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PART IV - PETERS (contd.)7. Subsequent Movements and Activities in the Abwehr (contd.)July,
1944.

PETERS' first task was to translate extracts from Soviet newspapers.

On the night of 20th July, PETERS was told, together with the rest of the Staff, that there had been an attempt on HITLER's life. PETERS spent the rest of the night on duty. There was little excitement the following morning, but for the first time PETERS sensed that there was some hidden antagonism between the Wehrmacht and the SS. A few days later, the names of those concerned in the plot were mentioned in the newspapers. These included some of the most important and able members of the Abwehr, e.g:

Baron v. FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN
Oberst LAHOUSEN
Oberst HANSEN.

The trial of the 'criminals' took place, but no questions were asked in the office.

August/
Nov. 1944.

The OKW/Abwehr became part of the RSHA, and Referat Ost became known as Mil.D/Ost, but no change took place in its activities. Major NAJMANN (see Appx. D.22), who had been Chief of the Chef-Gruppe (comprising Referat Ost, Suedost, Suedwest and West), was replaced by Major LOOS (see Appx. D.22), one of SKORZENY's men, whilst SKORZENY himself became Chief of the Mil.Amt.

PETERS' duties remained much the same: a certain amount of map-drawing, providing of information to officers of other Referate on the undertakings of the FAKs and FATs (see Appx. D.6), and occasional trips to Berlin, usually on Saturdays or Sundays. In addition, PETERS paid a visit to Dresden to see his only relatives, two girl-cousins of 18 and 24, whom he had brought to Germany from Russia in 1942. He then made a further trip to the 2nd Staffel of Leitstelle I Ost (often called Dienststelle BAUN, after its C.O.), in Harnepop, 45 Miles east of Berlin, to collect office requirements for FAK 202. There he made the acquaintance of Hptm. AUFFERMANN (see Appx. D.16).

Towards the end of November, on orders of the Mil.Amt, PETERS' office was moved to Birkenwerder, a northern suburb of Berlin, where other departments of Mil.Amt, including SKORZENY's office, were also being transferred.

December 1944/
February 1945. Dr. RAUFACH (details given earlier in this report) was transferred from FAK 202 in Cracow, his task being to collaborate with the Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations (see Appx. D.16).

At this time, it became apparent that a German victory was impossible; Russian advances were breaking down German resistance everywhere. It was also about this time that GAMBKE told him about the so-called "Unternehmen 20 Offiziere", and PETERS promised his support (details are at Appx. D.20).

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PART IV - PETERS (contd.)7. Subsequent Movements and Activities in the Abwehr (contd.)March,
1945.

As Berlin was being threatened by the Russians, Mil.D was ordered to move to Central Germany at the beginning of March. Major LOOS, Oberlt. GAMBEKE and PETERS, as well as a few other members of the staff remained in Berlin until the end of March, when they left by car for Bad Elster, in Saxony, which was to be the H.Q. of Mil.D. Most of its documents had already been burnt, or taken to the War Archives in Potsdam.

Decision to surrender to the Allies.April/June
1945.

A few days later, information was received that Mil.D was to be disbanded - officers and service men were to proceed either to some FAK or go with the rest of Mil.Amt to Bavaria where they were to make a last stand. Without experience of this type of work, it seemed quite senseless to obey these orders. When, therefore, GAMBEKE suggested that he should leave Bad Elster with RAUPACH and himself, and surrender to the Allies, PETERS agreed immediately.

The remainder of PETERS' account agrees with that related by GAMBEKE and will be found in the final pages of Part II to this Report.

PETERS, together with GAMBEKE and RAUPACH, was transferred to Camp 020 on 10th June, 1945.

PART V.

GAMBKE/RAUPACH/PETERS.

RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION.

Both GAMBKE and RAUPACH have volunteered statements claiming that in January of this year they were planning, together with some 20 other officers, to desert to the Allies at the earliest opportunity, and to turn over all information in their possession. Furthermore, RAUPACH alleges that in the middle of 1944 he attempted (without success however) to get into touch with the British Authorities through the Polish Resistance Movement in Warsaw.

RAUPACH has asserted that he was mal vu by the Nazi Party and that he was the subject of an adverse report from HEYDRICH to Admiral CANARIS.

With the wealth of information now available to the Allied Authorities, it should be possible to check the above, and both GAMBKE and RAUPACH fully appreciate this fact.

PETERS has apparently never been a member of the Nazi Party, and being half Russian by birth owes no real loyalties to Germany.

Practically all the information regarding Intelligence Organisations and Personnel that each has supplied has been susceptible to crosschecking against the statements of the other two, and, with the exception of minor points such as dates, etc., such statements have tallied.

Taking the above points into consideration, and bearing in mind that the trio have nothing to gain at the present juncture by telling lies, it is concluded that the main bulk of the information in this report can be regarded as reliable. Information regarding their own personal activities, however, should be treated with a certain amount of reserve until confirmed from other sources.

Investigated by:

A. Williams
..... Capt.

L. Williams

.....
Lieut. Colonel.

Camp 020.
August 1945.

A P P E N D I C E S

A (1)	Translation of questionnaire on sabotage submitted to GAMBKE	pps. I - V
B (1)	Translation of statement by RAUPACH on the Ukrainian problem	pps. VI - XI
C (1)	Translation of questionnaire on sabotage submitted to PETERS	pps. XII - XV
D (1) - (22)	Combined information	pps. XVI - CVII

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APPENDIX A (1)SABOTAGE(Translation of questionnaire submitted to GAMBKE)Prefatory Note

1. Many of the questions are intended for an agent who has been trained for operational purposes. For that reason, I am not able to answer them.
2. At the end of 1942 (December) I took part in an introductory course (mostly for beginners in Abwehr work) in the Abwehr II Service. I will begin my replies by a report on this course, incorporating all I can still remember about it, anticipating the replies to various questions.
3. Report on the introductory course in Abwehr II work
 - a) Purpose: to give a general picture of Abwehr II work to newly-enrolled officers and existing Abwehr assistants, and to show them the possibilities for carrying out this work.
 - b) Date: Mid-December 1942.
 - c) Duration: A fortnight.
 - d) Location: Quenz (Quelle). Abwehr II school near Brandenburg on the Havel.
 - e) Participants: About 14 people. The names I can remember are: ^{NT} Oblt. HAGELEITNER, Oblt. STRAUSS (a Feldwebel at the time) and ^A Lt. WINDGASSEN. ^{NT}
 - f) In Command: Major KEUNE (shortly afterwards left the Wehrmacht as a result of severe heart-trouble.)
 - g) Instructors: Major KEUNE, Hauptmann WAHL, Oblt. MUEHLMANN. As Guest Instructor, Oberstlt. v. ESCHWEGE. Oberst: MAGUERE, at that time the head of the Technical Group of Abwehr II inspected the course on one occasion.
 - h) Theoretical instruction:
 - i) Introduction to the organisation of the Abwehr. (Instructor: KEUNE)
 - ii) Technique of the handling of V-Men. Recruitment, handling and running of such V-Leute. (Instructor: KEUNE).
 - iii) Abwehr-II work on the Eastern front; activities of Abwehr Trupps; discussion of operation units. (Instructor: KEUNE).
 - iv) ESCHWEGE's guest lecture; "My work as Leader of a Kommando on the Eastern Front (with Abwehr II)".
 - v) British Kommando operations and the training therefor. (Lecture by KEUNE).

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APPENDIX A(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

- vi) The teaching of petty sabotage on the lines of instruction given to Russian partisans. (Petty sabotage (Kleinsabotage) is the name given to that type of sabotage which is carried out without the use of explosives). (Instructor: KEUNE).
 - vii) Explosive and incendiary materials, and the method of obtaining them from among current commercial products. (Instructor: WAHL).
 - viii) Foreign sabotage materials (just a brief survey, in four hours). (Instructor: WAHL). I can remember our astonishment at the diversity of the British materials, which was in sharp contrast to the poor German products.
 - ix) Sappers' explosive and incendiary materials; calculation of charges. (Instructor: MUEHLMANN).
 - x) Greater sabotage and its technical preliminary requirements (e.g., method of approaching a W/T mast). (Instructor: MUEHLMANN).
- i) Practical instruction:
- i) Production in the laboratory of materials mentioned at (h)(vii). (Instructor: WAHL).
 - ii) Practice in the handling of the materials mentioned at (i)(i), in the practice grounds of the school. (Instructor: WAHL).
 - iii) Night exercises: carrying out a sabotage operation in the dark with the requisite materials. (Instructor: WAHL).
 - iv) Practice in the grounds with sappers' explosive and incendiary materials. (Instructor: MUEHLMANN).
 - v) Shooting, with pistol and machine-pistol. (Instructor: KEUNE).
 - vi) Self-defence (Instructor: KEUNE).
- j) Notes and sketches of the material used during the instruction had to be destroyed at the end of the course.

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APPENDIX A(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

k) Normal daily time-table:

06.45	Reveille
06.45 - 07.00	P.T.
07.30	Breakfast
08.00 - 12.00	Instruction, with brief intervals
12.30	Lunch
14.00 - 16.00	Instruction
16.00	Break for coffee
16.30 - 19.00	Instruction
19.30	Supper

Following that came a period of organised free time, and revision of the instruction we had received.

l) System of instruction:

At the beginning of each lesson, the teachings of the previous day were run through.

- m) The course, which had originally been intended to last three weeks, was reduced to a fortnight in view of the approaching Christmas holiday. As a result, this very considerable subject was merely glossed over. I can no longer remember technical details, because I had no interest in the development of sabotage materials, and their use, since my own work was in the H.Q. of Abwehrabteilung II.

Questionnaire

- Q.1. Before being trained by the German Service, did you have any knowledge of chemistry or explosive and incendiary materials?
A.1. Yes. a) Chemistry: Instructed at school from Obersekunda to Oberprima and at the Technical School in the first four terms.
b) Explosives: Training in 1934/5 as sapper in the Engineers Battalion 18, on three manoeuvres and on a mission in Army units during the war. c) Incendiary materials: No previous knowledge.
- Q.2. Where did you receive your sabotage training?
A.2. Quenz bei Brandenburg, Abwehr II School.
- Q.3. How many hours theory?
A.3. About 25 hours.
- Q.4. How many hours practical training?
A.4. About 25 hours.
- Q.5. Date of instruction?
A.5. December 1942.

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APPENDIX A(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

- Q.6. Who were your instructors and what were their subjects?
 A.6. Major KEUNE: Sabotage (on a small scale) and general.
 Hptm. WAHL: Manufacture and application of sabotage materials.
 Oblt. MUEHLHANN: Sappers' explosive materials.
- Q.7. What other pupils attended sabotage courses?
 A.7. Oblt. HAGELEITNER, Oblt. STRAUSS and Lt. WINDGASSEN known by name.
 In all about 14 men.
-
- Q.8. Were you taught how to manufacture your own explosives and incendiary materials?
 A.8. The instruction took place too long ago for me to remember details. Fuses and incendiary materials were made.
- Q.9. What explosive materials do you know?
 A.9. Besides the usual ones like dynamite, sappers' explosives.
- Q.10. Which incendiary materials do you know?
 A.10. None by name.
- Q.11. What delay mechanisms do you know?
 A.11. Clockwork fuses, rail contact fuses and chemical fuses.
- Q.12. Which materials of British, German, Italian or Russian manufacture do you know?
 A.12. None.
- Q.13. Give details of camouflaged bombs known to you.
 A.13. To my knowledge the English method of camouflage of bombs (the camouflaged coal bomb) was taught at the course. The German method was also developed and used a great deal in the East, with comparatively small results.
- Q.14. How did the Germans expect you to get materials to carry out sabotage missions?
 A.14. -
- Q.15. Were you to steal sabotage materials?
 A.15. -
- Q.16. How many hidden dumps of sabotage materials do you know? Where are these?
 A.16. 1) Baltic States; 2) W. Ukraine; 3) Upper Silesia;
 4) Slovakia and Hungary; 5) E. Prussia.
 Details unknown. The position of the bunkers apart from East Prussia was the concern of mil. D.
- Q.17. What type of material is contained in these hidden dumps?
 A.17. Details not known.
- Q.18. Who is using these dumps?
 A.18. Used as reserve supplies for resistance movements in these districts.
- Q.19. How are fresh supplies sent?
 A.19. Groups of the future resistance movements would be supplied by aircraft.

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APPENDIX A(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

- Q. 20. Were you taught to use abrasives?
A. 20. No, but all these things were mentioned in the Russian partisan instructions (sand in oil, etc.)
- Q. 21. What fuse cords do you know?
A. 21. Time fuse cords and detonating fuses.
- Q. 22. What methods of using explosives did you learn? Who gave you this instruction?
A. 22. No methods of using H.E. Instructors: see answer to Q. 6.
- Q. 23 - Q. 26. Forgotten.
- Q. 27. Were you taught to destroy targets without explosive or incendiary materials?
A. 27. No details known. See Russian partisan documents. Displacement of railway lines was mentioned during the course. Wire obstruction is part of the instruction given to every Sapper.
- Q. 28 - Q. 31. Forgotten.
- Q. 32. Which books and pictures about sabotage have you seen? Where and when did you see them and who showed them to you?
A. 32. The following were gone through in the daily routine of Abwehr II:-
1) Russian partisan documents; 2) Serbian partisan documents;
3) English sabotage methods (it was according to these that we were mostly trained); 4) Polish sabotage documents (taken from the English).
- Q. 33. Give details of other sabotage training and materials known to you, or which you have heard of but which are not mentioned above.
A. 33. Nothing further known.
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Subject Index

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APPENDIX B(1)

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM NY

Translation of statement submitted by RAUPACH

Foreword

I presume that the general geographical and ethnographical facts of the Ukraine are known (the best report to the present is supposed to have been published in London during 1944) and I will confine myself to a brief summary of the dates and events of the immediate past, which were of importance for the waging of the German political war.

Zones of national consciousness

The 35 million odd Ukrainians in the present Soviet territory cannot be regarded as a homogenous political mass. We can better distinguish the following zones of national consciousness, and consequently of national activity:

East Galicia

Previously under Austrian rule and consequently developed political maturity in the modern struggles of nationalities. Here the Ukrainian language has survived, even after its suppression in Czarist Russia, in literary schools, participation in the Austrian corps of officers and in the administration. During the Polish occupation (after 1919) intensification of nationalist struggles resulted in illegal organisation of all forms of resistance.

Wolhynien (Rowno-Luzk-Dubno area)

Handed over by Russia to Poland. Radical development of national consciousness under the influence of Galicia. Woods and marshes always facilitated fighting by armed bands.

Ukraine left of the Dnieper

Area of the historical tradition of Kiev and Saporoshe (former military H.Q. of the Saporoshe Cossacks). More strongly influenced by the cultural influence of Europe than the rest of Russia. Polish-occupied zone to the gate of Kiev until 1918.

Ukraine right of the Dnieper

Settled by Ukrainians, and at the same time by Russians, during the last three centuries. Non-Ukrainians poured into the large industrial centres of the Donetz, Kharkov, Stalingrad. Therefore, with the exception of Poltava, weak national consciousness, but the Ukrainian language has survived in the country districts.

The neighbouring Ukrainian Cossacks on the Don are a special problem.

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APPENDIX B(1)
THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM (Contd.)

In brief, the national consciousness diminishes from West to East, and militant activism only appears on the wooded districts, i.e. North-West of the line Carpathians-Winniza-Tscherkassy.

