic Priest, KWERTKOWSKY, struck up a friendship with him, and maintained this friendship throughout the war. Soon after his transfer to Referat Ost, BOGOJAWLINSKY told GAMBKE that KWERTKOWSKY was an expert on Bolshevism and the Soviet system of government and had collected numerous documents and reports on this subject. He stated that during one audience that KWERTKOWSKY had with the Pope, he had given the latter a great deal of information and had shown His Holiness some of the reports. He also told GAMBKE that KWERTKOWSKY had at one time looked after certain German agents in Poland. GAMBKE thereupon decided that he must get hold of this man and his documents and see that they came into British hands. To this end, he ordered BOGOJAWLINSKY to set out and find KWERTKOWSKY who was at this time in Freiburg, near Naumburg, and see that he remained hidden until the British appeared. BOGOJAWLINSKY accordingly set out on the 3rd/4th March and GAMBKE states that he has heard nothing from him since.

iv) The "Unternehmen Pfeil" (See Appendix D(6))

This was a German "Insurgierung" undertaking in Turkestan, which was apparently controlled by Sdf. GREIFF of FAT 255. As GAMBKE and RAUPACH considered that this information would greatly interest the British, GAMBKE sent written instructions to GREIFF in January 1944 to surrender the whole "Pfeil" undertaking to the British at the earliest possible opportunity. GAMBKE later received a letter from GREIFF stating that he had received these instructions and understood what was expected of him. GAMBKE, however, does not know whether GREIFF in fact carried out these instructions.

v) Oberleutnant Dr. FERID of Mil. Amt. D, Referat Suedost went to Munich on 6th/7th April 1945 with instructions to hand himself over to the Allies.

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APPENDIX D(20)
"UNTERNEHMEN 20 OFFIZIERE" (Contd.)

The names of the officers referred to above as being in agreement with RAUPACH and GAMBKE are as follows:

See <i>u</i> A	DEHMEL, Oberst.	Kommandomeldegebiet Prag
	JENTSCH, Oberlt.	" "
See <i>u</i> A	RAUPACH, Leut.	Mil. D
See <i>u</i> A	GAMBKE, Oberlt.	" "
See <i>u</i> A	FERID, Oberlt.	" "
	NADOLNY, Leut.	" "
	MARKERT, Leut.	Kommando 202
	BARGEL, Leut.	Leitstelle II Ost
	HASSELMANN, Leut.	Abwehr Trupp 212
	v. STADEN, Leut.	Kommando 204
	REINHARD, Hptm.	Kommando 206
	JUNGJOHANN, Oberlt.	Trupp 204, ?Kommando 206
	WOLTER, Leut.	" " " "
	GREIFF, Sdf. (2)	Unternehmen "Pfeil" with Tr. 255
	KLOSE, Hptm.	Trupp 203
<i>NT</i> A	ACHENBRENNER, Leut.	Kommando 201
	TUEMMLER, Leut.	Leitstelle II SO (?)
See <i>u</i> A	PIFF, Leut.	" " " "
	RENGEMEYER, Oberlt.	Trupp 207
	SCHUETTE, Leut.	Transferred to VI C 15.3.45. Formerly with Kdo. 203.
	BRAUER, Leut.	Details not known.
	KOEPFKE, Hptm.	Abwehr II - later details unknown.
	WODKE, Leut.	Working with KOEPFKE
	WEYDE, Leut.	Amt VI; previously with Kdo. 203.
	KAUKAS, Sdf.	Details not known.

Details and descriptions of the above-mentioned officers are contained in Appendix D(22).

APPENDIX D(21)

SABOTAGE CACHES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

1. GAMBKE, RAUPACH and PETERS claim to have only a general knowledge of the FAK and FAT activities in regard to sabotage caches. They state that the policy was to bury material only in localities where there was a strong resistance movement. The sabotage material, which included clothes and food, was buried in chests approximately 2½ ft. high, 4½ ft. long, by about 1½ ft. wide, normally in wooded areas. They do not know exactly where these caches were located, but state that the FAK and FAT leaders and personnel concerned would be able to pin-point them on a map. A list of FAK and FAT personnel on the Eastern Front, under Leitstelle II Ost and Leitstelle II Sued Ost respectively, is attached hereto as an Appendix.
2. They also state that in every sabotage chest is a slip of paper on which is an index letter indicating what type of material the chest contains (W for Waffen, S for Sprengstoff, K for (?) Kleidung) which is followed by a code number. A list of the index letters and numbers is kept by the Trupp concerned, and two copies are filed at the Mil.Amt.D office. The latter copies have against the code numbers another number indicating approximately how many chests were hidden in that area.
3. The Mil.Amt.D office also kept two copies of vertical photographs of all the sabotage sites. Of these, one set of copies was burnt when the Mil.Amt.D moved to Bad Elster from Baruth in April 1945. PETERS claims that the other set was taken by a Lt. BOLDT to the Archives in Potsdam, but GAMBKE considers that it is more likely that Major LOOS burnt them.

All the files about the sabotage sites were kept by the head of Mil.Amt.D.
4. The following is the extent of GAMBKE's, RAUPACH's and PETERS' information concerning the location etc. of these sites in non-German territory. Most of this information comes from PETERS, as part of his work at the Referat Ost of Mil.Amt.D was to mark the maps. GAMBKE and RAUPACH know only vague details.

SF52/11/33
 See SF52/11/30
 SF52/11/24

FAK 204: SF52/11/23

PETERS states that from Spring to end of summer 1944 this FAK was engaged in burying a large number of boxes in Northern Estonia, and on the Islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa. The code name for the undertaking was 'EICHE'.

(PETERS)

*- X no/d. to
 ZABWERTANO OST
 EICHE
 SF52/Germany/11/104*

FAK 203: c/card. pl. ahead.

By the summer of 1944 this FAK had completed the burying of a number of boxes in the area Riga-Telsiai-Jakobstadt. Code name 'KATJA'.

(PETERS)

FAK 211: SF52/11/24

Had prepared in autumn 1944, but not fully completed, the burying of boxes in the area between Bromberg and Posen.

(PETERS, GAMBKE)

APPENDIX D(21)
SABOTAGE CACHES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT (Contd.)

