Catalogue description PP/MCR/136 Ts. personal experience account, entitled "A Soldier's Yesterdays", of Brigadier G S Brunskill. 12 chapters.

Chapter 1 (17 pp). George Stephen Brunskill entered the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1910 as the King's Indian Cadet and he comments on his time there : "most of the training was as a young private soldier with no introduction to the duties of an officer." In 1911 he was commissioned and went out to India to join the 1st Battalion, King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment and the following year he was transferred to his Indian Regiment, the 47th Sikhs, who were stationed at Jullunder in the Punjab. Always an enthusiastic sportsman, Brunskill was able to play polo and to go on hunting expeditions to the hills in the hot weather season, but he also found time to learn Punjabi as well as Urdu. In August 1914 his Regiment mobilized as part of the Jullunder Brigade of the 3rd Lahore Division and they landed in France on 26 September. The 47th Sikhs went into the line near Laventie and Brunskill was awarded one of the first Military Crosses for his leadership of a night patrol. Carrying out another reconnaissance on 5 November, Brunskill lost an eye and he was not allowed to rejoin his Regiment until April 1915. Within weeks, however, his left leg was broken during the fighting at Wieltje in the Battle of Second Ypres, but fortunately clever surgery ensured that he was only slightly handicapped.

Chapter 2 (5 pp). After convalescing, Brunskill was employed in the Military Secretary's (India) Branch at the War Office, where he was responsible for the welfare of wounded Indian Army officers and for Indian Army officers' pay. The injustices which he found in both areas emphasized to him "... the need for the powers that be to be unremitting in their regard for the welfare of all ranks." This experience had a profound influence on Brunskill, and his concern for the welfare of the officers and men under his command or supervision is a recurring theme in his memoirs.

Chapter 3 (6 pp). In 1917 Brunskill was appointed DAAG on the Lines of Communication of the British Corps in Italy, which were under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Lawson, a very able officer. The Lines of Communication staff were responsible for the sustenance of the British troops in the forward area as well as behind the line and this confusion of command eventually led to friction between Lawson and Lord Cavan, the Corps Commander, and to Lawson's supercession. In 1920, because his health was unlikely to hold up in India, Brunskill was transferred to the British Army as a brevet major in the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

Chapter 4 (11 pp). From 1920 to 1924 Brunskill served as a Staff Captain in the Adjutant-General's Branch at the War Office, which was charged among other things with the reduction of Army manpower. Faced with a large surplus of officers and a lack of precise detail about them, the cuts proved to be "...a hurriedly devised scheme, with meagre financial compensation" for those who were axed. The Adjutant-General's Branch was also responsible for advising on the reorganisation of the post-war British Army and in particular of the infantry regiments. Brunskill notes that the chief difficulties were the consequences of the Cardwell system that had been introduced in the 1870's : the other ranks were obliged to spend 5-6 years in India living under indifferent conditions, while there were inadquate training facilities in the United Kingdom.

Chapter 5 (3 pp) Brunskill's next appointment was to the Staff College at Camberley for the two year staff course. He recalls that there was a pleasing camaraderie among the students, but adds that he never had occasion to work with any of these officers afterwards.

Chapter 6 (28 pp) In 1926 Brunskill began a twelve year spell in India, as a company commander in the 1st Battalion KSLI in 1926-7, as its second-in-command from 1931-4 and as its Commanding Officer from 1934-7. In the intervening years he was GSO 2 at Aden in 1927-8 and GSO 2 (Training) at Army HQ from 1928 to 1931. During his regimental service, the welfare of all those under his command was in the forefront of his mind, and his period in command of the Battalion enabled him to crystallize his ideas on the conditions of service in India for all ranks. He notes that "the ordinary private soldier had to survive between five and six years in India without any leave or any girlfriends", often in an unpleasant garrison town like Dinapore. To fill in their time and prevent indiscipline, Brunskill provided regular sports and vocational training and relied on regimental traditions to do the rest. He also appreciated that, as the pay of British officers in British regiments doing a tour of duty in India was lower than that of Indian Army officers, the former found India expensive and he therefore did his best to help the younger ones. He tried, too, to encourage more contact between his officers and the Indians, even though the latter were not allowed to be members of British clubs. From his time at Army HQ Brunskill concluded that, despite Chetwode's great ability, "we were in danger of training for the last war instead of the next" and that few Army officers could express themselves satisfactorily on paper. Because India gave him ample opportunity to indulge his love of riding sports and, as the officers and NCOs of his Battalion were first-class, Brunskill found his time in India and especially his command of the Battalion "... happy and satisfying."