The World War as the Source of Ukraine Nationalism

The collapse of the Czarist empire gave rise to the following chief political trends in the Ukraine:

- a) Proclamation of the national right of self-determination by LENIN.
- b) Constitution of the government of the Hetmann SKOROPADSKI under German occupation.
- c) Its collapse through the action of the national radical Kurs PETLJURA; fighting by the PETLJURA army with Bolsheviks and Poles.
- d) Partition of the Ukrainian colony among the Soviet Union, Poland, with a small section to Czechoslovakia (Podkarpatska Rus) and Roumeria (Bukovina, Bessarab).
- e) Increase in Ukrainian emigration to the U.S.A., France, Prague and Berlin.

In the time up to the beginning of the second World War, a few new Ukrainian energetic centres were formed: The scientific institutes in Prague and Berlin, the military conspiracy under Oberst. KONOWALETZ (the latter was murdered in Rotterdam in 1939 by the GPU): creation of a strong nationalist party throughout the world with special financial support from the Ukrainians living in the U.S.A.; ever diminishing attempts to create a Nationalist organisation in the Soviet Union; successful setting up of an economic self-administration with strong political tendencies in Poland.

1939

The outbreak of the new war brought the Ukrainians immediate disappointments: Germany did not facilitate the creation of a Carpathian Ukraine state against Hungary; she evacuated the already occupied Lemberg to the Soviets and remained loyal in the Ukrainian problem to the Soviets, nor did she support the Ukrainians against the Poles. (The Ukrainian murderer of the Polish minister PIERADSKI was handed over to the Poles, on demand, by the German authorities).

Nevertheless the Ukraine, reinforced by the new emigration from Galicia to German territory - as in the democratic countries - was able to re-organise its forces. The following groups could be distinguished:

- 1) The group of the (former Austrian) Oberst MELNIK, who was looked upon as the legal successor of KONOWALETZ. Predominantly national democratic, conservative.
- 2) Stepan BANDERA's group, young men without great knowledge of the facts but with excellent conspiratorial talents, which they

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APPENDIX B(1)
THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM (Contd.)

acquired during the time of the Polish occupation. They strove for a Ukrainian national state and had decided to look upon all foreign powers, even Germany, as foreign occupiers, with whom occasionally agreements could be reached.

- 3) Political neutrals, especially the former Austrian officers, who wished to place their specialised knowledge to the best advantage for their people.

Military exploitation of these groups by the Germans: Abwehr II had good personal relations with the leaders; which led to material support. As far as I know, there was no return - even in purely intelligence matters. However the Ukrainians of all groups allowed themselves to be engaged for various motives, for future work as interpreters, clerks, etc. Whenever the Ukrainian nationalists in the Soviet-occupied zone prepared to work in an organised way, this happened with the use of the opportunities offered by the Germans, but without letting the German military authorities know anything concrete.

On the German side, there was a strong Ukrainophile group, which was especially represented by the officers Hptm. Prof. KOCH, Hptm. Prof. OBERLAENDER, and which tried to make effective in military discussions in high places the idea of a real independent Ukraine. As no internal instruction followed from German political departments, partly from loyalty to the Russo-German treaty, partly from preconceived ideas, the German general staff and German military propaganda pursued no political aim for the impending Russian campaign, and it was at the beginning only the Abwehr II officers who tried to put into operation a constructive Ukrainian policy, on their own responsibility, at least in practical measures.

Experiences of the campaign

In spite of the lack of propaganda, the Ukrainian people greeted the German troops in a friendly manner; in Galicia, with spontaneous enthusiasm, in the Soviet zone with friendly anticipation, especially of an immediate solution of the agricultural problem. Of direct military importance, there were only a few operations by a volunteer company near Lemberg, and quite isolated attempts to disturb the Russian retreat. The murder of several thousand Ukrainian nationalists in the Lemberg and Dubno prisons by the retreating GPU, caused the national feeling to blaze up. The Soviet P.O.W.s of Ukrainian nationality, readily gave evidence, and the officers offered no further opposition. This behaviour furthered the rapid advance into the Ukraine and also the comparatively slight losses of German troops; a connection which was not made clear to the German military leaders. Even the independent characters among the German leaders, like Von RUNDSTEDT and REICHENAU, ventured only very slowly to take positive measures against the Party policy, which was gradually becoming clear. (For example: a training policy in the Army occupied zone, release of large numbers of Ukrainian P.O.W.s by REICHENAU).

On the other side, it was obvious that the Ukrainian people were no longer in a position, to any great extent, to act on their own political will. Except for a few, the last directing groups of the National Opposition had been liquidated. (Suicide of the President of

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APPENDIX B(1)
THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM (Contd.)

the Soviet Ukrainian Government SKRIPNIK, 1934). In order to destroy the opposition against the collectivisation, in 1933 four millions were allowed to starve, in spite of good harvest; the collectivisation itself had resulted in the best farmers being sent to Siberia. The intelligentsia were insecure. I got to know the helplessness, when I tried, before the entry of the German civil administration, to put on its feet a Ukrainian municipal administration in Kiev. The measures of Reichskommissar KOCH (Gauleiter of East Prussia) revolted the intelligentsia.

Nazi Ukraine Policy

E. KOCH and his colleagues worked on the principle that the mistakes of the 1918 occupation (SKOROPADSKI government) should not be repeated and that only an unequivocal German government with self-administration only in least important matters, could overcome the problems which had been set Ukraine in the economic warfare (granary of Europe). All attempts by sensible people in the Ostministerium (KLEIST, Von MENDE) and in the German army of occupation, to oppose this course, were frustrated by the influence that KOCH and the narrow-minded circle around BURMANN, had with HITLER on the Eastern policy. In spite of these principal difficulties, innumerable opportunities arose for excellent personal co-operation between the Germans and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian problem could not be solved in this way, however.

The key to a positive solution lay in the agricultural question. This is not the place to discuss in detail this exceptionally complicated problem.

Ukrainian Reaction

Although the majority of the Ukrainian farms rapidly recovered through the increasingly practical relaxation of the Kolchos system, uncertainty over the political future and especially the fact that Germany had not succeeded in bringing the war against Moscow to an end created fertile soil for resistance movements. East of the Dnieper there was hardly any opposition, and only when the Red Army was approaching did the Ukrainians, in order to save their personal future, take part in sabotage undertakings against the German troops. In the large cities, especially Kiev, very active sabotage centres were organised by the Bolsheviks round the framework of Party cells; further west an autonomous Ukrainian command appeared, which thought to wage war against the Germans and at the same time against the Bolsheviks.

The origin of organised opposition lay in Wolhynien, where groups were trained under the command of TARAS BULBA (a cover name), which later became the core of the Ukrainian Resistance Army (UPA). They fought on principle, with all means, against the S.D. and the German civil administration, but left the German armed forces unmolested. The influence of this group reached the Dnieper, where they partially overlapped the Communist-led groups, and partially fought against them. With the German retreat fighting increased. Whilst the groups in the old Soviet zone were disbanded with the advance of the Red Army, in the wooded area of Wolhynien and in Galicia the struggle was carried on against the Russians.

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APPENDIX B (1).
THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM (Contd.)

Although BANDERA and some of his leaders were arrested shortly after the German entry, on instructions from HITLER because of a proclamation by a free Ukrainian on the Lemberg station, a political core of organisation was retained in Galicia, the sphere of influence of which stretched to Wolhynien and to Kiev and Kharkov. The old programme of an autonomous Ukraine against all occupying forces being maintained, BANDERA became a symbol as far as the Soviet Ukraine. The resistance movement was organised on strict military lines, and equipped from German and Hungarian depots by increasing raids. When a Galician S.S. Division was set up, at the instigation of the German governor WACHEBER of Lemberg, 10,000 volunteers reported who wished in this way to achieve military training for their national purpose.

The propaganda of the U.P.A. was directed with equal rigour against HITLER and STALIN, whom they reproached with the same imperialistic designs, and called on all Russian nationals to unite in a struggle for freedom. Large numbers of the Caucasian and Turkestanian groups in the German Army rushed to them. But also German deserters, especially N.C.O.s were to be found in their ranks and were gladly welcomed as instructors.

When the Red Army had overrun the whole Ukrainian colony, the following picture resulted from the evidence of prisoners, deserters, tapping of Soviet telephone lines and of the reconnaissance expeditions of the German command:

UPA succeeded in attaining an almost complete centralised control of the Ukrainian people in Galicia and Wolhynien, through a taut control organisation. Most of the country population maintained passive resistance against the measures of the Soviet authorities. The latter existed only in the cities and exercised hardly any authority in the country districts. Forcibly recruited Ukrainians received instructions to hinder the carrying on of the war in any way. Eastern Ukrainians released by surprise attacks on military transports, were sent home. In the cities active propaganda was used in the Red Army.

Military activity embraced a considerable sphere. The fortnightly reports of Kommando 202 contained each time some 30-40 credible reports of large scale struggles against the Red Army or GPU. Against the UPA counter-measures up to the strength of a division were carried out.

Relations with the German Army

As before the beginning of the Russian campaign, the UPA command willingly received support, but did not take a single step towards an effective military co-operation. The undertaking carried out by Hauptmann KIRN, which led him as far as 180 km. behind the Red Army lines, did not produce any settlement of military co-operation. Afterwards when Lt. KIRN succeeded, chiefly because of the surprising event in Berlin, in getting BANDERA and his followers released from the S.D., this did not alter in the slightest the basic attitude of UPA.

The Ukrainian rebels were well aware that they were fighting a hopeless campaign against the Russians, with their backs against the

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APPENDIX B(1)
THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM (Contd.)

wall. They trusted in the possibilities of a crisis, which they foresaw in the over-exertions of Red imperialism. With the further retreat of the German Army, all sources of information were dried up (about the end of January 1945) and there fell over the Ukraine the same impenetrable curtain as was over the other Soviet occupied areas.

Estimate of the Ukraine Problem

The numerical size of the Ukrainian people, which can be attributed to the fortunate co-existence of wide spaces and biological fertility, has no equivalent in any corresponding spiritual or political force. There is no historically developed leading class. The best forces previously went to Poland and later to Russia. Thus the Ukrainian has never had his own political organisation and even today his political horizon does not extend beyond the small zone of his social existence. He tends towards community life but in his political life he inclines towards anarchy and a fight of all against all.

But in spite of these weaknesses, it must not be overlooked that the political conscience of the Ukrainian people, in spite of the terrible setbacks of the last 30 years, has been increasingly organised. Both wars have brought the mass of the people into closer touch with West European thought (to this belongs the transfer of millions of Ukrainian workers to Germany) and thereby strengthened the trend towards West Europe. Just as the Nazi system of KOCH would have eventually been forced to make concessions, so also must the Communist state recognise the continued existence of the Ukrainian problem in a different form. It is not the might of a uniform political will, but rather the latent energy of the individual households of the peasant masses, which will prevail against all attempts at total domination.

The union of the Soviet Ukraine with Galicia (with simultaneous evacuation by the Poles of this sector) realises old Ukrainian dreams. It would, however, entail great danger for the Soviet system if STALIN failed to destroy the roots of the Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia by ruthless evacuation and moving, in this generation.

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APPENDIX C (1)SABOTAGE(Translation of questionnaire submitted to PETERS)

- Q.1. Before being trained by the German Service, did you have any knowledge of chemistry or explosive and incendiary materials?
A.1. Only the usual knowledge acquired at school.
- Q.2. Where were you taught sabotage by the Germans?
A.2. I received no instruction in sabotage as I did not go to a school of this nature. I had merely a short course on "explosives for use of engineers" within the framework of the usual infantry training, when I was with the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst from the middle of November 1943 till the second half of January 1944.
- Q.3. How many hours theory?
A.3. Two periods of 2 hours.
- Q.4. How many hours practical training?
A.4. Two mornings.
- Q.5. Dates of this training?
A.5. Exact date forgotten; probably about beginning or middle of December 1944.
- Q.6. Who were your instructors and what were their subjects?
A.6. The instructors were a Feldwebel MELCHIOR and two or three other N.C.O.s whose names are unknown to me.
- Q.7. What other pupils attended sabotage courses?
A.7. At that time there were about 110 men in my Company, but I did not by any means know them all. The names I remember were, Soldat WICKENHEISER, Gefr. FRUEHSORGER, Gefr. MARTINEWSKI and Soldat KRAUS.
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- Q.8. Were you taught how to manufacture your own explosives and incendiary materials?
A.8. No.
- Q.9. What explosive materials do you know?
A.9. Pionier-Sprengstoff 88 and the so-called Fuellpulver 02.
- Q.10. What incendiary materials do you know?
A.10. Thermitc and Phosphorbrandsaetze.
- Q.11, 12 and 13. Details of delay mechanisms, sabotage materials and camouflaged bombs, etc., known.
A.11, 12 and 13. While working with Mil. Ant. D., Ref. Ost, I came across the translation of an English document on sabotage instructions which I read for personal interest. From this I obtained information on time-fuses, camouflaged bombs, etc.
-

APPENDIX C(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

- Q.14. How did the Germans expect you to get materials to carry out sabotage missions?
A.14. I never received a sabotage mission.
- Q.15. Were you to steal sabotage materials?
A.15. -
- Q.16. How many hidden dumps of sabotage materials do you know?
A.16. (See Appendix D(21).)
- Q.17. What type of material is contained in these hidden dumps?
A.17. In these depots the following were deposited: small arms, such as rifles, pistols, also machine and sub-machine guns, hand-grenades of various origin, munitions, explosives and fuses, items of military equipment such as belts, slings, haversacks, dispatch cases, etc., and in several cases tinned rations.
- Q.18. Who is using these dumps?
A.18. These bunkers - or rather depots, for there was no accommodation for men, only buried boxes - were to be used according to orders, a) as supply base for volunteers dropped or left behind in enemy territory (in such a case the exact particulars concerning the depots, which were normally kept in the strictest secrecy and known to only a few people, were communicated to the men in question) and b) as resources for an expected or intended insurrection movement behind the enemy front lines.
- Q.19. How are fresh supplies sent?
A.19. These depots were intended as reserve supplies; there was no question of sending further supplies.
-
- Q.20. Were you taught to use abrasives?
A.20. No.
- Q.21. What fuse cords do you know?
A.21. From the Pionier-Sprengunterricht (explosives instruction to engineers) I know the following: the German fuse-cord, black, white casing, fuse-time about 1 cm. per second, and the German detonating fuse-cord, green or black casing, fuse-time about 800 mm. per second. From the above-mentioned document on English sabotage instructions I know of the fuse-cords used here which correspond in principle to the German.
- Q.22. What kind of explosives do you know?
A.22. At the engineers' course in explosives with the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst I learned approximately the following during the hours of instruction mentioned under questions 3 and 4: Pioniersprengstoff ("88" and "02"), Pioniersprengmittel (explosive material) (Bohrpatrone, explosive units (Sprengkoerper), primer-canisters (Sprengbuechse), concentrated explosive charges), safety fuse ignition and electrical ignition; and all material belonging thereto. For practical experience, the turning of woodland into arable land was carried out, by blowing up tree stumps in an area of forest with safety fuse ignition and electrical ignition. As already mentioned, the instruction was given by a Feldwebel or N.C.O.

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APPENDIX C(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

Q.23 - Q.25: No information.

Q.26. What other targets were recommended or discussed during training?

A.26. During the above-mentioned instruction a definite type of target (apart from general calculation formulae of a large amount of explosive material for various strong wooden and iron joists) was not mentioned since, as we were expressly told, it was not a matter of sabotage instruction but the normal tuition in explosives included in the framework of the general knowledge required by an engineer. I knew that the so-called "Pestalozzi School" of the Lehrregiment which held a special course every 3 - 4 weeks, imparted detailed information to its participants. I did not take part in a course of this nature.