SF 52/11/35

FAK 202: SF 52/11/35

By July 1944 had finished burying a small number of boxes, roughly on the line Cernauti/Kolomyja/Stanislawow. Code name 'LYDIA': NT

(PETERS)

SF 52/11/13

FAK 212: SF 52/11/13

During summer 1944, when this FAK was based on Riga, it had completed the burying of a large number of boxes in Latvia. When it moved from Breslau in September 1944, it buried boxes in the area Bethen/Ratibor/Katowitz. Code name 'SIXTUS'. In January 1945 it buried boxes in the area Gleiwitz/Katowitz. Code name 'WACHHOLDER': AT

(PETERS)

SF 52/11/23

FAK 205: SF 52/11/23

During March to June 1944, when this FAK was quartered in the schloss of the Archbishop of Lemberg (about 25.k. south-west of the town) it buried a large number of boxes in the area. These were mainly filled with Russian weapons and small arms, and a few British ones.

(RAUPACH, GAMBKE)

RAUPACH also thinks that when this FAK moved somewhere on the Hungarian-Czech border they were engaged in burying sabotage boxes there, but he is not certain of this.

 Extract to relevant S.F.s. &
 amended CI cards where necessary.

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APPENDIX D(22)GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL*See U*Major ERFLING (Reserve Officer)

Age over 60; married; insurance agent in Leipzig before the war. Early 1940 acted as Adjutant in the OKW, Abw. II, Berlin; transferred to Ast Wien II in the summer of the same year, and later to Ast Bucharest; returned to the OKW, Abw. II, Berlin, in the spring of 1943, and put in charge of Referat AK, Gruppe A (Ostgruppe). In autumn 1943, this department moved to Baruth, and Major ERFLING became VO Ch, Abt. Mil D, in Berlin (i.e. Verbindungs offizier der Chefgruppe, Berlin). The HQ of this 'Anlaufstelle' was at 59 Augsburgerstrasse, Berlin W.30, known to PETERS under the cover name 'BUNKER'.

In this latter capacity ERFLING carried out all duties required of a liaison officer in Berlin (Mil.D itself was then stationed outside Berlin), e.g. ordering of office materials, direction of volunteers, accommodation of officers and members of Abw. II passing through Berlin, establishment of liaison between platoons, etc.

GAMBKE and PETERS saw Major ERFLING on 30.3.45; GAMBKE states that he collected a trunk from ERFLING's private address in Berlin for transport to Bad Elster, and that it was then intended to transfer the the VO Ch. to the Plauen area early in April 1945, although he does not know if this actually took place. Subsequent employment unknown.

See U
Major i.G. NAUMANN (Regular Officer)

Age 30/35; married. Took part in the Polish campaign (in which he was wounded) and the Russian campaign (when he was Ic, Intelligence Officer, of a Panzer Division in about 1943); retreated from Charkow to the west of Kiev.

May 1944, took over from Oberst Baron Freitag von LORINGHOVEN, who had been discharged, Abwehrabteilung II, OKW, comprising Referat Ost, Suedost, Suedwest and West; HQ. until November 1944 at Baruth, a small town 30 miles S. of Berlin, then at Birkenwerder, a suburb of Berlin. Also acted as Deputy to SKORZENY.

Accompanied GAMBKE on three journeys:-

- a) About August 1944: Breslau and Cracow.
- b) About Sept. 1944: Leitstelle II-East in Konin.
- c) About Oct. or Nov.: Cracow, Kommando 202.

In December 1944, Major NAUMANN travelled to Upper Italy without the sanction of the Amtschef, thus precipitating his own desired release from Mil. Amt service, which took place in the first half of January 1945. He was then transferred to OKW Fremde Heere Ost des Gen. d. Heeres; H.Q. Zeppelin, near Berlin, where he was occupied with the 'Feindlager KURLAND', remaining until March 1945. Seen for the last time by GAMBKE during a visit to Birkenwerder in February 1945.

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APPENDIX D(22)GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNELHauptmann ZIERIAKS (Regular Officer)

See W X X

Age 30/35; married. Took part in the French campaign, 1940, as Platoon Commander of an Artillery Regt. and was badly wounded in the stomach. As a result, was transferred to Abwehr II in About 1942, as Administrative Officer, Personnel Department (later dealing with officers only). Acted as Adjutant to Major ABSHAGEN. In 1943, held the rank of Oberleutnant. In May 1944, became Leiter of this department which was also concerned with all matters relating to officers of FAKs and FATs, remaining there until April 1945. Last heard of in Bad Elster, but PETERS thinks it probable that ZIERIAKS went into hiding with the rest of the Abt. somewhere in South Germany.

Oberstlt. STROJIL (Regular Officer - Engineers; ex-Austrian Army)

See W X X

On the outbreak of war, Adjutant to Major DEHMEL, Ast II, Wien, dealing with weapons and other war materials. Early 1940, with the CKW, Abw. II, engaged on special missions in the Balkans. RAUPACH once met him in Sofia in March 1940. In about 1942, commanded a Trupp (205?) on the Crimean front. 1943, O.C. Kommando 201 (H.Q. in Belgrade), but was relieved by Hptm. MODRINIAK in Summer, 1944. Left Abwehr service at about this time; further appointments unknown.

Oberstleutnant Graf THUN. (Reserve Officer; ex-Austrian Army).

See W X X

Age about 50; married. Fought in the first World War in the Austrian Army, and holds the highest Austrian award of valour. On the outbreak of war, commanded a 'Kradshuetzenzug' in the Brandenburg Regiment. Remained for a time in Paris, without taking an active part on the Western Front, then went for a short period to the Meseritz training camp. On the outbreak of war with Russia, was given the command of a FAT in the Middle Sector, and in 1943, held the rank of Rittmeister Truppenfuehrer. (Court-martialled for making frivolous statements about the State and Party). April 1943/Oct. 1943, in command of FAT 204; injured on a special mission in Italy, and since the winter of 1943/44 in command of a FAK in Meran. 1944, Major O.C. Kdo. 212 in Italy. Late summer 1944, occupied with the formation of the Unternehmen 'EDELWEISS' and the operation of this unit, composed of mixed German and Russian troops, in Slovakia and Upper Hungary, against Red Partisans. Probably remained in this area until the end of the war.