Chapter 7 (18 pp) In 1937 Brunskill was appointed Colonel in charge of Administration in Palestine, a post which "... proved to be the most strenuous work of my career." There was at this time antagonism between the Army and the RAF, as the latter had taken over responsibility for the defence of some of Britain's overseas territories from the Army, but fortunately in Palestine Wavell, the GOC, and Sir Arthur Harris, the AOC, established good relations from the outset. The Jews, who were arriving in Palestine in growing numbers, and the Arabs, whose first rising had taken place in 1936, were not so easily reconciled, especially as Palestine was a country with few natural resources. The function of British internal security operations was to keep civil strife between these groups to a minimum and to appear impartial, although Brunskill at this time was somewhat pro-Arab. With the outbreak of war in 1939, the Arab revolt petered out and a number of Allied formations - the Australian Corps, the Yeomanry Division and the Polish Brigade - arrived in Palestine, from where they were destined to proceed to the Western Desert. Brunskill was also involved in the laying down of two important strategic roads, one from Haifa to Baghdad, the other from Jerusalem to Ismailia.

Chapter 8 (34 pp) In early 1941 Brunskill was appointed Brigadier in charge of Administration in Greece under General Sir H M "Jumbo" Wilson. On his arrival at GHQ in Athens, Brunskill found that the organization of the command was "unsatisfactory and complicated" and that there was some interference from the British Military Mission to the Greek Army. He correctly foresaw that the Germans would attack through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but few resources were available for either the Greek or British Armies and rail and road communications were limited and already under great pressure : there was, for instance, only one road from the British advanced base at Larissa to the likely fighting front at Aliakhmon. Furthermore, all railways, ports and shipping were under the complete control of the Greek Army GHQ and, by sheer bad luck, the blowing up of the amunition ship Clan Fraser in Piraeus harbour at the very outset of the German attack denied the Allies the use of the only major port in Greece. Despite all these complications, the British fighting formations were sufficiently mobile to withdraw in face of the German thrust and some plans, or at least ideas, for their evacuation already existed. Responsibility for the evacuation was vested in Admiral Baillie-Grohman and a special planning committee and they just about succeeded in extricating the troops during the period when there was no room : Brunskill himself was taken off from Nauplion by HMS Isis on the night of 26-27 April. After that date the evacuation did not proceed so smoothly, but Brunskill explains the peculiar difficulties faced by Brigadier Parrington at Kalamai in what was "a sad ending to the otherwise highly successful Operation Demon." The chapter is concluded with a summary of the lessons that can be learnt from the campaign.

Chapter 9 (42 pp) Soon after his arrival at Suda Bay, Brunskill was appointed Brigadier in charge of Administration in Crete under General Freyberg. He considers that the most important factors in planning the defence of the island were the peculiar nature of the terrain and its communications, the appreciation of Germany's command of the air and the Royal Navy's weaker control of the waters around Crete. Moreover, Freyberg had a very clear knowledge of the German plans for an assault on the island, but the disposition of troops in its defence was nonetheless difficult, mainly because there was an outside possibility of a seaborne landing, but also as there had been insufficient preparation of the island's defences since its occupation the previous November. In consequence, its defence would depend largely on the infantry firepower of some 30,000 men, many of whom had recently been evacuated from Greece. These men always had adequate ammunition, food and petrol and were fighting over land which they knew and had but one main objective : to deny the Germans the three airfields. At Heraklion Brigadier B H Chappel's force did this successfully up to the time of their evacuation and there was also an effective delaying action at Retimo, but at Canea the counter-attacks were delayed and Maleme airfield fell on the second day of the German attack and could not subsequently be recaptured. Brunskill believes that Crete should have been held : he argues that more emphasis should have been placed on the defence of Maleme and on rapid counter-attacks, and that the possibility of a seaborne landing should have been discounted.

Chapter 10 (10 pp) Following his successful evacuation from Crete, Brunskill proceeded home after a very pleasant detour to the United States, where the British troops were sympathetically received by the American press. On his return to the United Kingdom, he was appointed Brigadier in charge of Administration of 1st Corps and he at once set about improving the troops' living conditions and strengthening the anti-invasion defences. On the administrative side, he considered that the Army seemed ill-prepared for war.

Chapter 11 (24 pp) Brunskill was next asked to establish the Congo-Cairo supply route (later to be known as AFLOC) for stores which would be easy to transport. The chosen route was up the Congo river to Stanleyville, across to Juba, up the Nile to Khartoum and thence to Cairo - a total distance of 4489 miles of road, railway and river. Brunskill explains how much of the requisite equipment had to be ordered from the United States and how different problems had to be overcome along each section of the route. The Belgians in the Congo proved very helpful, but the Sudanese transportation services were apathetic, while checking of goods along the route to avoid pilfering was essential. In May 1943 Brunskill was ordered home as the Allies had reestablished their control in the Mediterranean and AFLOC was no longer of such importance. He feels that he had carried out his task successfully, but that his work had not been facilitated by the lack of coordinated effort in Africa.

Chapter 12 (3 pp) The writer's last appointment was as Brigadier in charge of Administration in Northern Ireland, a position which carried with it no hope of promotion or of getting to a fighting front. Brunskill therefore ended a "very happy Army career" of work, sport and adventure by retiring in 1945.