Q.27. Were you taught to destroy targets without explosive or incendiary materials?

A.27. I did not gain information on this subject at the above-mentioned course, but from the various issues of the Russian Sabotage Instructions, the so-called "Partisan Rules". This publication, whose issues for the years 1940, 1942 and 1943 I knew both in the original and in German translations of extracts, contains, in addition to general guidance for waging war on a small scale, detailed instructions on the various types of sabotage possible, with and without explosive material; this publication forms an essential ingredient of the training of Soviet partisans, and was naturally also of importance to the FAKs and FATs in their work. As far as I know it was the first and most complete compilation of the detailed possibilities of sabotage. It contains, for example, the demolition of railway lines (disassembling of fish-plates, removal of the rails by means of wire on the approach of a train, preferably on a steep stretch behind a curve), demolition of conducting wires by means of throwing over a rope weighted with stone, the tangling up of wires close to a pole by means of a thin wire, etc. I assume that the above is known over here and does not represent anything essentially new. The Russian name of the booklet is "Sputnik partisans".

Q.28. Were you to make anti-Allied or anti-war propaganda?

A.28. No. I was not an agent, but belonged to the regular German Wehrmacht and was therefore never employed on such missions anywhere.

Q.29. Was mention made of recruiting other persons to carry out sabotage for you?

A.29. No. See above.

Q.30. Were you to inform the Germans by radio of your acts of sabotage?

A.30. No. My knowledge of radio is limited to the general technical knowledge of an electrical engineer and a peace-time radio amateur.

Q.31. Were you to contact any other persons in connection with sabotage after you started your mission?

A.31. No. See answer to Q.28.

APPENDIX C(1)
SABOTAGE (Contd.)

- Q.32. What books and pictures have you seen on the subject of sabotage?
- A.32. During my employment as an expert with Referat Ost of Mil. D, I naturally had considerable opportunity to become acquainted with sabotage literature as I had access in particular to various kinds of captured material in this area; as, for example, the above-mentioned English Sabotage Instructions, the Soviet Partisan publication, a Sabotage publication in Polish (apparently of English origin), also reports from the FAKs and FATs on new methods of Soviet sabotage (very disjointed). I have no practical knowledge whatsoever of sabotage material. The working out and practical testing of such material was carried out in the laboratories of Mil. D, Gruppe T (Technical), to which I never had access as this group (in charge of Major POBER) was located in separate quarters from Referat Ost (in a place near Brandenburg on the Havel, near Potsdam). The work of the group was kept secret. From occasional general reports I could gather that most of the sabotage materials were of English origin or represented a further development of same, (e.g. "pencil" corrosive fuses, "cigarette" and acid fuses, switchboard explosive units for demolishing switchboards in power stations).
- Q.33. Give details of other sabotage training and materials known to you. (Poisons, trick sabotage materials, etc.)
- A.33. I do not know of any special kind of employment of explosives. I can state the following as regards poison: I know that the equipment for volunteers who were earmarked for employment behind the enemy lines included small doses of swift acting poison supplied by the Gruppe Technik; these poisons were for the personal use of the volunteer in the event of his capture, to enable him to get out of a hopeless position by his own voluntary death. Strict instructions were given that no poison material of any description was to be used for fighting the enemy; in these few cases, therefore, the above-mentioned poisons were supplied in such a form that it appeared impossible to use them as a means of fighting (never in powder form, but as compact pills or the like). I know of no case in which this prohibition of the use of poisons as a means of fighting was violated. Furthermore, an attempt was made (through FAK 204) in December 1944 to obtain the statements from returned volunteers, the sincerity and reliability of whose reports were doubted, by means of suitable chemicals. A small dose of atropin, mixed with alcohol, was given to the man concerned without his knowledge. Definite success could not be duly established, although the spirits of the volunteer concerned appeared to rise. There was no fear with these small doses of any prejudicial effect on the health of the man. According to the report, the only complaint of the man concerned was slight nausea and a headache the next morning, which, however, not knowing of the drug administered, he put down to the alcohol taken. These experiments must have been discontinued later in consequence of the withdrawal operations.

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APPENDIX D

INDEX

- (1) Mil. Amt. D.
- (2) Referat Ost of Mil. Amt. D.
- (3) Training establishments under Referat Ost:
 - Sonderlager Luckenwalde
 - Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht
 - Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain
- (4) The Leitstelle II Ost.
- (5) PAKs and FATs subordinate to Referat Ost.
- (6) Abw. II and Mil. Amt. D. operations on Russian Front.
- (7) The Strafkorps organisation and Einheit Schill.
- (8) The Wirtschaftsschule Sued.
- (9) The Technische Baukompanie 5.
- (10) Recruitment for Wirtschaftsschule Sued and Technische Baukompanie.
- (11) The Dienststelle Walli.
- (12) The Einheit Bergmann.
- (13) The Werewolf Organisation.
- (14) Brandenburg Division and S.S. Jagdverbände.
- (15) Abwehr and Mil. Amt. Intelligence regarding Russia.
- (16) Anti-Soviet Russian Volunteer Formations.
- (17) Systems of communication.
- (18) Grenadier Regiment 1001 and Ersatzbataillon 600.
- (19) Kamenz and Meseritz Schools.
- (20) "Unternehmen 20 Offiziere".
- (21) Sabotage Caches.
- (22) German Intelligence Service Personnel.

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APPENDIX D (1)Mil. Amt. D1. Organisation at turn of year 1944/5

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Duties</u>
1.	SKORZENY	Ostufaf.	Chief	General Control
2.	LOOS	Major	Deputy Chief	" "
3.	EISENBERG	Hptm.	L.Ch.	} Leiter, Chefgruppe. In charge of personnel (officers) Personnel - N.C.O.s and other ranks. Daily reports on the camps, aided II a and b. In charge of documents relating to dumps. Bucro-offizier and Registry. Finances - expenses. Payment of salaries. Kommando 212 (Italy). Leitstelle II West. Leitstelle II Suedost. Leitstelle II Ost. Auswertung u. Planung (Sifting of information and planning)
4.	ZIERIAKS	Hptm.	II a	
5.	BITTNER	Hptm.	II b	
6.	BOLDT	Oberlt.	II c	
7.	NEUMANN	Oberlt.	II e	
8.	TODDE	Stabsing.	IV a	
9.	SCHERFLING	Oberzahlm.	IV z	
10.	LORLIS	Hptm.	WS	
11.	SCHOENEICH	Hptm.	W	
12.	FERID	Oberlt.	SO	
13.	GAMBKE	Oberlt.	O	
14.	KNIESCHE	Hptm.	AP	
15.	PAULUS	Leutnant	F	Liaison with Luftwaffe; carrying out of missions where aircraft were used.
16.	MENGER	Major	Kommandt. Stabsquart.	Organisation of the external work; messing.

Apart from these Referats, there were also:-

i) Gruppe Technik:Leiter: Major EHRMANN; other staff known to GAMBKE:
A X Oblt. KLOENNE, Hptm. BRAUER, Lt. MAUS and Hptm. WAHL.ii) VO Ch. Berlin (i.e. liaison officer of the Chefgruppe with Berlin): Leiter: Major ERFLING.

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APPENDIX D (1)
Mil. Amt. D (contd.)

- iii) VO T Berlin (i.e. liaison officer of Gruppe Technik with Berlin): Leiter: Major PAGEN-
SIECHER.
- iv) Sonderlager Luckenwalde with Hptm. KEUPER as
Commandant (Training Camp). (See App. D(3)).
- v) Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht in Sol O/S
with Lt. BREUER as Leiter. (Training Camp)
(See App. D(3)).
- vi) Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain with Sdf. (2)
NIEBUHR. (Departure point for missions).
(See App. D(3)).

The Gruppe Technik, which was situated near Brandenburg, was responsible for the preparation and collection of sabotage equipment. It dealt with weapons, clothing, explosives, and also had laboratories for research in explosives, etc.

A family tree of Mil. Amt. D, and its departments and subordinate organisations, is at para 6 below.

2. Personnel before July 20th, and after

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Position before</u>	<u>Position after</u>	<u>Replaced by</u>
1.	NAUMANN	Major	Chief	Deputy Chief	SKORZENY
2.	-	-	-	Deputy Chief	NAUMANN
3.	EISENBERG	Hptm.	Leiter Chef-gruppe	L.Ch.	
4.	ZIERIAKS	Hptm.	II a	No change	
5.	BITTNER	Hptm.	II b	No change	
6.	BOLDT	Oberlt.	II c	No change	
7.	NEUMANN	Oberlt.	II e	No change	
8.	TODDE	Stabsing	IV a	No change	
9.	SCHERFLING	Oberzahlm.	IV z	No change	
A	10. GOTTSCHLICH	Secretary	Registry	No change	Dismissed later when staff cut down. Replaced by NEUMANN.
	NHT				
A	11. MENGER	Major	Stabsquart.	No change	
	see u				

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APPENDIX D (1)
Mil. Ant. D (Contd.)

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Position Before</u>	<u>Position After</u>	<u>Replaced by</u>
	12. <u>ASTOR</u>	<u>Major</u>	West Gruppe-Leiter	Dismissed and not replaced	
	13. SCHOENIECH	Hptm.	West	No change	
H X	14. ^{see u} GIEBLER	Hptm.	West	No change	
	15. LORMIS	Hptm.	West	No change	
H X	16. ^{HHT} HARMS	Sdf.	West	No change	
	17. KOCH	Major	Ost Gruleit	L II SO	Not replaced in Ost Gruleit.
	18. GAMBKE	Oberlt.	Ost	No change	
A X	19. ^{see u} GILDE- MEISTER	Oberlt.	Ost	No change in Lt. MARKERT July. Later transferred to West.	and RAUFACH.
A X	20. ^{HII} ETTINGER	Leut.	Ost	Ost, later VO with Mil C.	
	21. PAULUS	Leut.	Ost	No change	
	22. SCHROETER	Leut.	Ost	No change	
	23. ERFLING	Major	VO Ch. Berlin	No change	
	24. HALL	Oberlt.	VO Ch. Berlin	No change	
	25. KUEPPE	Hptm.	Solag. Luckenwalde	No change	
A X	26. ^{see u} BERNDT	Leut.	" "	No change	Later to the Camp of Kdo. 203.
A X	27. ^{see u} HOEHN	Sdf.	" "	No change	
	28. BREUER	Leut.	Bergwacht	No change	
	29. NIKLASCH	Oberlt.	Ost (SO)	Ost	Later replaced by FERID
	30. WAGNER, Dr.	Fdw.	Ost (SO)	Ost	Later sent to L. II W.

Two former officers of Gruppe Technik were relieved of their posts:

Oberstlt. MAURITIUS and Major POSER.

amend cards where necessary

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APPENDIX D(1)
Mil. Amt. D (Contd.)

Subsequent fate of officers dismissed:-

NAUMANN: Immediately replaced after 20th July by SKORZENY. Not actually arrested, but suspicion centred on him and the whole Abteilung. NAUMANN never actually came into contact with SKORZENY with regard to the work, and in December 1944 provoked his own departure. He went to 1 (a) Fremde Heere Ost.

See 111

X ASTOR: X

Major ASTOR went during the re-organisation in the summer of 1944. He was transferred to the personnel office, and immediately dismissed. ASTOR's co-operation with FREYTAG and sudden dismissal must have been connected with the 20th July, but he suffered from heart trouble.

KOCH: At the time of the 20th July, KOCH was undergoing medical treatment in Karlsbad. He never returned to his office, but became deputy C.O. of Leitstelle II Suedost. Owing to GAMBKE's friendship with KOCH, he knows this transfer was to KOCH's liking, as he wanted to get as far away as possible from the R.S.H.A. people.

MAURITIUS/POSER: These two officers were suddenly relieved of their duties in the late summer of 1944. No reason was given them, but it was pointed out that they had been in touch with the 20th July men. As far as is known, no further proceedings were taken against them.

ABSHAGEN: As far as is known ABSHAGEN was in charge of the Chefgruppe until early 1944. Before FREYTAG finally left the Abteilung ABSHAGEN was replaced first by BEBKERN, then by EISENBERG. Shortly after 20th July, ABSHAGEN was in Paris, where he was in charge of Leitstelle II West; he was arrested there and was kept in prison for two months in Berlin. Finally it was announced that he had been dismissed from the army, degraded and given the choice of joining a Volksgrenadierdivision as an ordinary soldier, or working in a munitions factory. ABSHAGEN later learned through friends that he could return to his civilian job - with Ufa. All attempts by the Abteilung to come to ABSHAGEN's aid were fruitless. It is certain that ABSHAGEN was a close collaborator of FREYTAG's when Chefgruppenleiter.

WAHL: WAHL was responsible for providing the weapons for the attack on the 20th July, at the suggestion of Oberst. HANSEN. He did not realise what HANSEN wanted them for. He was saved from severe punishment, because he had told a friend in Gruppe Technik about it.

GERICKE: Frä. GERICKE, a woman from one of the best Berlin families, was secretary to ABSHAGEN, when he was Chefgruppenleiter and when he was with Leitstelle II West in Paris. She was not actually arrested but transferred elsewhere.

APPENDIX D (1)
Mil. Amt. D (Contd.)

GAMBKE suggests that the events of 20th July were used as the excuse for getting rid of certain people for personal reasons. For example, a certain Hauptsturmfuehrer GERHARD had long tried to oust POSER and MAURITIUS from Gruppe Technik. (GERHARD had been trained in the gangster methods of RADL and SKORZENY).

3. Reasons and results of transformation of Abwehr II into Mil. D

The taking over of Abwehr II by the R.S.H.A. was all part of the large-scale plan to oust the Wehrmacht from authority. After the 20th July, the S.S. were gradually appointed to various posts - e.g., Kurt EGGERS became Befehlshaber of the army of reserve and BERGER (Obergruppenfuehrer) took over the prison of war organisation.

Early in 1944 KALFENBRUNNER began his policy of putting the Reichsfuehrer S.S. in charge of all intelligence organisations, thus replacing the Abwehr. Consequently there was a great deal of bad feeling in the militarily-controlled Abwehr.

The results of this in the Mil. D. were chiefly that the clear-cut system and organisation was destroyed, and where formerly all contact had been with the Wehrmacht, contact was now with the R.S.H.A. SKORZENY demanded close co-operation between Mil. D. and Mil. F. The Abwehr officers, however, maintained friendly relations among themselves, and succeeded in glossing over mistakes and omissions caused by the re-organisation.

The actual work of Abwehr II was scarcely altered, but the tone was considerably changed. R.S.H.A. had not the same grasp on situations and policies that the Abwehr had had, and relations with agents and volunteers would have become strained but for the efforts of the Abwehr officers.

4. How far SKORZENY controlled Mil. Amt. D. What changes he introduced.

SKORZENY took over Mil. D shortly after 20th July. NAUMANN made the announcement to the officers gathered in the mess ante-room in Baruth. There was no message of introduction to the officers, nor did any of the officers actually come into contact personally with SKORZENY later.

NAUMANN would go to Friedenthal or Berkaerstrasse for orders, and occasionally took one of the Referents with him. Reports and suggestions submitted to SKORZENY by NAUMANN remained a long time in Friedenthal, and most often came back only with his stamp, and often without even this, showing that very little attention was paid to them. As long as NAUMANN remained deputy C.O., he tried to carry on the running of the department himself. SKORZENY, however, demanded to be kept au fait with all personnel changes in the Abteilung and the Kommandos and Trupps.