Oberstl. WALTER (Regular Officer)

See W X X

At the beginning of 1940, in the Lehrregiment Brandenburg. Went into action on the Dutch frontier at the beginning of the German offensive; decorated with the Knight's Cross. In the Summer of 1944, was transferred to the SS, Jagdverbaende, together with other technical personnel. GAMBKE believes he was wounded, so it was only towards the end of 1944, if not at the beginning of 1945, that he took over the post as Chief

APPENDIX D(22)

- C -

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNELWALTER (otd)

of Staff with the Jagdverbaende. At the beginning of April 1945, H.O. was transferred to Hof (to the south of Plauen in Saxony). Further particulars unknown.

Hptm. KRETSCHMAR (Regular Officer according to RAUPACH, Reserve Officer according to GAMBKE)

Age 30/38; married. Early 1940, in the Lehrregiment Brandenburg, fighting on the Dutch frontier; was severely wounded. Was Intelligence Officer in the Brandenburg Division. In Autumn 1943(?), a 'Nachrichtenkompanie' for Abwehr II work was formed within the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, under the command of KRETSCHMAR. This Coy. was dissolved on the formation of Mil. Amt, and the Nachrichtenregiment of the Amt incorporated under Major FORETSCHKIN. KRETSCHMAR then transferred to Mil. E, but soon went on to VI F(?), where he dealt with W/T intercepts. Since the summer of 1944, was with the Abweherschule KAMENZ. GAMBKE last heard of him when he had a telephone conversation with KRETSCHMAR in February 1945 about the collection of 'intercept' equipment for Frontaufklaerungskommandos.

Leutnant PAULUS (Reserve Officer)

Age about 35; married. Served with the Paratroops (Air Force) and took part in the airborne landing in Crete in 1941. In the same year, transferred to the Infantry Parachute Trupp in Leningrad. Date of joining Abw. II unknown, but in the Spring of 1943, held the rank of Feldwebel in Referat AL, Gruppe A. Early in the winter of 1943, took over the Luft Referat, dealing with air transport matters as well as the development of means of transport for the special use of Abw. II.

GAMBKE stayed with PAULUS in Bucharest, April/May 1944, in connexion with the forming of the Unternehmen 'BRENNESSEL'. Remained with the Referat until the end. Last heard of in Bad Elster, April 1945.

Oberstleutnant ARNOLD (Regular Officer)

Age 45/50; married. Has been with the OKW since January 1938, and since the outbreak of war, in Oberst STOLZE's Dept. (Gruppe Ost). 1942, approximately, in command of FAK 201 on the Caucasian front. This unit went to the Crimea for a period of rest prior to being transferred to Walli in the Warsaw area. In the autumn of 1943, ARNOLD returned for a short period to the Abt. where he was in charge of Referat OK, Gruppe Ost. Then, until the end of January 1945, he was O.C. FAK 203, at first attached to Heeresgruppe Mitte. At the beginning of the Soviet offensive, he was discharged on orders of Oberst BUNEROCK, Mil. F (formerly Wehrmacht-Fuehrungsstab) for being absent from the Kommando without leave, and worked temporarily with Mil. F. End February 1945 or beginning March, with the Kommandomeldgebiet, Berlin. RAUPACH believes that ARNOLD then joined Oberst STOLZE, who was head of Ast-Berlin.

- CI -

APPENDIX D(22)
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

Oberstlt. SCHMALSCHLÄGER (Regular Officer)

Section III Assistant for Russia from the beginning of the Eastern campaign. Since Spring 1944, in charge of Leitstelle III Ost, which did very good work in connexion with evaluation of Frontaufklärung III activities. In command of Walli III.

Oberstlt. Ernst zu EIKERN (Regular Officer)

Age 45/50; married; two children. Summer 1938, in Abw. II, Ast Breslau. Beginning 1940, Ast Cracow. 1942, O.C. Kdo. 202, with Heeresgruppe Sued. Spring 1943, O.C. Lehrregt. Kurfuerst (formerly a Regiment of the Brandenburg Division), and the Abweherschule in Brandenburg. Autumn 1943, took over Gruppe Ost of Abwehr Abt. II. Spring 1944, went for about two months to Zeppelin, to take charge of the Chefgruppe, after which he was granted a month's leave for dental treatment. June 1944, approximately, O.C. Leitstelle II Ost, succeeding Oberst STOLZE, H.Q. Bischofsfelden bei Konin. At the beginning of the Soviet offensive, Leitstelle II Ost moved to the so-called Warthegau (formerly West Poland), then to Birkenwerder bei Berlin, previously H.Q. of Mil.D. which had moved to Bad Elster, Saxony. PETERS states that Leitstelle II Ost, as far as he knows, was last at Bernburg an der Elbe, but GAMBKE mentions a telephone conversation at the beginning of April 1945, when he spoke to zu EIKERN; the latter then mentioned that he had received orders to move to South Bavaria.

Werner EISENBERG

EISENBERG was a man of good family, who had fought as an officer in the last war and won the Iron Cross, First Class. His father had been a wealthy man, and EISENBERG had studied at several German universities. After the war he went to Lausanne for a period, to improve his French, and on his return took up a legal career. He specialised in economic law and became one of the best-known lawyers in Dessau. His chief business was as legal representative of big industrial firms in Dessau, such as Junkers, and he also was legal adviser to the Prince of Anhalt. Until the Nazis came into power he was a National Liberal and was Deputy of the Deutsche Volkspartei in Dessau. After 1933 he retired from politics and devoted himself to his profession.

As the Prince of Anhalt was distrusted by the Nazis, EISENBERG, as the former's legal adviser, also fell under suspicion. For this reason, and perhaps also because in his business life he had connexions with many Jews, he was described as 'a man with one foot in the concentration-camp'. At one time he was bluntly told by the Nazis that if he persisted in meddling with the Prince of Anhalt's affairs, he would find himself in a concentration-camp; the Prince of Anhalt himself was interned as a result of the attempt against Hitler on 20th July, 1944.