GAMBKE recalls two occasions when SKORZENY's actual intervention had important consequences for those involved:

- 1) The recommendation for promotion for Oberstlt. FECHNER, C.O. of Leitstelle II Suedost was not passed on, because he was 25% Jewish. SKORZENY obtained his release from the Abwehr. This was in March, 1945.

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APPENDIX D (1)
Mil. Amt. D (Contd.)

- 2) Major Graf THUN, leader of the "Unternehmen Edelweiss", was recommended for the Knight's Cross or the Iron Cross. SKORZENY stopped the recommendation, because he had heard that THUN's wife had Jewish blood in her veins. Graf THUN had, however, received the highest Austrian decoration in the last war. It turned out later that it was Graf THUN's brother who had a Jewish wife. The recommendation was then advanced.

SKORZENY's behaviour with regard to MAURITIUS/POSER has already been given. (He supported GERHARD's claims). Further details of this can be obtained from ZIERIAKS and NAUMANN.

So that SKORZENY could maintain better control of the Abteilung, it was moved in the late autumn of 1944 to Birkenwerder, 12 Kms. from Friedenthal. As long as NAUMANN was in Birkenwerder, SKORZENY apparently did not visit the Abteilung. It was only when LOOS took over that SKORZENY actually visited him.

There was never a conference between all the Referents, or with the officers, and the new departmental chief.

SKORZENY did not run Mil. D but controlled it. He never offered positive suggestions for the work.

Changes brought about by SKORZENY are briefly as follows:-

- a) Transfer of the Dienststelle from Baruth to Birkenwerder.
- b) Interference with personnel (NAUMANN, MAURITIUS, POSER, FECHNER, Graf THUN).
- c) Dismissal of officers and replacement by Amt VI, so that mutual understanding among the officers no longer existed. (Cases of KOCH and SCHUETTE).
- d) Intervention as in the case of Kommando 202 - taking over Ukrainian problems.
- e) Taking away of work from Abwehr II, to give added glory to the S.S. Jagdverbande.


5. Liaison

The Chefgruppe was in liaison with Mil. A and Mil. Pers. for the purpose of organisation and personnel questions. The whole department was in contact with Mil. F. through VO Mil. D., especially II a and II b, and the Referents.

Internal W/T contact within the Abwehr, procuring of sets and training of agents was discussed with Mil. E.

6. Hereunder is a diagram showing the organisation of Mil. Amt. D, its departments and subordinate units, etc., including the Frontaufklaerung Kommandos and Trupps.

Mil. Amt. D.



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APPENDIX D (2)THE REFERAT OST OF MIL. AUF D.1. Corresponding section of Abwehr II:

a) Abwehr II had been divided into Abteilungen, Gruppen and Referats:

i) In 1943 Gruppe A (Russland) with Referats AK, AI, AF, AL and AV.

ii) In early summer 1944, Gruppe O with Referats OK, OI, OF, OL, SO.

b) Mil D was divided into Abteilungen and Referats:

August 1944, Referat Ost consisted of a combination of OL and SO.

Thus Referat Ost corresponded exactly to the former Gruppe O (or A) but for correspondence, the symbols OK, OI, OF and OV were still used.

2. Personnel of Abwehr II transferred to Referat Ost.
Subsequent fate of the others.

This information is given in the following table:

<u>Name, Rank</u>	<u>Position when the Leitstellen were formed: (early 1944)</u>	<u>Before the re-organisation Summer 1944</u>	<u>August 1944</u>	<u>March 1945.</u>
Ernst zu EIKERN, Oberstlt.	Gruppenleiter	Leitstelle II Ost	-	-
KOCH, Hptm.	Deputy and OI	Gruppenleiter	Leit II O.	-
MARKERT, Lt.	OK	A F St.	AP with Mil D.	Kdo. 202
A X HOCKER, Oblt.	OV <i>see u</i>	Leit. II O	-	-
GAMBKE, Oblt.	OF	OF	Ref. Ost.	Ref. Ost.
A X ETTINGER, Lt.	OI <i>HHT</i>	OI	Ref. Ost.	VO with Mil C.
A X GILDEMEISTER, Oblt.	- <i>See u (P.1)</i>	OK and OV	Ref. Ost.	VO with Mil F.
A X HENNINGS, Oblt.	<i>HHT</i> OA (only for a short time, then transferred to a convalescent centre)			

(Abbreviations: WF St. = Wehrmachtsführungstab - High Command Staff.
VO = Verbindungsoffizier - liaison officer.
OA = Ost - Auswertung.)

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APPENDIX D(2)THE REFERAT OST OF MIL. AMT D. (Contd.)

<u>Name, Rank</u>	<u>Position when the Leitstellen were formed: (early 1944)</u>	<u>Before the re- organisation Summer 1944</u>	<u>August 1944</u>	<u>March 1945</u>
RAUPACH, <i>See u</i>	-	-	-	Ref. Ost.
<i>A</i> v.d. SCHULENBERG Uffz.	OF	Solag. Luck- enwalde	-	-
WAGNER, Pkw.	OI	Heerwesen Abt.	Leit. II O	-
PETERS, Gefr.	-	OI	Ref. Ost	Ref. Ost
<i>B</i> BOGOFJAWLINSKY	-	-	-	Ref. Ost
a Gefreiter with OK	OK	Leit. II O	-	-
REICHERS, Gefr.	-	-	-	Ref. Ost (+)

There were also two orderlies (names forgotten) one of whom came at the time the Leitstellen were formed.

((+) = Stayed with VO in Berlin on 30.3.45.)

Secretaries

<i>B</i> Frl. DENECKE <i>See u</i>	Gruppenleiter	Chefgruppe	-	-
Frau ANKLAM <i>NKT</i>	OK	OK	Ref. Ost (left at the time of the move to Birkenwerder)	
Frau NAHRWOLDF <i>NT</i>	OV	OV	Chefgruppe	-
Frl. MOESER <i>NKT</i>	OI	OI	Leit. II O	-
Frl. JULIUS <i>See u</i>	OF	OF	Ref. Ost	Ref. Ost
Frl. KRISCH <i>See u</i>	-	-	Ref. Ost	Ref. Ost
Frau MILKA <i>See u</i>	-	Leit. II O	Ref. Ost	Sick.

There were always many changes in the female staff, and outside help was always being recruited. The last woman to help Referat Ost in Birkenwerder was Frl. THIESE.

3. Duties of Referat Ost

Referat Ost took over the main functions of Gruppe Ost. Its duties were never specifically laid down in a charter, but its four main responsibilities were as follows:

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APPENDIX D(2)

THE REFERAT OST OF ILL AMT D. (Contd.)

- O.K. This consisted of all reports from the outlying posts (Kommandos and Trupps) concerning the successful and planned operations, as well as the existing exchange of correspondence from the Kommandos. The operations were collected together according to code-names, in a card index (first set up on July 1st, 1944.)
- O.F. Matters concerning missions of the Aussenstellen where volunteers (of non-German nationality) were employed; correspondence with the camps where these volunteers were housed.
- O.J. Study of the Eastern political problems, including research and reports on the populations in the occupied zones (Poland, Ukraine). Partisan movements, their creation and organisation. Everything concerned with the insurrection of the peoples against the enemy forces.
- O.V. This included all that remained of the internal administration, of greater importance previously because of the need for administration in the Referat (disposal of necessary office equipment).

The actual division of work was made as occasion arose. However, on the arrival of RAUPACH in 1944, GAMBKE decided on the following clear-cut division of responsibility:

- | | | |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1. | GAMBKE, Oberlt. | Referatsleiter. |
| 2. | RAUPACH, Lt. | Deputy. Evaluation of reports, supervising all political work in the Eastern sector. |
| 3. | PETERS, Gefr. | In charge of Kommando and Trupp files; maintaining the "War Diary"; translator. |
| <i>B</i> 4. | ^{HT}
BOGOWALINSKY, Gefr. | Translator; worked on Polish matters; drawings and maps, when necessary, for AP. |
| 5. | ^{HT}
REICHERS, Gefr. | Registry and filing. |
| 6. | JULIUS, Frl. <i>see u (p. 9)</i> | Shorthand typist and filing. |
| 7. | KRIESCH, Frl. <i>see id/w (L. 11)</i> | Shorthand typist and filing. |
| 8. | MISKA, Frau. <i>see u (p. 9)</i> | Shorthand typist (Absent on account of illness for some time). |
| 9. | ^{HT}
THIEME, Frl. | Outside help as shorthand typist and filing clerk. |

The files of the Referat retained the symbols of the Gruppe Ost, e.g. OK, OF, OJ, OV. OV more or less ceased to exist as the administration duties were taken over by the Chefgruppe.

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APPENDIX D(2)THE REFERAT OST OF MIL A.I.T. D. (Contd.)4. Main duties of the Referat Ost.

When the Leitstellen were created, the main work of the Abteilung i.e. direction of Kommandos and Trupps, was handed over to them. For this reason, some of the staff of Gruppe Ost were transferred to the Leitstelle. The control of Gruppe Ost and Referat OK was given to Leitstelle Ost. Major NAUMANN's purpose was to keep the four main Referats. In agreement with the O.K.W., he wished to give minor tasks to the Leitstelle and leave the Referats free to cope with major work.

Although no specific list of responsibilities and duties was drawn up for the Referat Ost, its main functions included the following:

- i) Collecting and editing information (e.g. on reported unrest and morale of troops and civilians in Russian territories; Russian production; success or otherwise of Abt. II sabotage missions as reported from Abt. I sources; this information was obtained from Mil C); sifting it for points of interest to Abwehr II and the front-line Kommandos and the Leitstelle.
- ii) Examination of monthly and special reports from F.A.K.'s. Assessing them.
- iii) Putting forward suggestions to high authority as a result of reports received.
- iv) The preparation and forwarding of reports to the Amtschef on successes achieved.
- v) Keeping up the "War Diary".
- vi) Contact with the prisoner-of-war organisation at Torgau for the selection of volunteers for training camps. Contact with the General commanding volunteer groups in regard to the obtaining of volunteers from the Legions. Contact with the S.S. Hauptamt, Foreign section, in connection with problems regarding the position of the minorities in the Eastern section and their political organisations.
- vii) Appointment of officers to Kommandos and Trupps. (Agreement had to be reached with WFSt, later with Mil F, Mil D and the Leitstellen).
- viii) Administration and supervision of the Luckenwalde camp, the Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht and the Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain.
- ix) Supplying the demands of the F.A. Verbaende from Mil E, Gruppe Technik when Leitstelle II Ost itself could not do so. In particular, during the time that the Leitstelle was retreating from Bilschdorf (January/February 1945) Referat Ost took over all its duties.

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APPENDIX B(2)THE REFERAT OST OF MIL D. (Contd.)

- x) Translating and obtaining information from original Russian newspapers.

5. Responsibilities of Referat Ost towards Leitstelle II Ost. (See also Appendix D(L).)

The position of Referat Ost with regard to Mil D, and the Leitstelle II Ost was never explained. Referat Ost, or rather Mil D, had authority to direct Leitstelle II Ost, but in practice, this was never used, owing to the difference in rank of the respective heads. Referat Ost never "ordered" the Leitstelle, but "requested" it.

GAMBE relates the following as an example of the position:

"During January, the Leitstelle set up a camp for volunteers from the East in the Wittenberg area, on the road from Berlin to Hamburg, with the object of training men there for work with the Kommandos. Despite the enormous difficulties of transport, some 100-150 volunteers from South Germany were transferred to the North. Referat Ost warned the Leitstelle of the difficulties of communication, but the camp was set up, after Mil F and Oberst BUNEROCK gave their support. In this case Mil F ultimately became responsible for the camp. The Referat could only request and suggest. The lack of written lists of functions often led to friction. Oberst BUNEROCK wanted to take over Mil D, so as to be able to control the Frontaufklaerung II completely. SKORZENY held on to the control of Mil D so as not to lose his influence on the Frontaufklaerung. It was then decided to divide the Frontaufklaerung and to set up a FA II for both BUNEROCK and SKORZENY. But who was to give orders for what, was not settled at the end."

The handling of this question throws a side-light on the muddled organisation which resulted from the "fusion" of early 1944.

The actual responsibility between Mil D and its Referats towards the Leitstellen was never clarified. The Leitstellen were subordinate to W F St., later Mil F and at the same time to Mil D. Later BUNEROCK and SKORZENY were continually fighting for control over the Leitstellen.

6. Liaison with other sections.

- a) Mil C: Mil D kept a liaison officer with Mil C (Lt. ETTINGER). The latter forwarded any reports on Eastern questions which he considered important for the referat.
- b) Mil E: This section took over the responsibility of the supply of W/F sets for the P.A.K.'s in January and February 1945, when Leitstelle II Ost and Funkleiter II Ost could not cope during their evacuation.

APPENDIX D(2)THE REFERAT OST OF MIL. AIR D. (Contd.)

- c) VI Wi: Regarding economic reports on the Eastern section.
- d) VI c: Points of interest on the Eastern sector, received from their Aussenstellen.
- e) S.S. Jagdverbaende: (See also Appendix D(14).)
- i) At a conference at Bischofsfelden in the autumn of 1944, it was decided that the Jagdverbaende should undertake all work far behind the Russian lines - e.g. Resistance movements, while the F.A.K. should in future only carry out work near at hand.
 - ii) Liaison in the late summer of 1944 over W/T operators for Jagdverbaende missions, from the Sonderlager Luckenwalde. 10 W/T operators (Caucasian) were transferred to Befehlsstelle Ost.
 - iii) In January and February 1945, there were discussions over the handing over to the S.S. Jagdverbaende of White Ruthenians and Lithuanians.
 - iv) In the summer of 1944, there were consultations with the Jagdverbaende about their plans for an undertaking in the Roumanian Carpathians.
 - v) Exchange of reports, as for example, reports received from Mil C, which were of interest to the Jagdverbaende.
- f) Referat Luft:
- Collecting and passing on of demands submitted each month by the Aussenstellen for the use of airfields for parachute missions. Referat Luft submitted these to the Chefgruppe for ratification. Fighter squadron (K-G) 200 (Gartenfeld) was the squadron attached for such missions.
- g) Mil F: Contact with this section was maintained through Mil D's liaison officer (Oblt. GILDLEISTER). Contact was made concerning personnel and man-power questions.

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APPENDIX D(3)

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TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST1. General

At the beginning of 1943, Gruppe Ost, of Abwehr II, had only one training camp, the Sonderlager Luckenwalde. As the sphere of activity of Gruppe Ost increased and its commitments in Russian territory (particularly in Turkestan and the Caucasus) extended, it was soon realised that further camps of this nature would be necessary. It was therefore decided:

- a) To establish a recruiting centre for volunteers with its own jumping-off point. (The Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain).
- b) To set up a training centre where elementary instruction could be given in the following subjects: general military training, small arms training, explosives and sabotage technique, woodcraft and W/T. (Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht).
- c) To maintain Sonderlager Luckenwalde for the detailed training of selected groups of individuals for a particular mission.

When the war was reaching its later stages, however, shortage of sabotage equipment and particularly aircraft made large scale missions into Russian territory no longer practicable. These camps, therefore, according to GAMBKE, became used for purposes for which they had not been originally designed.

GAMBKE was given the job of establishing a) and b) above, and he was in control of all three establishments. He used to pay regular visits and it is mainly from him that the following information has been extracted.

Further information regarding operations referred to by codewords will be found in Appendix D(6).

2. Sonderlager Luckenwalde [SF 52/4/5(18)]a) Location:

Sonderlager Luckenwalde lay on the edge of Luckenwalde in the Baruth Kirchhof (Kirchhofsweg). Evacuated January/February 1945 to Bad Liebenstein in Thuringia.

b) German personnel

At the time of the collapse:-

KUEPER, Hptm. <i>see u</i>	Lagerleiter.
AHLFELDT, Oberlt. <i>see u</i>	In charge of technical side.
HOEHN, Sdf. (Z) <i>see u (P)</i>	Administration of groups, and interpreter.
BRAUER, Uffz. <i>MKT</i>	Administration and interpreter.
WALKER, Uffz. <i>see u</i>	Administration and interpreter.

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APPENDIX D(3)
TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (Contd.)

X WEIRS, Fdw. ^A ^{MLT}	Lagerfeldwebel (administration).
HILZ, Uffz.	Kammerunteroffizier (billets).
X JAROSCH, Uffz. ^{MLT}	W/T operator (instructor).
X SCHOLZ, Obergefr. ^{MLT}	Setter and printer.
X BAUM, Fdw. ^{See u}	Accounts.

SdZ. Dr. GREIFF came in the spring of 1944 as chief instructor for "Brennessel" and in July, August and September, Lt. BERNDT ^{See u} for "Ginster".

In the summer of 1944, ^A ^{See u} Stabszahlmeister GEORGE, who had been accounts officer, left.

c) History of the camp

The barracks of the camp were in existence before the war as billets for the Reichsarbeitsdienst. At the beginning of the war, Luckenwalde was taken over as an officers' camp by Stalag III a. It appears that at that time Flemish officers were quartered there. The exact date when Abwehr II took the camp over is not known, but as far as is remembered, it was organised by Major MEIERMADER in 1942 as a transit camp for Turkestanians. When GAMBKE joined the Abwehr in the spring of 1943, Luckenwalde was being used as a transit camp for some 250 men (Russians, Ukrainians, Turkestanians, etc.) who had been collected there. The organisation and administration of the camp, including the quality of recruits, was not satisfactory; nevertheless the camp trained the personnel for the Unternehmen "Myrthe" which took place in the spring of 1943. Most of the Turkestanians and Caucasians were posted to Trupps in the south-east to be there employed in partisan warfare. In the early spring of 1944 some 100 newly recruited Turkestanians and Caucasians passed through the camp. They were transferred to the Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht soon afterwards in March or April 1944. Thirteen Kazachs selected for the Unternehmen "Brennessel" were trained in the summer of 1944; training for the Unternehmen "Ginster" was carried out and five Azerbaijanis left the camp for a mission in the Baku area, as the first of the four insurrection undertakings sent to Azerbaijan.

From the summer of 1944 an agents' printing press was developed in Luckenwalde with Russian printing matrices and in due course put into production. A static printing press was also set up, in order to be able to cope with the needs for pamphlets. The camp took over, during January 1945, the Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht, which had evacuated from Sol C/S on account of the war situation. In February and March of this year, it was evacuated to Bad Liebenstein in Thuringia.

d) Functions of the camp

1943

- i) Collecting together of volunteers from all anti-Soviet minorities of the greater Russian area..

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APPENDIX D(3)TRAINING ESTABLISSEMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (Contd.)

- ii) Collecting, training and preparing of groups for missions.
(W/T and sabotage training were not dealt with in the camp in 1943).

1944

- i) Final training for the "Brennessel" operation.
- ii) Final training for the "Ginster" operation.

Additional duties, 1944.

- i) Developing and setting up of agents' printing presses.
 - ii) Publishing of printed instructions for agents' printing presses.
 - iii) Composing and printing a German-Kasach dictionary.
 - iv) Preparing chests for concealment. Packing materials and despatching them to Kdos. 205 and 212.
- e) Instruction

1943

Training in Luckenwalde was very primitive. An 8-14 days sabotage course took place in Quenz under Gruppe Technik. W/T training was carried out by the Funkleiter Ost of Stab Walli (Warsaw); physical training, sport; route marches and weapon training. Unternehmen "Lyrthe" was run by Referat OF from Berlin (then Lt. NISSEN). GAMBKE took over shortly before the mission (spring 1943).

1944 February/March

Training for "Brennessel", as follows:

- i) W/T training
- ii) Training in propaganda. Training in setting and printing with agents' printing machines.
- iii) Final training in explosives and sabotage.
- iv) Weapon training with special regard to necessary care of weapons. Practice shoots with the weapons to be taken on the mission (small arms).
- v) Medical instruction (first aid for accidents and wounds).
- vi) Current information on the present conditions in the region selected for the mission.
- vii) Instruction in equipment.
- viii) Drawing up of a written plan for the mission.
- ix) Technical instructions for the flight.

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APPENDIX D(3)

TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (otd.)

The instructors were:-

In charge of the course:	Sdf. Dr. GREIFF	<i>see LU</i>
Medicine:	Stabsarzt Dr. HUEBNER	<i>see LU</i>
Sabotage:	Hptm. Dr. WAHL	<i>see LU</i>
Weapon training:	A Feldwebel	
Printing instruction:	A Feldwebel	
W/T training:	An Unteroffizier	<i>see LU (p.1)</i>
Collective administration:	Sdf. HOEHN @ HENKEL	<i>see LU</i>
Technical explosive instruction:	Lt. PAULUS	

Training documents were provided by I.G. Staffel of Leitstelle II Ost.

Training for "Ginster" included the same programme as above. July or August 1944.

In charge of the course: Lt. BERNDT @ BELOW
also HOEHN.

The instructors named were only visiting instructors and were chiefly there only for the duration of the training.

In addition the Camp undertook the training of members of the Trupps and Kommandos in the use of the agents' printing presses.

f) Successes of the camp:

- i) Unternehmen "Lyrthe" did not report by W/T. Success unknown.
- ii) Unternehmen "Brennessel" did not report by W/T. Success unknown.
- iii) Unternehmen "Ginster" did not set out.
- iv) Development of portable agents' printing presses (so-called Western printing presses)
- v) The hiding of sabotage material in Upper Silesia.

Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht: *NT-coded in SF 52/4/4(4)*

a) Location:

The camp was situated near the station of Sol Q/S. Sol lies on the line between Katowitz and Zwardon.

b) German personnel:

At the time of the German collapse:

<i>A</i> BREUER, Lt.	<i>see LU</i>	Lagerleiter
BECKER, Uffz.		Mess:
		<i>NT</i> <i>X</i> <i>A</i> <i>NT</i>

In 1944 there were also there Lt. WEISSMUND (@ WOLFF), and Feldw. MURBACH. There were some ten Germans as staff.

In addition, Kao. 202 instructors were transferred there in the autumn of 1944 for the training of Ukrainians.

*see m.3.
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APPENDIX D93)TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (Contd.)

c) History:

Founded in the late spring of 1944. The first course with some 160 men, began in June. Only Caucasians and Turkestanians (including Kasachs) were trained. An agents' W/T school for some 20 men was later organised. Approximately 120 Caucasians were trained and then transferred to the Unternehmen "Edelweiss" under the command of Lt. WEISSMUND and Feldw. MURBACH. At the same time approximately 40 Kasachs were trained and later transferred to the Unternehmen "Pfeil". In the autumn 100 Ukrainians were taken over from F.A.K. 202 to be trained. In the middle of January the camp was evacuated to Luckenwalde.

d) Functions of the camp:

- i) Collecting point for the volunteers recruited by Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain.
- ii) Selection (sifting) and elementary training of these men (including immediate withdrawal of selected men for W/T training).

e) Instruction:

Training was carried out in the subjects mentioned in para. 1 b above.

Training of the Ukrainians was carried out under the direction of Kdo. 202.

The W/T school was controlled by Mil E.

f) General:

This camp supplied the personnel for the "Edelweiss" operation in 1944.

Arbeitsvermittlung Kirchhain - Sonderstab:

- ended in SF 52/4/4(14)

a) Dienststelle's location:

Kirchhain/Niederlausitz, Suedstrasse. Evacuated in February 1945 to Leinsfelde in Suedharz.

b) German personnel:

NIEBUHR, Sdf. (Z) @ NAUFELD	Leiter
BENZIN, Oberfeldwebel	Mess
Frau LEHN	Secretary and interpretress.

In addition Sdf. (Z) TEICHERT, various N.C.O.s and other ranks who worked as recruiters in the different camps.

c) History of the Dienststelle:

In the spring of 1944, GAMBE was instructed to create a setting-out place for agents for Gruppe Ost in the neighbourhood of Baruth. This Dienststelle was then moved to Kirchhain and given the above-mentioned name. It was founded under Oberfeldwebel BENZIN with two hotel rooms, three billets in the town, an office and a small mess. During the summer barracks were built (Suedstrasse)

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APPENDIX D(3)TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (ctd.)

and the Anlaufstelle moved there. In the summer there followed the setting up of a recruiting centre for volunteers for the whole Eastern front (i.e. for the requirements of the Trupps and Kommandos). Some sixty volunteers passed through each month. In February 1945 the Dienststelle evacuated to Leinefelde in the Harz.

d). Functions of the Dienststelle:

- i) Transit point and meeting place for agents.
- ii) Transit point for volunteers, who were to carry out special missions.
- iii) Recruiting centre for all agents and volunteers, who were needed for the Frontkommandos or the camps of the Abteilung.

5. In regard to the apparently extremely limited value of the three above mentioned training institutions and concerning the many failures of the Abwehr II and Mil Ant D 'unternehmen', RAUPACH writes as follows:-

"I must make the general observation that Abwehr II in the East did not use individual agents, "bought" individuals or any kind of desperadoes, but relied solely on members of national or internal political Freedom Movements who regarded Bolshevism as the enemy from within. For that reason the Abteilung was not able to follow any definite anti-Bolshevist (for example, Fascist) course. On the contrary, the national forces in the Baltic countries showed a preponderantly national-democratic tendency; among the Ukrainians, besides the Bandera groups which were organised on totalitarian lines, were strong democratic elements; and the only really active anti-Bolshevist Russian group which came to my knowledge - the Nationalsozialisten - stood for a democratic national economy (wirtschafts-demokratisch) and were markedly individualistic. Therefore, Abwehr II could only hope for success when working with Movements which were already active on their own account, and then only when it was in a position to supply to these Movements the technical aid they required, such as weapons, training and aircraft. Note: An attempt was made by the S.D. in the Unternehmen "Zeppelin", back in 1943, to train individual agents who showed ability and were not politically impartial, but I gather they had no success. Towards the end of the war the S.D. gave up this attempt.

"Forces of the type described offered themselves in such numbers, at the beginning of the Russian Offensive - not only from the ranks of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union but also from among the Russian people themselves - that we could have set up a complete Partisan Army. It was the basic mistake of the German leadership in the East, that because of their limited political outlook they did not make use of this opportunity. At the time when anti-Bolshevist feeling among the Soviet masses stood at its height, the Abwehr had no aircraft at its disposal. A W/T outfit had not even been thought of at that time for Abwehrwork. This shows that the German Army had not profited in the slightest from the Soviet theories of revolutionary warfare which were already well-known.

"When, at the beginning of 1943, the position from the technical point of view began to improve, the political possibilities for Abwehr II work had in the meantime fundamentally changed. The fact that the German Army had failed to defeat the Red Army, and the successful defence of Stalingrad had increased STALIN's prestige enormously. At the same time, clever moves

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APPENDIX D(3)
TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (Contd.)

taken by the Soviet Command (such as dismissals, changes in the system of political commissars in the Army, the concession of a certain amount of religious activity, and making the fullest use, for propaganda purposes, of the mistakes made in German Eastern politics) had caused the majority of the Russian opponents of the Regime to doubt the rectitude of their opposition during the war. The forces which henceforth could be used for active work in Abwehr II, can be classified as under:-

- a) Members of nationalistic groups (Caucasiens, Turk-Tartars, Ukrainians). These were well organised, politically, by the various National Committees and provided with plentiful propaganda in their national tongue, given preferential treatment as prisoners, and to a certain extent, since they had no knowledge of the world situation, unable to form any accurate opinion of the chances of either side in the war.
- b) Russian prisoners, whose chief interest was to offer themselves as volunteers in order to obtain release from imprisonment, and secondly to ensure favourable conditions in the future. As the Wlassow Movement grew stronger, it was a matter of urgency to take that course; indeed, in the first place, only those Russians applied for a mission in Abwehr II who hoped to use it, chiefly to get back to their own country, or who believed they would be able to rehabilitate themselves with the OGPU by giving information. (An exactly similar development to that on the Russian side when the Seydlitz Movement (Free German Committee) was set up).
- c) With the relinquishment of further Soviet territories, nationals of those countries who knew there was no hope for them (i.e. chiefly Estonians, Lithuanians, Letts, West Ukrainians and White Russians).

"With regard to a). The use of these groups was rendered impossible or incredibly difficult when the airfields in Southern Russia had to be surrendered, for they could only be sent out by special machines (Ju.290). Even in 1943 the last undertaking of that type ("Brennessel", "Myrthe") had to be carried out at the last moment, under conditions of great difficulty, from a Roumanian airfield. After that, there was really nothing else to do with these groups except to employ them in some other field of warfare (fighting against Communist bands) or to keep them as gardeners at Luckenwalde Camp.

"With regard to b). The change of heart among the Russian volunteers became chiefly evident to Abwehr II through the JOHANSEN case. After working for more than a year, JOHANSEN had set up a group of Turkish nationals and Ukrainians to carry out missions in the area East of the Volga. He made himself out to be a Russian major of part Swedish extraction, and on account of his unusual personality enjoyed the confidence of the leading officers of Ost, in particular Oberst. Von FREITAG. In the autumn of 1943 he stated that his nerves had been affected by the long period of waiting for a mission, and offered his group for a front-line trial expedition. In the neighbourhood of Winnitza he and his group went over to the Red Partisans, leaving behind him the information that he had planned this move from the very beginning. I, however, am convinced that it was not until the Russians advanced over the Dnieper that he reconsidered his position and probably tried to ingratiate himself with the OGPU by giving information about Abwehr II. It is more than likely he was unsuccessful in this, for the counter-activities we were expecting from him totally failed to materialise.

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APPENDIX D(3)TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER REFERAT OST (Contd.)

"This classic case proved a very much greater shock to the Abteilung than was apparent from outside, and only served to increase the scepticism hitherto held in regard to Von FREITAG's personal activities in the East. However, there was no other reliable officer in the Abteilung who had an understanding of the Russian mentality, and we could therefore only hope that by some individual action the Abteilung would be able to accomplish something effective. An exception were the group of Nationalsolidaristen, but on account of the police restrictions imposed on them by the S.D. - which have already been described - they were never able to undertake any mission; and the Unternehmen "Wolf" attached to FAK 203, which actually was more founded on the inclination of certain Russian leading personalities to live the life of bandits.

"As a consequence, the Abteilung had to turn to the Wlassow Movement as the chief Russian factor in Anti-Bolshevism, and we put out feelers in this respect. WLASSOW and his very able helpers, above all General TRUCHIN, were convinced that their Movement had no hope of success unless they could at the same time work actively in Russia itself. But they doubted whether Germany could provide the material means necessary for such an enterprise. WLASSOW was well informed by his followers, who had had practical experience in Abwehr II undertakings, regarding the activities of the opposition (all-night air attacks of the Red Partisans along the whole Eastern Front; 60 machines for the rising in Slovakia; frequent supplies from the Western Allies to the Polish and Balkan revolutionary groups) and compared them with the slight efforts made by the Abwehr command to obtain the use of an occasional aircraft on the Eastern Front. As a Russian, however, he only could have faith in a mission of gigantic proportions with reliable supplies, and his chief doubt was that he would not be able to get regular reinforcements.