It is not known exactly when EISENBERG left his civilian profession and entered the Abwehr. RAUPACH stated that he was definitely in Abwehr service at the end of 1940 or beginning of 1941, and it was more than likely his work was of a general economic nature. RAUPACH thinks that in 1942 he became Sachbearbeiter Sued-Ost, working on Balkan affairs, in Abwehr-II in Berlin; GAMBKE states that in January 1943 EISENBERG was possibly Head of one of the Referate in Sued-Ost. In the spring of 1943 Abwehr-II divided into two, one part

- CII -

APPENDIX D(22)
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

Werner EISENBERG (ctd.)

remaining in Berlin and the other going to Zeppelin, outside Berlin. When this occurred EISENBERG was appointed liaison officer for Sued-Ost affairs between Berlin and Zeppelin. In the autumn of 1943 the whole Amt went from Berlin to Baruth, only the Fuehrung and the Chefgruppe remaining at Zeppelin. EISENBERG went to Baruth and took up his former job in Gruppe Sued-Ost.

In the spring of 1944 Major ABSHAGEN left the Chefgruppe (which in the meantime had moved from Zeppelin to Baruth) and went to Paris. He was succeeded by Oberst Ernst ZU EIKERN, and two months later, by EISENBERG. This was probably in June 1944, at any rate before the debacle of the 20th July. He remained in this capacity until the collapse of Germany.

When the Mil. Amt. was instituted, EISENBERG was regarded with deep suspicion by Major LOOS, SKORZENY's deputy, but he was a cleverer man than LOOS and although the latter would have preferred to dismiss him, he realised he could not afford to lose him. It was rumoured that EISENBERG was successful in saving the life of NAUMANN on the night of 20th/21st July. EISENBERG's ability showed itself less in the external workings of Abwehr-II than in the inner policy of steering a course between the S.S. on the one hand and the old military caste on the other. He retained his title of Leiter Chefgruppe under Major LOOS, although to an extent he was superfluous and LOOS was the real head. Latterly EISENBERG was occupied with finding accommodation, etc., for Abwehr-II; it was he who arranged for the move to Bad Elster.

EISENBERG was last heard of about the 6th March 1945, when the Mil. Amt. split up and part went with LOOS to the Bavarian mountains. EISENBERG openly asked LOOS to excuse him, on account of his age and health, since he would be unfit for mountain warfare. LOOS agreed to his remaining behind at Bad-Elster. It is thought his real reason for staying on was that he wished to return to his civilian profession.

EISENBERG had a brother (Christian name unknown) some five years younger than himself. He also was a lawyer, but during the war had been serving as a Gefreiter. At the very end EISENBERG succeeded in getting his brother into the Abwehr, obviously as a means of getting him out of the Army, and he arrived at Bad-Elster on the night that GAMBKE, RAUPACH and PETERS left. There was some resemblance between the two brothers, but it could be seen that the latter was younger than Werner EISENBERG.

GAMBKE, RAUPACH and PETERS are agreed that Werner EISENBERG was anti-Nazi, although he did not openly air his views. This is supported by his background and was brought out in conversations he had, particularly with GAMBKE.

+ DEHMEL, Hans (Oberst) + PF 602928 xref.

DEHMEL was prominently connected with youth movements, both in Germany and abroad - he had contacts with the Scout Movement in England and organised visits by German youth to the Balkans. He was the founder of the Volkshochschulheims Boberhaus, Loewenberg, Silesia. After 1933 DEHMEL and his friends were violently opposed to the Nazi Party, and the S.D. in particular, and he had to live abroad for a

- CEEK -

APPENDIX D(22)GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNELDEHMEL, Hans (ctd.) PF with W.R.C.3

time (Transylvania, whence his wife came). But in 1936 he undertook to work for the Wehrmacht, in order to have a job and to gain political protection. In 1937 he was summoned to Hptm. GROSSKURTH, who appointed him to various Dienststellen, including Dresden and Vienna. He was a pacifist and saw in Abwehr work propaganda possibilities rather than actual active results; i.e. any enemy would be afraid of the Abwehr, simply because it existed. After the beginning of the war, he served for two years as head of the German-Italian Officer Commission, which was set up to determine the frontiers between Hungary and Roumania, at Kronstadt. Because of being on bad terms with the S.D., further employment by the Abwehr seemed out of the question, but he was finally appointed deputy to the head of the Kommandomeldegebiet in Prague. DEHMEL was informed of the plan set up by GAMBKE and RAUPACH, through a mutual friend, but owing to transport difficulties, a personal meeting was out of the question.

Description (combined from GAMBKE and RAUPACH)

Nationality: German; Age: 48-50; Build: slim; Height: medium; Hair: grey-white, abundant; Eyes: grey-brown; Face: lean, fresh, aquiline nose, determined chin, cleanshaven; Hands: long, slender; Voice: clear, wide range of tone; Peculiarity: wound in the thigh from the Great War; Languages: English.

JENTSCH, Rudolf (Oberleutnant)

MT X
A
JENTSCH had served as an infantry officer, but after severe wounds, was transferred to the Abwehr in 1944 - Kommandomeldegebiet in Prague - where he was in charge of the Referat Auswertung. His home is in the Bahnhofstrasse, Mittelwalde, but his family had been evacuated.

Description (combined)

Nationality: German; Age: 40; Build: medium; Hair: light brown; Eyes: grey; Face: oval-longish; Peculiarities: war wounds; Languages: English, some French.

FERID (Oberlt. Dr.) PF with W.R.C.2

FERID worked with Kdo. 204 until the autumn of 1944, when he was appointed to Referat Suedost in the Mil D. When Leitstelle Wien was set up, he lost actual authority, but promoted the work of the Kommandos through personal contacts and his vast knowledge. He had exceptionally good contacts in Greece. He was a magistrate in Munich before the war.

Description (combined)

Nationality: German; Age: 36-38; Build: slim; Height: medium; Hair: light brown; wears spectacles; longish, pale face, cleanshaven; clear voice; speaks perfect modern Greek, English and French.

NADOLNY, Lt. Dr.

MT X
A
Hilfsoffizier in Referat Suedost of Mil D. NADOLNY was the son of the former German Ambassador in Ankara and Moscow, and was well informed on events in German Foreign policy. Apparently he spent some time in Bulgaria.

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APPENDIX D(22)
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

NADOLNY (ctd.)Description (combined)

German nationality; 35-38 years old; slim build; about 1m. 78; light brown hair; grey-blue eyes; longish, brown face; cleanshaven; speaks English, Bulgarian, probably also French.

MARKERT, Werner (Lt. Dr.)