"These are the reasons which were bound to bring about the neglect of the Abteilung's camps (which were to be Fernsinsatzlager suitable for Abteilung work), and all that could be done was to supply to the Kommando undertakings (Naheinsatze) the material which was already at hand. This was to found in Group c) alone".

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APPENDIX D(4)

LEITSTELLE II OST.



1. General:

The Leitstelle II Ost was founded in the early summer of 1944. According to GAMBKE this establishment was set up for purely political reasons. Oberst. FREYTAG von LORINGHOVEN was particularly anxious to prevent Abwehr officers loyal to himself from being taken over by the R.S.H.A. The Leitstellen were therefore set up as an excuse to get these officers away from Berlin. Whether this is the real reason or not, it would certainly account for the fact that the Leitstelle II Ost seemed to serve no useful purpose other than that of being a post office between the FAKS and Mil.Amt., and FAKS and I.c. of the Heeresgruppe, its responsibilities and functions never having been clearly defined.

2. Organisation before 20th July 1944:

FREYTAG von LORINGHOVEN was also in charge of OKH Heerwesenabteilung. When the Leitstelle was set up he apparently gave instructions that it was to be the responsibility of this Department of the Staff. Why an intelligence organisation of this nature should be subordinated to the administrative branch of the Staff GAMBKE and RAUPACH are unable to say.

Personnel at that time were as follows:-

- | | |
|---|--|
| a) C.O. | Oberstlt. Ernst zu EIKERN. |
| b) Deputy C.O. | Oberlt. d.R. HOCKER. |
| c) Bearbeiter for Officers and other ranks; technical organising officer. | Oberlt. d.R. STRAUSS. |
| d) Quartermaster | Sonderfuehrer (Z) BRUNGMANN. ^{TH T} X A |
| Fdw. WAGNER | - Liaison officer with Heerwesenabteilung. |

3. Organisation after 20th July 1944:

After the affair of 20th July and the suicide of FREYTAG von LORINGHOVEN the subordination of Leitstelle II Ost to the Heerwesenabteilung was cancelled and it was placed under the direct control of Mil.Amt., sections D and F. Here again neither the officers of Referat Ost, of Mil. D, or those of Mil. F. were able to agree on a clear cut division of responsibility. Accordingly, when any particular order was to be sent out to the Leitstelle, either Referat Ost would deal with it, copy to Mil.F, or vice versa. This was a source of considerable annoyance to the Leitstelle officers, who never knew with which section of the Mil. Amt. they had to deal when visiting Berlin on duty. As time went on BUNTRUCK, head of Mil.F, tended to gain more control over the Leitstelle.

O.K.H. Fremde Heere Ost also wanted a finger in the pie, as they had originally a certain amount of control over the FAKS and FATS which were normally assigned to Army Groups and Armies respectively. GAMBKE, however, does not think that they ever obtained any control over Leitstelle II Ost.

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APPENDIX D(4)
Leitstelle II Ost (Contd.)

The relationship between the Leitstelle II Ost and SKORZENY becomes clear when it is realised that the latter was Gruppenleiter VI. S, also commanded the S.S. Jagdverbaende and the Befehlstelle (the Jagdverbaende parallel to the Leitstellen II) and was at the same time Abteilungschef Mil. D.

4. Activities and Functions of Leitstelle II Ost:

As has been stated above the Leitstelle was never given a charter, but as far as is known to GAMBKE, RAUPACH and PETERS its activities and functions were as follows:-

- a) The control of the FAKs and FATs by front line liaison. EIKERN and his staff used to make frequent visits to the FAK H.Q.s.
- b) Administration and Personnel.
- c) The collating of all intelligence matter and the appropriate dissemination of it to the FAKs.
- d) Liaison with I.C. of the Heeresgruppen and Armies.
- e) The collating of reports from its FAKs and FATs and the preparation and forwarding of routine reports back to Mil. Amt.
- f) The training of Russian volunteers suitable for work with the FAKs and FATs.

GAMBKE states that the abolition of the Leitstelle would have made no difference to the Abteilung II activities on the Eastern Front. The FAKs and FATs would have been able to carry on perfectly well by themselves directly under Mil. Amt. He points out that an establishment of this kind would only have served a real purpose if the Germans had penetrated deeply into Russia, when the control of the front line FAKs and FATs would have been difficult from Berlin.

5. Training establishments:

- a) In a monastery near Bischofsfelden. This camp was run on the same lines as the Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht. It was eventually evacuated to Wittenberg in February 1945. The Lagerleiter was Oblt. KWATERNIK. A certain Uffz. Olgerd WICKENHEISER was an interpreter. H
- b) Another camp (later evacuated to a place near Boitzenburg, Pomerania) was established under a Major GERULLIS and Oberlt. STRAUSS, which trained White Russians. No further details.
- c) A further camp was established near Rummelsburg, Pomerania, under Korv. Kpt. LAURINAT and Sdf. SEGELKE, for Lithuanians. No further details.
- d) GAMBKE states that a Hptm. LEZENDECKER was instructed to prepare an establishment near Danzig. No further details.

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APPENDIX D(4)
Leitstelle II Ost (Contd.)

- e) The Leitstelle also took over the Z. Staffel (Propagandatroop) of FAK 203 and used it to train personnel. Its C.O. was Lt. BARGEL and later Lt. SCHUETTE.

6. Personnel of the Leitstelle at turn of year 1944/45:

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| 1. Oberstlt. Ernst zu EIGERN | Commandant |
| 2. Oberlt. HOCKER | Deputy C.O. |
| 3. Oberlt. STRAUSS | C.O. of a Lithuanian camp |
| 4. Korv. Kpt. LAURINAT | Temporary attachment.
Was waiting for a post with OKM. |
| 5. Lt. GLOECKNER | Technical officer, previous task of STRAUSS. |
| 6. Sdf. BRINKMANN | Quartermaster |
| 7. Lt. BARGEL | Z. Staffel and liaison with Polish circles. |
| 8. Lt. SCHUETTE | Z. Staffel with Russians. |

7. Location and Moves of Leitstelle II Ost:

It was established originally in Bischofsfelden in May/June 1944. It remained there until January 1945, when it evacuated to Grunberg, thence to Vriedzen (N.W. of Berlin). Here it was attached to the Heeresgruppe WEICHSEL, I. Staffel being set up at Prenzlau, and II Staffel at Neu Brandenburg.

In February 1945 it was reformed as a Leitstelle and sent to Birkenwerder (near Berlin). On 30th March it was transferred to a place (name forgotten) just north of Halle. On 6th April the Leitstelle moved to a locality about half-way between Halle and Dessau. On instructions from BUNTROCK it evacuated to Bavaria on April 10th, 1945.

52/11/33 = Already noted in SF 52/11/33, (3a)

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SF

APPENDIX D (5).

F.A.Ks and F.A.Ts SUBORDINATE TO REFERAT OST.

1. General.

The officer in command of a F.A.K. or F.A.T. was, to a very large extent, independent. Normally he advised the Ic of the Army Group concerned of his plans and intentions without receiving orders. However, the Ic from time to time expressed certain wishes which were carried out whenever possible. He depended upon the Referat Ost (and Leitstelle II Ost) mainly for the laying down of policy matters. Centralisation was more or less out of the question owing to the distances involved.

The areas of operation for a Frontaufklaerungskommando were normally about 150 Km. in advance of the main front line of an Army Group. This figure is to a certain extent theoretical as the areas of operation were naturally dependent on circumstances and the military situation. Operations beyond this boundary were generally under the direction of the Abteilung itself in Berlin.

2. F.A.K. 204. ^{NNI. WR.} (Heeresgruppe Weichsel).

already extracted to 52/11/33.

Personnel.

Major ROENNECKE ✓
 Leut. v. STADEN *See W*
 Leut. REINDL *MT*
 Leut. MEYER BROTHLING *MT*
 Leut. v. FIRCKS *See W*
 Sdf. (Z) PITZKEN ✓ *See W*
 Sdf. (Z) SEGELCKE ✓ *See W*
 Sdf. (Z) WALTHER ✓
 Sdf. (Z) KITTLER-KAPSITZ. *MT*

The predecessors of Major ROENNECKE were Oberstlt. MUTRAY (killed), Oberstlt. v. ESCHWEGE and Major KEUNE (?). ROENNECKE took over in Spring 1944 and led the Kommando until the end.

Chain of Command.

F.A.K. 204 was, as far as is known, formed for Army Group North, which in 1943 was holding the Leningrad front. When this Army Group North was used in the Kurland bridgehead, and the Kommando was transferred in Winter 1944/45 to Insterburg and Danzig, it was temporarily put under the command of Army Group Centre (simultaneously with F.A.K. 203). After the successful Soviet offensive in January 1945 and the collapse of the central front, Army Group VISTULA was formed, and in February 1945 Kommando 204 was placed under its command together with other units. At the beginning of March, when Leitstelle II Ost was withdrawn from the Vistula, Kommando 204 took over control of II matters with this Army Group and withdrew to Prenzlau (last location known at the end of March 1945). Eventually Kommando 203 and Trupps 212 (Heeresgruppe Kurland), 205 and 210 were placed under the command of 204.

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APPENDIX D (5) - contd.2. F.A.K. 204 - contd.Activities.

As with each Kommando, work is primarily the control of subordinate Trupps and secondarily the carrying out of actual operations. During the course of Summer 1944, Kommando 204 took over the preliminary work done by Trupp 211 in Esthonia, and 212 in Lithuania and Latvia, against the event of reconquest by the Soviets (concealment of stores and V-Men). Until this time the Kommando had only Trupp 205 in the front line. During this period in Riga the Kommando undertook a host of small operations, mostly S-operations. After the withdrawal to Insterburg only Trupp 212 remained in Kurland. 205 was employed in East Prussian territory. It was joined by 210 which was likewise in East Prussia and was administered by F.A.K. 204. In January 1945, during the Danzig period, 204 took over all the camps of 203 which were mainly in the West Prussian area, and fitted out several Streifkorps. About activities conducted from Prenzlau, nothing more is known.

Operations (not referred to in APPENDIX D (6)).

None of the operations carried out by 204, according to GAMBEKE, was conspicuous enough to warrant special mention. In addition to those mentioned in APPENDIX D (6), the Kommando carried out the following operations in February 1945: -

- 1) A Streifkorps operation composed of Russian personnel under Lt. GOETTLER in the Pommeranian-Polish frontier area. The operation failed during the crossing of the front line. (Schleusung operation).
- 2) A Streifkorps operation consisting of Polish volunteers under Lt. MACHNIK and Lt. ERFLING. Fate of the section under Lt. MACHNIK unknown. The Poles under Lt. ERFLING deserted to the Russians. Lt. ERFLING eventually returned through the front line. (V.E. operation).
- 3) A Streifkorps operation consisting of German personnel operating in the Hohensalza area which was at that time already occupied by the Soviet Russians. The operation got involved in a Polish police raid. Only a few came back.
- 4) A Streifkorps operation under Lt. v. STADEN in the West Prussian area. Details and composition unknown. The operation produced a certain amount of information.

All these operations must be described as failures unless one is willing to consider them as partial successes because of the experience gained for further operations and the disquiet caused to the enemy.

Areas.

Kommando 204's area of operation was in front of the line held by Army Group North, which was changing constantly in this sector according to the positions at the front, e.g. Leningrad and Soutn (until about the middle of 1944). Then the Baltic, i.e. Latvia, Esthonia and later Lithuania; from January 1945,

APPENDIX D (5) - contd.

2. F.A.K. 204 - contd.

Areas (contd).

East Prussia, the Province of Posen, Pomerania. Such was the position until the collapse.

Schools and Training Camps.

Kommando 204 had training camps at various times in Pleskau, Riga, Insterburg and Danzig. Details about them are not known. During the Danzig period (approx. January 1945) and after the collapse of the Vistula front, the Kommando took over the White Ruthenian Camp under Leut. BERNDT @ BELOW, the Russian Camp under Leut. GOETTLER, and the Lithuanian Camp under Korv. Kapitän LAURINAT. Also during this time, an agents' camp staffed with Latvians was maintained for S-operations. Apart from this, the Kommando maintained in Insterburg and Danzig a Z-staff under the Roa Hptm. PURIK (2) and Sonderfuehrer KITTLER-KAPSITZ.

(a) F.A.T. 212. (Heeresgruppe Kurland)

Personnel:

Hauptmann REUTER @ RUNGE
 Leut. HASSELMANN
 Leut. KOCK
 Oberfwbl. SCHUBERT.

N.B. - REUTER was eventually succeeded by HASSELMANN.

Chain of Command.

After its creation, 212 was with the German Army Group in Finland (Karelia). In Spring 1944 the Trupp emerged with Ast. Riga, as a Z-Trupp; task: supply mission in Lithuania and Latvia. After this was finished in Summer 1944, it was allotted to an army and placed under Kommando 204. Trupp 212 remained first in Kurland with the so-called Army Group North, then Kurland. It remained there until the end. The accuracy of the above details cannot be guaranteed owing to lapse of time.

Activities.

No details are known concerning the Trupp's activities in Finland. It undertook the establishment of secret dumps in Lithuania and Latvia, and the recruiting of volunteers. Thereafter, the Trupp was allotted to the Army at the front, and to Army Group North.

(b) F.A.T. 205

Personnel.

Hauptmann THOMSEN
 Leut. LAUE
 Leut. GANSS
 Leut. WEISSWEILER (transferred to Kdo: 212)
 Sdf. (Z) LUISK.

Extrad
 SF 52/11/33(4)

Extrad
 SF 52/11/33(1)

See u HLT
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See u
 HLT
 See u

APPENDIX D (5) - contd.

(b) F.A.T. 205 - contd.

Chain of Command.

As far as can be remembered, in Summer 1944 the unit was still with a sub-unit of the Army Group Centre. It is possible that already at this time a Trupp was with Army Group North. In January 1945, or February 1945, the Trupp appeared in the area of Danzig subordinate to F.A.K. 204 with the Second Army. Special task: formation and execution of Streifkorps operations under the direction of the Second Army. Evacuation was ordered from the Danzig area. Whether it was carried out is not known.

Activities.

Apart from the Streifkorps training in the Danzig area, details are not known.

(c) F.A.T. 210.

Personnel.

- Oberlt. NISSEN ✓
- Leut. VOGIER ✓
- Leut. MANNS
- Sdf. (Z) KALLEY ✓
- Sdf. (Z) KRAUSE ✓
- Sdf. (Z) MUELLER. See U

Chain of Command.

In Summer 1944, the Trupp belonged to Army Group Centre (as far as can be remembered, the Third Panzer Army). After the collapse of the central front in Summer 1944, this Trupp was also withdrawn and was finally on the Lithuanian East Prussian frontier. After the Soviet offensive in January 1945, it withdrew with Army Group Centre to the forces encircled around Koenigsberg and was subordinate to Army Group Centre. In February it was moved off to the West via Pilleau and was employed again eastwards of Stettin under the command of Kommando 204 by Army Group VISTULA.

3. F.A.K. 203. (Heeresgruppe Weichsel).

Personnel.

- Oberstlt. ARNOLD See U
- Hptm. TANNER MLT
- Hptm. SCHLAGEL MLT
- Oberlt. JOHANNER MT
- Leut. v. HIRSCHYDT See U
- Leut. ERBEN See U
- Leut. KELLER MLT
- Leut. SCHUETTE MLT
- Leut. GOETTLER See U
- Leut. MACHNIK MLT
- Leut. BERNDT @ BELOW See U (p. 11)
- Leut. PFALZER MT
- Sdf. (Z) IRSCHIK. MT
- Oberfwbl. KAJANDER See U

SF 52/11/33(1)

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SF 52/11/33(2)

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F.A.K. 203
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APPENDIX D (5) - contd.

3. F.A.K. 203. (Heeresgruppe Weichsel) - contd.

As far as can be remembered, the Kommandofuehrer before ARNOLD were Oberst. STROJIL and HOTZEL. Oberst. HOTZEL was Kommandofuehrer in Spring 1943. In Spring 1944 Oberstlt. ARNOLD took over command and retained it until the end of January 1945. He was relieved of his command for going on leave without permission, and was replaced by Hptm. TANNER who died in the middle of March. At the beginning of April GAMBKE was nominated Kommandofuehrer, but did not take up his duties.

Chain of Command.

In the Spring of 1943, F.A.K. 203 was subordinate to Army Group Centre. At the time of the collapse of the German Front on the Vistula in January 1945, the Kommando was separated from its camps and the Army Group, and reassembled in the area of Brandenburg on the Havel, and was put under the Command of the 9th Army in the Vistula Army Group. Immediately upon this followed its allocation to "Einsatzstab Cuba" (name of Leitstelle II Ost when it was allotted for a short time to the Army Group Vistula in January and February 1945). This allocation to the 9th Army continued until the collapse.

Activities.

In 1944 the Kommando had a large camp of about 200 Russians under Lt. GOETTLER, and started Unternehmen 1 Mob. Tag in Summer 1944 from there. At the same time a Z staff was allotted to the Kommando under Lt. BARGEL. After the transfer to Lentschuetz, the Kommando controlled a White Ruthenian camp near Insterburg in East Prussia, under Major GERULLIS and Lt. SCHUETTE, a Lithuanian camp under Korv. Kapitain LAURINAT, and a Russian camp under Lt. GOETTLER. Simultaneously, a Polish detachment of about 50 men, which was later transferred to West Prussia, was formed near Litzmannstadt under Lt. MACHINK and Lt. BUCHHOLZ. The Z staff, under Lt. BARGEL was put under command of Leitstelle II Ost in Autumn 1944 (direction Lt. SCHUETTE). Lt. BEERTDT @ BELOW took over the White Ruthenian camp in Autumn 1944. After the new organisation of the F.A.Ks in February 1945 in Brandenburg, all the above-named camps were handed over to F.A.K. 204. F.A.K. 203 organised a Streifkorpsschule under Hptm. SCHLEGEL and endeavoured to form a Polish Z Staffel.

From the Kuestrin bridgehead in February 1945, successful K operations were undertaken by Lt. HIRSCHHEYDT and Lt. ERBIEN with a Russian group consisting of about 30 men.

S.I.
12.7.45

(a) F.A.T. 209.

Personnel.

Hptm. DRAEGER
Leut. THORWART
Leut. WINDGASSEN

Chain of Command.

In Summer 1944, F.A.T. 209 belonged to Army Group Centre, near Warsaw on the Vistula Front. GAMBKE thinks it was allotted to the 9th Army from Autumn 1944 until the collapse. The 9th Army and with it, Trupp 209, were temporarily allotted to Army Group A (SCHOERNER) in

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- XIWI -

APPENDIX D (5) - contd.

(a) F.A.T. 209 - contd.

January 1945; it reassembled at the beginning of February 1945 in Herrndorf near Glogau. At the same time it joined the Vistula Army Group, and moved to a place immediately East of Berlin.

Activities.

After the collapse of the Vistula front in January 1945, Hptm. DRAEGER took over the protection of the Chief of Staff of the Army, for which he was decorated with the "E.K.I." When they were located near Berlin, 209 mainly organized S operations with Polish volunteers who declared themselves ready to work against the Red Army. GAMBKE remembers an operation when two agents were passed through the enemy lines East of Berlin to destroy documents in the house of a General at Liegnitz. The operation was successful and the two volunteers brought back proof of their activities.

(b) F.A.T. 211.

Personnel.

- Hptm. TANNER @ TROEGER (until February 1945). ^{MhT}
- Leut. ERFLING (transferred to K 204 in February 1945). ^{MhT}
- Leut. GRAEBE ^{See 44}
- Leut. GLOECKNER ^{MhT}
- Leut. GOTTSCHALK. ^{MhT}

From the beginning of operations in Esthonia until the collapse, Hptm. TANNER@TROEGER was in command. He had as assistant in Esthonia Lt. v. STADEN, who is best informed about the establishment of sabotage dumps in the Esthonian area.

Chain of Command.

From Spring 1944 the Trupp was operating in Esthonia. A temporary subordination to F.A.K. 204 may have taken place. In Autumn 1944 the Trupp was transferred to the area Posen - Konin to establish secret dumps. Before this task was ended the Trupp had to evacuate and marched via Luckenwalde to Brandenburg where it was, for practical purposes, united with Kommando 203 (direction by combined personnel) in January 1945.

Activities.

In Esthonia the Trupp was establishing secret sabotage dumps and was recruiting volunteers for later operations. Further dumps were to be established in the Konin area, although these were never completed. During the Brandenburg period their work ran parallel in fact to that of Kommando 203.

4. F.A.K. 202. (Heeresgruppe Mitte).

Personnel.

- Hptm. KIRN ^{MhT}
- Hptm. HEILMANN ^{MhT}
- Hptm. BAUM ^{MhT}
- Oberlt. MASUHR @ SPERBER ^{MhT}
- Oberlt. MUELLER, Josef. ^{MhT}
- Leut. MARKERT @ THOMAS ^{MhT}
- Leut. MORITZ @ LOEWEN ^{MhT}
- Leut. MENNER. ^{MhT}

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D(7)

- XLVII -

APPENDIX D (5) - contd.FAK 202 - contd.Personnel (contd).

The Kommandofuehrer to begin with were: Oberstleutnant Ernst ZU EIKERN, and successively Oberstleutnant SEELIGER. SEELIGER was killed in the late Summer of 1944 and his place was taken by Hauptmann KIRN.

Chain of Command.

From the beginning of the Russian war, Kommando 202 belonged to Heeresgruppe Sued, i.e. RUNDSTEDT, REICHENAU, MANSTEIN and SCHOERNER's Heeresgruppe. At the end the Heeresgruppe bore the initial "A". The Trupps attached to it changed during the course of time, but were finally F.A.Ts 207, 203 and 206. The Kommando followed the same route as the above-mentioned Heeresgruppe i.e. Kiev and Poltava. In the Summer of 1944 the Kommando was in Lemberg. After the Soviet Summer Offensive of 1944 the Kommando removed to Cracow. In January 1945 the Kommando passed through Frankenstein, Silesia, then Salzbrunn and finally Kollin, Bohemia. Some time after February 1945, F.A.K. 212 was also attached to Kdo. 202.

Activities.

In the year 1942 until the Autumn of 1943, the Kommando was connected with the "Kasache" group of the "Linde" operation.

In the Autumn of 1944 the Kommando worked in conjunction with the Ukrainian revolutionary movement. Several operations were carried out, the chief of which was one headed by the leader of the Kommando, behind the lines, to get information on the Ukrainian movement. Streifkorps work was set up through the foundation of the "Schill" Streifkorps school. In January 1945, the Kommando took on a Legion of Polish nationals, about a thousand in number, who had declared themselves ready to fight for a free and independent Poland. In January/February 1945 their area of operations was chiefly confined to the Soviet-Occupied portion of Silesia.

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Schools and Training-Camps.

In 1943 the Kommando ran the "Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht" camp which trained the Kasachen of the "Linde" operation. The leader was Hauptmann BAUM, to whom Sonderfuehrer GREIFF was attached. (See APPENDIX D (3) for further details).

In the course of the year 1944, the "Technische Baukompanie 5" was founded by Hauptmann BAUM for the training of small sabotage groups, mainly for the purpose of blowing up railway lines. (See APPENDIX D (9) for further details).

At the same time the Wirtschaftsschule Sued was founded for the training of Z-Men under Leutnant RAUPACH. (See APPENDIX D (8) for further details).

At the beginning of February 1945, a Polish camp was set up in Bohemian territory. Leader: Hauptmann HEILMANN. Here the Polish National Legion was trained.

In the Autumn of 1944 the Streifkorps school of the Heeresgruppe was founded under Leutnant MORITZ @ LOEWEN. (See APPENDIX D (7) for further details).

APPENDIX D (5) - contd.

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(a) ~~X~~ F.A.T. 203. *MT*

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Personnel.

Hptm. KLOSE *MLT* *MT*
Leut. SALLABA *MLT*
Leut. HERRMANN *MLT*
Leut. REMPEL. *MLT*

Chain of Command.

In the Spring of 1944 the Trupp was led by Hauptmann REINHARD who later took over Kdo 206. About Summer 1944, REINHARD was replaced by the then Oberleutnant (later Hauptmann) KLOSE.

The Trupp was always attached to an Army of Heeresgruppe Sued (then "A"). In the Autumn of 1944 it was East Slovakia. It retreated with the army back to Moravia. Its last position known (March 1945) was Machrisch Gruebau.

Activities.

During the time it was in Slovakia the Trupp's particular job was contacting the Ukrainian Freedom Movement. No further details are known.

(b) F.A.T. 206. *SF 52/11/35/2)*

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Personnel.

Leut. SUSS @ SCHILLING *MLT* *MLT*
Leut. ROLKE *MLT*

Activities.

From January 1945 the Trupp was preparing sabotage caches in the Silesia/Moravia area, somewhere near Glatzer Kessel.

(c) F.A.T. 207.

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Personnel.

Leut. RENKEMEYER @ MASSEN *MLT* *MLT*
MLT Leut. FOERSTER @ PAHLBERG *MLT*
Leut. PAHL. *MLT* *POHL* *MLT*

Leut. RENKEMEYER was the successor, in late Summer 1944, of a certain Leut. KOSLOWSKY.

Chain of Command.

Formerly with an army under Heeresgruppe Mitte (prior to Summer 1944). Then under an army of Heeresgruppe Sued "A" (General SCHOERNER). Last known location in Kamenz, Saxony.

Activities.

Nothing is known about the activities of this Trupp beyond the fact that it carried out Z and K missions with Russian V-Men.

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52/11/33(4)
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APPENDIX D (5) - contd.

5. F.A.K. 212.

Personnel.

AX

- Hptm. REUTER @ RUNGE See W
- Oberlt. IDEN MHT See W
- Leut. BARGEL (transferred to Leitstelle II-Ost)
- Leut. BUCHHOLZ See W
- Leut. RAMDOHR See W

The Kommandofuehrer in Italy was Major Graf THUN. He handed over in the Summer to REUTER who ran it for a short time in Italy and then in Breslau.

Chain of Command.

SF 52/11/13

In the Summer (July or August) of 1944, Kommando 212 was transferred from Northern Italy to Silesia (Breslau). Hauptmann REUTER had led the Kommando in Italy. The Kommando was directly attached to the Leitstelle II-Ost) with close liaison with Kommando-meldegebiet Breslau. In January 1945 it was allotted to Heeresgruppe "A" (SCHOERNER) which, on leaving Cracow, withdrew to Silesia. The Kommando was placed under Kommando 202.

Activities.

In Silesia during January 1945 the task of the Kommando was to prepare sabotage caches ("Sixtus" and "Wachholder" operations) in the areas of Upper Silesia and the Glatzer district. The Kommando commenced the training of volunteers in Upper Silesia. Its last known position was Bad Lengnau in Glatzer Kessel.

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 the whole Appendix (6)
 - L - Copy in SF 52/4/28 (7)
~~SF 52/4/4 (14)~~

APPENDIX D(6)

ABWEHR II AND MIL AMT D OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Operations were distinguished according to the purpose of the mission as follows:

FS Einsatz:	Fallschirmeinsatz - volunteers dropped by parachute.
Schl. Einsatz:	Schleusungseinsatz - volunteers passed through the lines.
Ue. Einsatz:	Ueberrollungseinsatz - volunteers deliberately left behind in territory evacuated by the Germans.
K. Unternehmen:	Kampfunternehmen - an actual tactical military task, e.g. against Russian partisans in German-occupied territory.
S. Unternehmen:	Sabotageunternehmen - a sabotage mission.
B. Unternehmen:	Bandenunternehmen - the training of bands behind the enemy lines for the purpose of guerilla warfare.
Z. Unternehmen:	Zersetzungsunternehmen - propaganda missions, especially propaganda intended to cause unrest and dissatisfaction among the enemy populations or armed forces. E.g. Showing a Russian p.o.w. good examples of the German Farm System and letting him be returned through the lines to explain to his compatriots the advantages of the German system over the collective system.
I. Unternehmen:	Insurgierungsunternehmen - bringing about the political insurrection of local populations by the creation of cells, rallying points, etc. E.g. similar to the French Resistance Movement fostered by Great Britain.
R. Unternehmen:	Residenten-Unternehmen - when evacuation of territory was imminent, the Germans prepared to organize such of the local inhabitants as were sympathetic and to provide them with buried stores of weapons, ammunition and food.
V. Unternehmen:	Vergrabungsunternehmen - the preparation of secret stores of weapons, ammunition, food, etc. for R. Unternehmen or for FS Einsätze.

Designations FS, Schl. and Ue. originate from the method of transportation of the volunteer to the assigned area of operation. Designations K, S, B, Z, and I adumbrate the envisaged activities of the volunteer. Designations R and V refer to the material and personnel preparations for the undertaking. A sharp generic division of operations and designations such as have been cited above is impossible. E.g. some operations could be given several of these symbols. Unternehmen 'BRENNESSEL' was an FS Einsatz, a B. and an I. Unternehmen. Later the symbol S could also be applied to it.

- LI -

S.I.
12.1.45

X APPENDIX D(6)

ABWEHR II AND MIL AIR D OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Individual operations remembered by GAMBEKE/RAUPACH/PETERS are hereunder. They have been catalogued in alphabetical order for easy reference :-

1. Unternehmen 'AURORA'

Preparation for this operation commenced in the autumn of 1943. It was a 'Z' operation under Kdo. 202, directed by Abwehr II, Referat OI of Gruppe Ost. The task was the formation of anti-Bolshevik cells behind the Russian lines in the Army. Personnel included Lt.-Col. (Russian) KUSNETZOFF and Uffz. HOESCH. The WLASSOW movement, according to RAUPACH, had an active interest in this operation. Only a few operations of this nature were carried out owing to the increasing difficulties in respect of aircraft. They were as follows:

(a) A Russian Air Force major crossed the lines at Lemberg in July 1944. Further details unknown.

(b) Three officers, including two airmen, were dropped in the Bryansk forest in August 1944.

(c) In October 1944, about twenty personnel were dropped in the district of Upper Djensa in order to get through to the 'Wolf' operation of F.A.K. 203. On account of misunderstanding fighting took place between these two groups, until they realised what the position was.

2. Unternehmen 'BAERENFANG'

Took place in approximately January 1945, and consisted of a raid on the quarters of an Intelligence Officer of a Russian Army Unit west of Riga with the object of taking him prisoner. One German private and about ten Latvian agents took part. The Russian officer was killed during the fighting that ensued; five of the Latvians got back.


3. Unternehmen 'BLUETE'

Training for this operation commenced in February 1944 and took place during April 1944 under the control of F.A.T. 204, Referat Sued-Ost. A group of about eight men (Russians) was dropped by parachute in the Balta district (Transnistria - N.E. Roumania). It made a successful landing but no W/T communications were received.