MARKERT was business manager (general secretary) of the Gesellschaft zum Studium Osteuropas (Society for the Study of Eastern Europe) in Berlin. He was also employed for a year in the personal service of the German Ambassador, DIERCKSEN, in Moscow. Through his work before the war, MARKERT had expert knowledge of Eastern Europe, especially Poland and the Baltic States. He also edited the periodical 'Osteuropa', but was distrusted by the S.D. He was in touch with all dissatisfied elements in the Ostministerium. He spent a short time as a Truppfuehrer in the Caucasian campaign, and a short period of service with the infantry in order to obtain his promotion. Otherwise he had been working with Abwehr II since its formation; in 1943 he took over Referat OK with Gruppe Ost; early in 1944 he became Abteilung liaison officer with Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab; returned to the Abteilung in August 1944, when he took over Referat Auswertung and was finally appointed to Cracow in December, to replace RAUPACH.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 37-40 years of age; thin, wiry build; medium height; brown hair; longish, fresh face; cleanshaven; appears younger than his years; speaks Russian, French and English.

BARGEL, Ernst (Leutnant)

BARGEL was one of the oldest members of Abwehr II. He took part in the Russian campaign in EIKERN's suite, working chiefly on composing pamphlets and other propaganda work. He was in charge of the 2 Staffel of Kdo. 203 until the autumn of 1944, then was attached to Kdo. 212 and from December 1944 was a member of Leitstelle II Ost. He knew the Balkans well, but could speak none of the languages. He is married to a Pole.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 45-48 years old; thickset build; medium height; dark hair, partially bald; grey eyes; speaks some English.

HASSELMANN

This officer was not known personally to either GAMBKE or RAUPACH, but was enrolled in the plan through a mutual friend. He was Truppfuehrer of Trupp 212 in Kurland.

Von STADEN, Leutnant

This officer was with Kdo. 204 from the summer of 1944 until the end. GAMBKE thinks he was last working in Prenzlau (Pomerania).

Description (from GAMBKE, not known to RAUPACH)

German nationality; 26 years old; slim, well-knit figure; about 1m.75; dark hair; cleanshaven; disfiguring muscular development on the face; speaks Latvian and German.

- CV -

APPENDIX D(22)
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

REINHARD (Hptm.)

X
H
See
u
Truppfuehrer of Trupp 203, then with Kdo. 206 until the end. At the beginning of the Russian campaign, he made a parachute jump with Estonian volunteers. He is a brave soldier, and an expert in the handling of Russian volunteers. He worked in Magdeburg before the war in a provision factory.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 38-39 years old; slim build; about 1 m.78; greying hair; grey eyes, wears spectacles.

JUNGJOHANN (Oberlt.)

X
A
See
u
Truppfuehrer 204 with Kdo. 206. Successful as the leader of the Russian volunteer mounted patrol and later during the retreat as organiser of Roumanian opposition in the Carpathian mountains. Latterly in Upper Hungary.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 30-38 years old; slim build; small, energetic; fair hair; blue eyes; narrow, longish face; cleanshaven; clear voice.

WOLFER (Leutnant)

X
H
A
Trupppoffizier with Trupp 204, with Kdo. 206. He had previously worked in the Abteilung. He knows Roumanian well, on account of his work for IG Farben.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 30-35 years old; tall, powerful build; about 1.87 m.; dark brown hair; brown eyes, wears spectacles; longish, tanned face; deep voice; speaks Roumanian.

X
H
A
GREIFF, Walter (Sonderfuehrer (Z))

Unable to join the Army because of wound, received during a fall from a horse, but volunteered for Abwehr II. Was in charge of the Kasach undertaking and has been in North Italy with Trupp 255 since the autumn of 1943.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 42 years old; broad-shouldered, tall, clumsy; light brown hair, greying; grey eyes; full face; fresh complexion; wounded in the left foot, walks with a stick. Knows some Kasach.

X
A
KLOSE, Kurt (Hptm.)

Severely wounded while serving with the Artillery as an observation officer; was then appointed Hilfsoffizier to a Kommando 204 in North Russia; early in 1944 transferred to Trupp 203 as Truppfuehrer. He was especially interested in Ukrainian problems.

- CVI -

APPENDIX D(22)
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

KLOSE, Kurt (ctd.)

Description (combined)

German nationality; 39 years old; athletic build; about 1m.78; brown hair; grey eyes; longish, pale face; pointed nose; cleanshaven; speaks English well, some French.

ACHENBRENNER, (Leutnant)

Served as a Feldwebel with Trupp 203 in Russia. He was in touch with Marshal SCHAPOSCHNIKOFF, and forwarded proposals from the latter, which were personally rejected by HITLER. ACHENBRENNER was then transferred to the Balkans, where he had excellent contacts, owing to his work as secretary of the German-Slovakian Company and as nephew of the former Chamberlain of the King of Yugoslavia. From the summer of 1944, with Kdo. 204.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 35 years old; slim build; about 1m.80.; brown hair; grey eyes; cleanshaven; speaks Slovakian, Russian.

TUEMLER, Heinz (?) (Leutnant)

X Worked with Referat Suedost in Belgrade. He knows Serbia well. Other details unknown to RAUPACH.

A Description (from RAUPACH, not known to GAMBKE)

See u German nationality; aged about 40; medium build, tall; light brown hair; grey eyes.

PIFF (Leutnant)

Had served with Leitstelle II Suedost since the summer of 1944.

Description (from GAMBKE, not known to RAUPACH)

German nationality; aged about 30; small-medium build; about 1m.75; dark hair; pale face, cleanshaven; clear voice; speaks German and Roumanian.

HIT RENKEMEYER, Oberlt. Dr. @ MASSEN

X A After working in connexion with German foreign policy, RENKEMEYER came to Abwehr II and took over Trupp 207 in the autumn of 1944. He carried out various tasks with Russian volunteers and tried to contact the Polish National Organisation. He was wounded during fighting on the Eastern front and was sent to the West to recuperate.

Description (combined)

German nationality; aged 32-37; slim build; about 1m.82; fair hair; blue eyes; longish face; cleanshaven; speaks English well, Polish and Russian.

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APPENDIX D(22)
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

SCHUETTE, Ehrenfried (Lt. Dr.)