4. Unternehmen 'BORGIA I
II
III'

These operations commenced in the summer of 1944, August. They were controlled by F.A.K. 204(?). Several parachute groups, similar to 'WOLF' and 'I.MOB TAG' had sabotage tasks in central Russia. 'BORGIA I and II' never reported by W/T so their fate is unknown. 'BORGIA III' which was composed of some 16-20 personnel, reported successful sabotage actions and several times received reinforcements by plane. During 1945, however, the group did not appear to be very active, and in March 1945, communications were severed.

Card all the operations in this Appendix



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5. Unternehmen 'DONKASACHEN' ^{MT} The operation commenced in the summer of 1943 under the control of F.A.T. 204, a Hptm. SCHLIMMEL. Tasks were sabotage and insurrection activities in the Don Steppes. RAUPACH remembers seeing aerial photographs of a munition train which had been blown up and of a railway bridge which had been destroyed, which were part of the successful activities of this operation group.
6. Unternehmen 'DSCHUNGEL' ^{MT} Personnel for the operation were trained in a camp of Ast Riga. The operation began in early summer 1943 under the Ast Riga Gruppe II. The task was to free prisoners in a concentration camp situated in N. Russia, in the Archangel, Murmansk or Kotlas (?) areas. It was planned by Oberst KARWEDE, who was Leiter II in Riga. W/T contact was received but it was suspected that this was an enemy attempt to deceive the Germans as to the fate of the operation.
7. Unternehmen 'EDELWEISS' ^{MT} About 100 Caucasians were trained in the Fortschuttkommando Bergwacht in the summer of 1944, and in the autumn the operation was put into effect. The task was directed against the armed bands of Russian partisans behind the German lines. In charge was Major Graf THUN. Other personnel included Lt. WEISSMUND @ WOLF and Edw. MURDACH. The operation was directed by Leitstelle II Sued-Ost.
8. Unternehmen 'EHER' ^{MT} This operation had the same object as 'SCHAMIL' and 'TAMARA'. A group of fifteen Germans under a Feldwebel AMERMAN were used to foment unrest in the Caucasus. They were controlled by F.A.K. 201, which was then in the Crimea. Further details unknown.
9. Unternehmen 'ERSTIMAA' ^{MT} This was a series of operations, about 8-10 in number, which took place during the summer and autumn of 1944 under the control of F.A.K. 204. Objects were sabotage and espionage in the Estonian sector. No further details known.
10. Unternehmen 'GINSTER' ^{MT} Personnel had been collected together and trained during the year 1943 in Sonderlager Luckenwalde. Training was completed at the end of August 1944. The operation was under the direction of Referat Ost. The task was to drop a group of agents by parachute near Baku in the Caucasus. The agents were volunteers from the Azerbaijan tribe, about 5-10 in number, and were led by certain LERMATOV. The operation was not carried out owing to the unfavourable military situation (loss of landing grounds in the Crimea and on the coast of the Black Sea).

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11. ^{ut} Unternehmen 'IRRLICHT' The operation started in the summer of 1944 under the control of F.A.K. 203. The task was to drop empty parachutes over the front-line east of Riga as a deception measure to persuade the enemy that it was a large-scale parachute operation.
12. ^{ut} Unternehmen 'JASMIN' Training commenced in 1942 at Sonderlager Luckenwalde, but the operation was not carried out until the end of autumn 1943. It was directed by Referat AF of Gruppe A of Abwehr II. The task was insurrection and sabotage in the Aschaabad (Turkestan) area. It was to be led by a Russian Major JOHANNSEN. GAMBKE does not think the operation was carried out.
13. ^{ut} Unternehmen 'KATER' Training for this operation commenced in July 1944 with the Lehr Regiment Kurfuerst in Kamenz, under the direction of Referat Ost. A certain Oblt. KUBITS was in charge and he had about 8-10 men under him. The task was to reconnoitre and carry out sabotage behind the Russian lines on the Peipus-Sees front in Estonia. The lessons learnt from the operation were to be the training basis for more extensively planned raiding operations. The operation was carried out in August 1944 under the control of F.A.K. 204. The party was equipped with W/T apparatus but as nothing further was heard from its members, it was considered that they were all rounded up by the Russians. see A
14. ^{ut} Unternehmen 'KOLIERI' The operation was planned in the summer of 1944, and was carried out in October 1944. It was under the direction of Referat Ost and Referat Luft and consisted of a raiding operation in the Strya-Stanislawow district (south Russian/Polish frontier) with the object of contacting Ukrainian partisans and leaders of the UPA (Ukrainian Revolutionary Army), and ascertaining the possibility of further German soldiers remaining behind the lines. The party consisted of approximately ten Germans, who were slipped through the lines. They stayed for about a month in Russian territory and were brought back by plane eventually. It was considered to be a very successful operation.
15. ^{ut} Unternehmen 'KOSUTH' This operation took place during November/December 1944 and was directed by one of the F.A.T.s of F.A.K. 202. The object was the infiltration of Hungarian agents into the Kaschau (Kosice) region in order to organise a stay-behind network. There were eight groups, in all about 15 - 20 persons, including one woman. The agents were instructed to return when the

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15. Unternehmen 'KOSSUTH'
 (ctd.) M
 organisation was complete, but this afterwards proved impossible as the German lines were withdrawn further than was anticipated.
16. Unternehmen 'KUCKUCKSEI' M
 Carried out in October 1944 under the direction of F.A.K. 203. The object was sabotage of railway engines east of Warsaw, by the planting of pieces of explosive coal in the locomotive tenders. Russian youths of 14-16 years old were landed in five groups of about two each. It was later learned by Russian W/T reports that this operation had been partially successful, and had caused a certain amount of alarm.
17. Unternehmen 'LATVIA' M
 Carried out from summer to autumn 1944 by ? F.A.K. 204. Tasks were sabotage of all kinds in the Kurland sector (around Riga). About twelve groups in all of 1-2 men each, were dropped by parachute. The agents were in most cases given instructions to return through the lines after having carried out their mission but in fact in only two or three cases did this happen. It was suspected that a few groups fell into enemy hands before they could carry out their tasks.
18. Unternehmen 'LIBANON I-IV' M
 These were operations with Lithuanian personnel prepared by Lt. GOETTLER in summer 1944. LIBANON I and II were actually carried out. No more details known. Hosts buried in the Latvian area were used for this operation.
19. Unternehmen 'MERKUR' M
 'VENUS' M
 'MARS' M
 'JUPITER' M
 This was a series of sabotage operations carried out during the summer of 1944 under the direction of F.A.K. 203. The task was the destruction of the railway line on the Riga-Daugavpils (Doenaburg Dwinsis) sector. There were approximately four groups of 1-2 men per group. PETERS states that the operations were mainly successful, and confirmed by aerial photographs.
20. Unternehmen 'NEPTUN' M
 'URANUS' M
 'ORION' M
 As above, but the agents were slipped through the lines instead of being parachuted. X A X
21. Unternehmen 'MISTEL' M
 Directed by a Major MEIDER-MADER X who was assisted by GAMBKE in the spring of 1943 in the Crimea. The object was to foment insurrection in the Ashaabad area in Turkestan. Operation controlled by Referat AF, Gruppe A of Abwehr II. Eventually abandoned, as no aircraft available. X

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APPENDIX D(6)ABWEHR II AND MIL AMT D OPERATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT22. Unternehmen 'I. MOB TAG' MT

The operation was planned during the winter of 1943/4 under the direction of F.A.K. 203. The operation took place in successive waves in June/July 1944. The task was to form a partisan group in the Smolensk area and to carry out sabotage, support any existing partisan groups as well as to carry on seditious propaganda amongst the local inhabitants. It consisted of some fifty individuals. Names of individuals taking part are not known but Lt. BARGEL, Lt. SCHUETTE and a Capt. of the KLASSOW Army, one PAVLOV, were all connected with this operation. The group reported by W/T the successful destruction of railways, motor vehicles, and supply dumps. In December 1944, the group received supplementary material by parachute and PETERS thinks it was also given assistance in April 1945. MT

23. Unternehmen 'MOHR' MT

This operation consisted of a party of Caucasians under the command of a Feldwebel MURBACH who were originally trained in the Sonderlager Luckenwalde and transferred to the Forstschutzkommando Bergwacht. They were controlled by Referat Ost in co-operation with F.A.K. 202. Mission and results not known.

24. Unternehmen 'MOND'
'NEU-MOND' MT
'VOLL-MOND' MT

These three operations were initiated by F.A.K. 203 and were directed against Bialystok. No further details known.

25. Unternehmen 'MYRTHE' MT

Persomel for this operation were trained in Sonderlager Luckenwalde during 1942. Part of them were trained in W/T and secret ink at the Stab Walli in Warsaw. The operation began in April 1943. It was under the direction of Referat AF of Gruppe A of Abwehr II. Tasks were sabotage and fomenting of insurrection in the Ukrainian part of the population of Turkestan. Names of individuals taking part not known except Lt. NISSEN. Fate of the parachutists unknown as no W/T contact was established. MT

26. Unternehmen 'NACHSCHUB'
RIGA' (originally called
'PETER') cicard

Took place around January 1945 and consisted in the reinforcement of a group of the 'LATVIJA' series already dropped in the Riga area which had reported by wireless. About five took part in this operation, which managed to contact the 'LATVIJA' group by W/T. However, the latter group had fallen into Russian hands and had been forced to send out false messages. The operation was therefore unsuccessful.

Cancelled.
P. K. D. PETERS
PT 604664 DE TONCE, 7a (13)

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27. Unternehmen 'NACHTIGALL' ^{N-T} The operation was planned during the summer of 1940 and took place during August 1941 under the direction of Abwehr II. The main task was to prevent the retreating Red Army sabotaging the Drohic oil district and also the Lemberg railway station. In the subsequent infantry action, the unit had very heavy losses, was soon withdrawn and disbanded on account of its insufficient equipment and training. The measure of success unknown. RAUPACH states that most of the subsequent leaders of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army were formed from 'Nachtigall' personnel.
28. Unternehmen 'PEEL' ^{N-T}
'LINDE' ^{N-T}
'BRENNESSEL' ^{N-T} Training for the operation 'LINDE' started during 1942 with F.A.K. 202 under Heeresgruppe Sued (Poltawa-Kharkov). Some twenty-five carefully chosen volunteers from the Kasach tribe (Caucasus) under a certain ~~IRANOW~~ were to be parachuted into their own country in order to foment armed resistance to the Russians. The operation was timed to synchronise with the German push to the Volys, but in fact was never carried out. In the autumn of 1943, the Kasachs were reinforced with other personnel and transferred to F.A.T. 255. Their leader IRANOW was promoted Lieutenant and ran the whole unit. At this time they were being trained in partisan warfare and getting practical experience. In early 1944 the unit received its own arm badge and flash. In February 1944, part of the unit, under IRANOW, was transferred to Sonderlager Luckenwalde for training for the future 'BRENNESSEL' operation. In summer 1944, the unit received the cover-name 'PEEL' and was then about 120 strong. After IRANOW left, the command passed to ~~Feldwebel TAPALOW~~ who was promoted Leutnant. Soon afterwards, the unit minus the 'BRENNESSEL' personnel was transferred to the Slovenian frontier area to fight the partisan bands. Here they remained for the rest of the war.
- The operation 'BRENNESSEL' was the continuation of the abandoned 'LINDE', under the control of Referat Ost. The group was actually dropped by parachute with IRANOW as leader, at the end of April/beginning of May at Emba on the Caspian - about 13 in number. The task was to make contact with the Basmatchen (rebel bands of Kasachs), foment insurrection and sabotage. It was not intended that they should return, but they took four W/T sets with them. No W/T contact was established

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and the fate of the personnel is unknown. Another operation was planned (BERGESSSEL II) to find out what happened but was never put into operation.

29. Unternehmen 'RODERICH I'

This was a White Ruthenian operation which was initiated in the White Ruthenian area from East Prussia by the White Ruthenian camp directed by Major GERULLIS. Time: late summer 1944. Radio contact was established but the operation was soon abandoned. Further White Ruthenian operations could not be started because of lack of aircraft.

30. Unternehmen 'SAJZEE'

A Leitstelle I Ost operation in the Kalmaeken Steppes west of Stalingrad in the summer of 1944. No further details known.

31. Unternehmen 'SCHANEL'

Training for this operation started in 1942. It was organized by Gruppe A of Abwehr Abteilung II under the direction of Lt. LANGE. The task was to foment insurrection in the Caucasus by the use of German and N. Caucasian paratroops. A further task was the sabotage of the oil wells in the district. Fierce resistance from Russian forces was encountered on landing and the Group continued to fight for about six weeks with the help of the local population. It was timed to synchronise with the intended advance of the German Army in this area, but as this did not take place, LANGE had to fight his way back to the German front-line, in which he was successful. It appears that there were technical defects in the airborne operations. When being parachuted, the group was widely scattered and the containers with W/T apparatus and arms were mostly broken or not found.

32. Unternehmen 'TAMARA I'
'TAMARA II'

Operations under the leadership of Oblt. KRALER (killed in 1944) and Lt. HAUFER (killed in 1945). They took place in about September 1942 under the control of Abwehr II and ?FAK 204. The task was to foment unrest in Georgia and the sabotage of the Manganese mines at Chiaturi. Personnel included Fdw. HERMANN, Uffz. BUCHHOLZ, a few other German other ranks, Georgian nationalists and volunteers from Russian p.o.w.s. Timed to synchronise with the proposed German crossing of the Caucasus. As this, however, did not materialise, the operation was unsuccessful and most of its personnel rounded up (this was subsequently learned from statements made by p.o.w.s).

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33. Unternehmen 'TRANSIT' MT
 The task was the equipment of Roumanian National Resistance groups with weapons, etc. and the hiding of arms and explosives in suitable districts (Roter-Turm Pass and the Predeal Pass) before the Soviet occupation of Roumania. Operations started in 1944. Plans were formulated directly under the head of Referat Sued-Ost, Oblt. FFRID, his adviser being a certain Major VERBECK. Personnel included a certain Lt. KOENIG(?) and German other ranks. After the entry of the Red Army, KOENIG returned. No further details known. A
H/T
34. Unternehmen 'VIERA' N.T.
 This was the cover name given to the Werewolf organisation set up in East Prussia in the autumn of 1944. GAMBKE and his chief Major NAUMANN were asked for advice in regard to the providing of W/T operators, W/T sets, materials (weapons and sabotage) and instructors. Hptm. KUTSCHKE was sent as instructor, and GAMBKE arranged the other matters with Mil E and Gruppe Technik. Luckenwalde was to be the assembly point.
35. Unternehmen 'WALDLAEUFER' MT
 This was an operation planned by S.S. Jagdverbaende in the summer of 1944. The task was the sabotage of a railway line in the Roumanian Carpathians. GAMBKE was called in to assist Hstuf. BESEKOW and Hptm. IRRMANN over questions of material, and on the composition of the party. The operation was, however, not carried out. A
H/T
36. Unternehmen 'WOLF 202' M
 This operation ended shortly after its inception in the summer or autumn of 1944 by being merged into the Unternehmen 'I. MOB TAG'. It was originally under the control of F.A.K. 202. The operation was directed against the Bryansk sector and its tasks were sabotage and sedition, amongst the local inhabitants. It reported by W/T. At the end of 1944, one of the 'AURORA' operations was placed by F.A.K. 203 in the same sector to reinforce and collaborate with 'WOLF 202'. The groups met but did not recognise each other and began shooting at what they thought were enemy partisan groups.
37. Unternehmen 'Z' H/T
 This was a propaganda stunt organised by the Z Staffel of F.A.K. 203 and consisted of the dropping by plane into Russian lines spurious editions of the Russian paper 'Pravda'. Similar actions were undertaken by several other F.A.K.s but no further details remembered.