X MT
A
SCHUETTE had studied in France and America and had relatives in Scotland, whom he often visited before the war. He was an Unter-offizier during the Russian campaign, and later became an officer in the Caucasian Legion under OBERLAENDER; then worked with BARGEL in Kdo. 203, controlling a Russian propaganda Trupp. He was transferred to Amt VI at the end of March 1945, but RAUPACH does not think he took up the appointment.

Description (combined)

German nationality; about 35 years old; slim build; about 1 m. 85; dark-auburn hair; brown(?) eyes; cleanshaven; walks stiffly; speaks English, French and Russian perfectly, some Polish.

MT
see
BRAUER (or BREUER), Otto (Leutnant)

X III
see
A
Since 1941 he has been employed in economic missions. Early in 1944 he took over the Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht, moved with them to Luckenwalde in January 1945 and had been given a mission to escape to the West with the 15 remaining W/T operators.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 40-43 years of age; tall, broad build; bald, grey hair; brown eyes; oval - longish face, cleanshaven; speaks Polish and some Russian.

KOEPPKE, (Hptm.)

MT
X
A
Served with the Censorship in Paris, then transferred to Abwehr II. Last employed with Trupp 255 in North Italy.

Description (combined)

German nationality; 34-38 years old; lanky build; about 1 m. 85; fair hair; grey eyes; oval face; cleanshaven; young-looking; speaks French.

WODKE, (Leutnant)

X
A
Served with Trupp 204 as a lieutenant. Transferred to a Trupp or Kommando in North Russia and finally worked with KOEPPKE.

Description (from RAUPACH, not known to GAMBKE)

German nationality; aged about 38; slim build; medium height; fair hair; grey eyes; small face.

WEYDE (Leutnant) @ PANKOFF MT

X
A
see
u
Collected the 'Unternehmen Jaguar' for Kdo. 202 in Cracow. This was handed over to Kdo. 206 and WEYDE was transferred with it. Comes from the Baltic region; has a Russian mother and has great personal influence on Russian soldiers.

Description (combined)

German nationality; about 27 years old; slim build, upright carriage; about 1m.80; fair hair; blue eyes; narrow face; cleanshaven; clear voice; speaks excellent Russian.

59A



29a

RAUPACH, HansArrived Camp 020 10.6.45. Taken over
by escort from Hendon Airport.RECESS 8

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Deed Box	<p><u>CASH:</u> Nil.</p> <p><u>FOREIGN CURRENCY:</u></p> <p>5 - 100 Reichsmark notes, German 1 - 50 " note, " 10 - 20 " notes, " 7 - 10 " " "</p> <p>2 - 100 Kronen notes, Protectorate of Bohemia & Moravia 1 - 50 " note, " " "</p> <p>1 gold wedding ring inscribed 1.5.30.</p>
In Filing Cabinet	<p><u>DOSSIER:</u> For details see list attached.</p>
In 1st. Cupboard	<p><u>ENVELOPE, marked 8A, containing:-</u></p> <p>1 red box containing 2 cut throat razors 1 pen knife 1 brown leather case containing 1 pr. scissors, 1 small nail file, 1 small pen knife.</p>
In Cellar	<p><u>SACK, marked 'RAUPACH - 1' containing:-</u></p> <p>1 pr. black knee boots 1 tie 1 woollen vest 1 pr. long cotton pants 1 green long sleeved shirt, collar attached 1 pr. grey kid gloves 1 pr. grey woollen socks 1 pr. brown knickerbockers with belt attached 1 check woollen scarf 1 fawn long sleeved pullover 1 brown jacket 1 green overcoat 1 leather belt 1 grey Trilby hat 1 brown beret 1 book marked 'BRITAIN and GERMANY'. 1 envelope containing:- 2 leather wallets some loose envelopes 1 paper covered book 1 square of cardboard some toilet paper 1 handkerchief 1 soiled handkerchief 2 pencil stubs 1 safety pin 1 comb 1 watch in metal case</p>

28a

RAUPACH, Hans

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Cellar	<p>SACK, marked 1, continued -</p> <p>1 envelope continued - ctg:-</p> <p>9 pkts. containing guitar string marked CARUSO</p> <p>3 pkts. " " " " 25</p> <p>4 pkts. " " " " KUNZEL</p> <p>1 pkt. " " " " G.3.</p> <p>1 " " " " H.2.</p> <p>1 " " " " GITARR</p> <p>1 " " " " S.E.</p>
In Cellar	<p>RUCKSACK, marked 'RAUPACH - 2' containing:-</p> <p><u>In Side Pockets:</u></p> <p>1 spoon</p> <p>1 suede leather case containing:-</p> <p>1 wooden flute in 3 parts contained in 2 woollen bags and 1 flute cleaner</p> <p>1 pr. black leather slippers</p> <p><u>In Front Pocket:</u></p> <p>1 tablet soap and 1 shaving stick wrapped in oilskin bag</p> <p>1 carton marked BLEISTIFT containing 8 pencils</p> <p>1 note case containing empty carton marked DBEL</p> <p>number of bandaid plasters wrapped in cellophane paper</p> <p>1 tin marked MARSCH</p> <p>1 cotton housewife</p> <p>1 cotton bag containing shoe cleaning materials</p> <p><u>In Main Part of Rucksack:</u></p> <p>1 leather purse (empty)</p> <p>1 child's dress</p> <p>1 pkt. KIRKMAN soap</p> <p>1 white cotton bag containing tea and coffee beans</p> <p>1 white crepe child's frock</p> <p>1 pr. black lisle socks</p> <p>1 pr. dark blue lisle socks</p> <p>1 cotton bag containing:-</p> <p>1 pr. elastic sock suspenders</p> <p>1 piece canvas material</p> <p>3 handkerchiefs</p> <p>1 pr. brown silk socks</p> <p>1 linen bag containing small pieces of wood</p> <p>1 blue pin striped suit (jacket and trousers, with braces attached)</p> <p>1 odd black shoe</p> <p>1 blue and white doley</p> <p>1 grey striped shirt, collar attached</p> <p>2 prs. brown woollen socks</p> <p>1 mess tin (German Army Pattern)</p> <p>1 hand towel</p> <p>1 waterproof bag containing:-</p> <p>1 U.S.A. Field ration D. carton containing number of buttons and odd pieces of wool</p> <p>1 tube BRUSHLESS shaving cream in carton marked MOLLE</p> <p>1 nail brush</p> <p>1 shaving brush</p> <p>1 toothbrush in cellophane wrapper</p> <p>1 small tin marked LALOLIN</p> <p style="text-align: right;">contd./</p>

19c

RAUPACH, Hans

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
---------	---------------------

In Collar

RUCKSACK, marked RAUPACH - 2' continued -
In Main part of Rucksack:
 1 waterproof bag continued - ctg:-
 1 small earthenware pot containing paste
 1 white bakelite soap container containing:-
 small tablet of soap
 1 broken travelling mirror
 1 tube paste
 1 blue striped bag containing:-
 1 white linen mattress cover
 1 pr. long cotton pants
 1 white cotton vest
 1 green woollen sports shirt, collar attached

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Signature

Signature *J. Gambour*

Camp 020/CFGK/JG/11.6.45.

SECRET

29a

Telephone Nos.
REGENT 6050.
WHITEHALL 6789.

BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

11th June, 1945.

MEMORANDUM.

To: B.I.W., Mr. H.P. Milmo.

RAUPACH, Hans.

I have to advise you that
RAUPACH was collected from Hendon
Airport on 10.6.45.

Herewith list of property.
Details of intelligence papers
are being sent separately.

[Handwritten signature]

.....
Lt.-Col.

I.4/I.2/Camp 020
JG

Encl: Property list in duplicate.

[Handwritten mark]
✓ JB
19/6/45

29A

PETERS, SergiusArrived Camp O20 10.6.45. Taken over
by escort from Hendon Airport.RECESS 3.

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Deed Box	<p><u>CASH:</u> Nil.</p> <p><u>FOREIGN CURRENCY:</u></p> <p>2 - 100 Reichsmark notes, German 2 - 20 " " " 12 - 10 " " " 2 - 5 " " " 1 - 2 Rentenmark note, "</p> <p>1 brown leather purse containing:- 12 - 10 Reichspfennig coins, German 5 - 5 " " "</p>
In Deed Box	<p>2 small buttons 1 sardine tin opener 1 gold cross on piece of grey wool some flints 1 lighter wick 1 white metal pocket watch with chain attached 1 black fountain pen. 1 white metal propelling pencil</p>
In Filing Cabinet	<p><u>DOSSIER:</u> For details see list attached.</p>
In 1st. Cupboard	<p><u>ENVELOPE, marked 3A, containing:-</u> number of loose wrapped blades of various makes 3 unwrapped blades 1 pr. broken scissors</p>
In Cellar	<p><u>SACK, marked 'PETERS - 1' containing:-</u> 1 pr. black leather knee boots 1 grey greatcoat 1 pr. long white pants 1 cotton shirt, cuff links, and back stud and front stud attached 1 grey felt Trilby hat 1 soiled handkerchief 1 white collar 1 blue striped tie 1 pr. blue socks 1 brown beret 1 pr. grey riding breeches with braces attached 1 grey long sleeved pullover 1 grey jacket 1 envelope containing:- 2 metal shavers 2 leather wallets 1 leather cigar case 1 travelling mirror 1 electric torch 1 cigarette lighter 1 booklet matches</p>

29A

-2-

PETERS:

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Cellar	<p><u>SACK, marked 'PETERS - 1' continued -</u> 1 envelope continued - ctg:- 1 cigarette holder 1 piece white metal 1 spoon 2 sardine tin openers 1 piece pencil 1 tin tube 1 comb 1 pr. spectacles</p>
In Cellar	<p><u>RUCKSACK, marked 'PETERS - 2' containing:-</u> <u>In Small Pockets:</u> 1 bag of boot cleaning materials 1 black tin of boot polish 1 tin box containing medicaments 1 U.S.A. Field Ration tin containing:- 2 small phials of water purifying tablets <u>In Large Pocket (in front of Rucksack)</u> 1 leather case containing toilet requisites 1 tablet soap 1 white celluloid toilet soap container with soap 1 empty tin marked GREILING 1 coffee Field Ration 1 face towel 1 white cotton shirt 1 shirt, collar attached 1 pr. fur slippers <u>In Main Part of Rucksack:</u> 1 suit pyjamas 1 pr. long white cotton pants 1 grey shirt with collar 1 face towel 1 blue shirt 1 green sports shirt 1 leather fur lined pullover 1 towel 1 piece wood 3 tins with handles 1 brown sleeping bag <u>In Large Pocket (at top of Rucksack)</u> 1 cotton bag containing coffee some toilet paper 1 pr. blue socks 1 pr. black socks 1 empty khaki cotton bag 1 khaki cotton bag containing red handkerchief 1 khaki cotton bag containing:- 1 piece cotton edging 1 boot brush 1 nail brush 1 small square soap 1 handkerchief 1 green belt, linen 2 housewives</p>

contd. over/

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PETERS:

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Cellar	<u>RUCKSACK, marked 'PETERS - 2' continued -</u> <u>In Large Pocket (at top of Rucksack)</u> 1 khaki cotton bag containing:- 4 prs. socks 1 odd sock 1 handkerchief 2 ties 2 linen belts 3 spare blue collars 1 white linen collar 1 pr. elastic sock suspenders

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Signature *C. B. Lewis*

Signature *J. G. Lamborn*

Camp 020/CFGK/JG/11.6.45.

SECRET

1229A

Telephone Nos.
REGENT 6050.
WHITEHALL 6789.

BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

11th June, 1945.

MEMORANDUM.

To: B.I.W., Mr. H.P. Milmo.

PETERS, Serjius

I have to advise you that
PETERS was collected from Hendon
Airport on 10.6.45.

Herewith list of property.
Details of intelligence papers
are being sent separately.

D. H. ...

.....
Lt.-Col.

I.2/I.4/Camp 020
JG

Encl: Property list in duplicate.

19/6/45

27A

GAMBKE, GotthardArrived Camp 020 10.6.45. Taken over
by escort from Hendon Airport.RECESS 5

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Deed Box	<p><u>CASH:</u> Nil.</p> <p><u>FOREIGN CURRENCY:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 - 1000 Reichsmark note, German 5 - 100 " notes, " 7 - 50 " " " 19 - 20 " " " 31 - 10 " " " 1 - 5 " note, " 1 - 1 Rentenmark note, " <p>1 brown leather purse containing:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 17 - 10 Reichspfennig coins, German 8 - 5 " " " 11 - 1 " " " <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 - 2 Lei coin, Rounanian 1 - 20 Groszy coin, Polish
In Deed Box	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 loose keys 1 small key ring with 2 keys 1 pr. white metal cuff links 2 small pieces white metal 1 small charm in shape of a pig 1 small charm in shape of 2 toad stools 1 linen button 1 green and black fountain pen 1 white metal wrist watch with brown leather strap
In Filing Cabinet	<u>DOSSIER:</u> For details see list attached.
1st. Cupboard	<p><u>ENVELOPE, marked 5A, containing:-</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 large pen knife 2 pkts. OLANDA razor blades 1 red pkt. containing wrapped razor blades 2 wrapped razor blades marked BERKELEY
In Cellar	<p><u>WHITE KITBAG, marked 'GAMBKE - 1' containing:-</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 green overcoat 1 grey jacket 1 pr. flannel knickerbockers, with braces attached 1 dark blue sweater 1 grey shirt, collar attached 1 puce coloured tie 1 aertex vest 1 pr. long woollen pants 1 pr. woollen socks 1 pr. brown boots 1 black beret 1 handkerchief

27A

GAMBKE, G.

REMARKS	DETAILS OF PROPERTY
In Cellar	<p><u>LEATHER BRIEF CASE, marked 'GAMBKE - 2' containing:-</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 leather map case 3 leather wallets 1 pr. kid gloves 1 comb 1 electric torch 4 pencils 1 face towel some toilet paper some brown paper 1 pkt. marked CHESTERFIELD cigarettes containing matches coil of wire 1 spoon 1 pr. ear protectors 1 leather belt 1 leather strap 1 booklet matches 1 leather bag containing:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 broken pipe some loose pipe cleaners 1 booklet matches 1 cigarette holder 1 spring lock with key 1 white linen bag containing:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> odd pieces paper 1 glass phial marked CHINOSOL 1 pr. sun glasses 1 empty tube toothpaste 1 toilet bag containing shaving and washing materials 1 comb
In Cellar	<p><u>CARDBOARD CARTON, marked 'GAMBKE - 3' containing:-</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 green canvas bag containing:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 prs. woollen stockings 1 grey shirt, collar attached 3 handkerchiefs 1 white shirt, collar attached 1 white aertex vest 1 green cotton shirt, collar attached 2 dried milk tins with handles 3 smaller tins with handles 1 pink bakelite screw topped container with lemonade powder 1 small canvas bag containing sugar 1 face cloth 2 pieces wood 1 tube MOLLE shaving cream 1 length of string 1 length of wire 1 pr. dark blue knickerbockers 1 green bag containing:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 pr. long woollen pants 1 face towel 1 pr. woollen socks 1 odd white woollen sock 1 handkerchief

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Signature

Signature *J. Garbhan*

Camp 020/C887/JG/11.6.45.

SECRET

27 A

Telephone Nos.
REGENT 6050.
WHITEHALL 6789.

BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

11th June, 1945.

MEMORANDUM.

To: B.I.W., Mr. H.P. Milmo.

GAMBKE, Gotthard.

I have to advise you that
GAMBKE was collected from Hendon
Airport on 10.6.45.

Herewith list of property.
Details of intelligence papers
are being sent separately.

[Handwritten signature]

.....
Lt.-Col.

I.2/I.4/Camp 020
JG

Encl: Property list in duplicate.

[Handwritten initials]
19/6/45

SECRET.

WAR ROOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM.

WRH
PA
2A

(ALP/GX 39)

Sent 18th April 1945.
 Received 19th April 1945. (WR/X 1700/19)
 Channel O.S.S. SAINT.

Reference 12th Rear 125
 Case Officer W.R.C.2.
 File PF 601.616

12th Rear.

To: War Room, London.
 Info: Paris X-2
 From: 12th A.G.

Drink Signals.

1. A. 3 members RSHA MILANT D REFERAT OST surrendered voluntarily 13 April KLOETKE ALTMARE.
2. B. Oberleutnant GOTTARD G A M B K E Chief Referat OST born 11 September 08 GLOGAU. *PF 601, 616*
3. C. Leutnant Doktor HANS RAUPACH assistant above. Born 10 April 03 PRAGUE. *PF 601, 617*
4. D. Gefreiter Sergina PETERS secretary born 22 Oct. 09. *PF 601, 618*
5. E. In civilian clothes no soldbuche have PW status.
6. F. Prepared volunteer details ABWEHR 2 MILANT D and operations these organisations on eastern front.
7. G. Have been transferred 9th Army interrogation centre for detailed interrogation subjects para F.

Distribution: Action copy: SAINT: Information: DIREC
 SECT.

DISTRIBUTION

- | | |
|------------|----------|
| 2 SIS (VF) | 1 DSDOC |
| 1 WEE | 1 D/WR ✓ |
| 1 WRF | 4 WRC2 ✓ |
| | 1 spare. |

ACTION COPY

22 APR 1945

*File 110/PM/1
2w. 4.45*

12

EXTRACT.

Ex for File No. P.F. 601,616. Name: GAMBKE/RAUPACH/PETERS.

Original in File No. P.F. 65930. v.2. Serial: 28a. Receipt Date: 26.8.43.

Original from: S.I.M.E. Under Ref.: SIME/500/14/5. Dated: 20.8.43.

Extracted on: 1.5.46. by: C.M.H. Section: W.R.H.

S.I.M.E. Interim Reports on G.J. MULLER.

2nd Interim Report

.....
16. KIRKENES

PAULUS, the "checker-outer", or "bouncer" of MUELLER's party told them that a few days previously or about 10 June 43, he had acted in a similar capacity in the in the KIRKENES Expedition. A Lt. GAMKE accompanied the group, but was not dropped by parachute.

The group contained 10/20 men in two A.C. The leader is not known to AGT. The expedition was prepared at ABW II, and started from BERLIN. According to PAULUS the entire group made a perfect landing.

.....
4th Interim Report.

.....
2. UNTERNEHMEN KIRKENES (ABW II)

(a) Departure from BERLIN approx 10 June 42 (sic)

.....
(e) Probably on journey, but returned to BERLIN:
2/Lt. GAMBKE (Not GAMKE) who prepares all expeditions to Russia, and flies with them to destinations.

*Copy
1.5.46.*